This piece was published in Mixed Migration Review on November 29, 2023.
When he was running for president, Joe Biden criticised Trump administration policies that returned asylum seekers to Mexico and, upon entering office, he issued an executive order promising to restore access to asylum at the US border and to address the root causes of migration from Central America.1 Policy changes followed suit over the next six months: the new administration established a process to allow people previously forced to wait in Mexico to pursue their asylum claims in the United States. It also ended safe third country agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and, in their stead, put forward a plan to promote economic development, the rule of law and human rights in those countries.2
But, by the summer of 2021, there was a marked shift. Large numbers of migrants and refugees from places other than the northern triangle of Central America made their way to the US-Mexico border, frequently after transiting the Darien Gap. From the fall of 2021 through the spring of 2022, the Biden administration deported and expelled—using a section of public health legislation known as Title 42 that the Trump administration invoked during the coronavirus pandemic—over twenty thousand Haitians.3 In early 2022, the Biden administration enrolled over 12,500 asylum seekers, mostly from Nicaragua but also from Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia and Ecuador, into its own version of a Remain in Mexico program.4 Further, the administration neglected to issue a regulation (called for in the executive order) specifying the circumstances under which a person should be considered a member of a “particular social group”—criteria crucial to the claims of many asylum seekers coming to the US border. In the summer of 2022, the administration convened a Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles. Discussions at the summit did not address the root causes of increased out-migration from countries of origin such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, whose leaders were not in attendance and whose interests are not aligned with those of the United States. Discussions on migration at the summit focused rather on how transit and host countries in the Americas with which the United States had better relations could do more to integrate migrants and refugees and crack down on smugglers.5 But, in the second half of 2022, US support for migration enforcement and “stabilization” in other countries in the region did not have much of an impact on the number of arrivals at the US border. The “border crisis” was kept politically ever-present for the Biden administration by the Republican governor of Texas, who regularly sent busses of asylum seekers to the vice president’s residence in Washington.6
A new approach
On January 5, 2023, President Biden gave his first speech about immigration to the United States.7 But his focus was much narrower: a new approach to “better manage” the situation at the southwest border, where Cubans, Nicaraguans, Venezuelans and Haitians made up an increasing percentage of arriving asylum seekers.
The president acknowledged that the “comprehensive” reform he proposed to Congress upon assuming office—which included the regularisation of undocumented immigrants and increasing the number of visas available—would not pass a newly-divided legislature. Indeed, the president accused lawmakers of not appropriating funding for an adequate number of asylum officers and judges to handle asylum claims at the border. But, even if Congress did appropriate funds for a sufficient number of adjudicators, and even if the adjudication of claims were speedy, most people from Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Haiti not granted asylum could not be removed from the US because of the conditions on the ground in their home countries and to the absence of readmission agreements with their governments. This is not the case for nationals from the northern triangle of Central America, who are rapidly and frequently deported to their home countries or returned to Mexico, by agreement with the Mexican government.
President Biden did not suggest any “root cause” strategy or foreign policies that might address out-migration from the four countries; he merely said that people from there were fleeing “oppressive dictators” and “gangs”. Unstated but implied was that the United States cannot influence the conditions that drive people to migrate from Cuba, Venezuela or Nicaragua through the use of economic investment, the promotion of anti-corruption efforts and the rule of law, or the provision of security support as it does elsewhere. Rather than adopting a root causes approach or arguing—as the Trump administration did—that building a wall on the US southern border was the answer, President Biden asserted that migration to the United States from the four repressive and failing countries—and indeed from all countries where opportunity and security were lacking—is inevitable. As he put it in his speech: “We can’t stop people from making the journey, but we can require them to come here…in an orderly way.”
The new approach focuses on diverting migrants away from smugglers and towards new pathways to ports of entry at the land border and at airports. President Biden did not detail what, under the new approach, would happen to those who crossed without authorisation, beyond saying they would be barred from future entry and subject to removal to Mexico, which newly agreed to accept returns of the four nationalities. The new approach also involves making most of those who cross the border without authorisation ineligible for asylum.
Carrots and sticks
Despite assertions to the contrary by both supporters and opponents, nothing about the “carrot and stick” approach is completely new.8
A regulatory stick
The “stick” is a regulation that went into effect on May 12, 2022, when the Title 42 policy ended.9 The regulation makes most migrants who have transited third countries without seeking refuge there and who cross the border between designated ports of entry ineligible for asylum. It is very similar to restrictions put in place by the Trump administration. Then, as now, the transit and entry bans have been challenged successfully in court as violations of US asylum law.10 This is because, under US law, asylum can be sought regardless of mode of entry and transit so long as asylum seekers are not firmly resettled in a transit country or that country has a bilateral “safe third country” agreement with the United States. In addition, as during the Trump administration, the Biden administration is putting migrants subject to the new regulation through speeded-up and telephonic screenings from within Border Patrol tents, which means that conditions are primitive and they have very limited access to counsel.11 Unlike during the Trump administration, adults traveling with children are not being put through this process but can be placed in a speeded-up non-detained version of screening under the regulation.12 With very few exceptions, everyone who crosses into the United States from Mexico other than at official ports of entry is ineligible for asylum and is instead screened to determine if they are eligible for a more limited, temporary form of protection after proving they are likely to be persecuted or tortured if removed from the United States. In short, under the regulation, asylum seekers are punished if they cross between ports.
The Biden administration has gone further than previous administrations in getting the Mexican government to accept Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans who are removed after unauthorised entry and are legally barred from coming back to the United States. Formerly, Mexico only agreed to be a migrant “waiting room” for future entry to the United States. Under the Trump and Biden administration versions of Remain in Mexico programmes, asylum seekers returned to Mexico had future appointments in US immigration courts. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had tried to meter or limit the processing of asylum through land border ports of entry via ad hoc waiting lists that were run differently at different ports. The Biden administration’s form of metering is more complicated and high tech: asylum seekers must make appointments to approach a port of entry via a smartphone app called CBP One.13 Some asylum seekers who simply walk up to ports of entry and ask for asylum are being processed by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, while others are not and are instead being told to wait or to get a CBP One appointment. Such turning away at ports of entry of asylum seekers because they lack CBP One appointments is, like previous turnback policies, being challenged in federal court.14 There have already been documented fatal consequences for some asylum seekers who have been turned away because they lacked a CBP One appointment.15 The policy has left many more asylum seekers stranded without provision for their basic needs just on the other side of the US border.
Queues as carrots
The “carrots”—which the administration calls “lawful pathways”—are various queues that different migrants are eligible to join as they wait for possible processing so that they can enter the United States through a port of entry.
New mobile app
CBP One is one of these queues. The Biden administration claims the use of the app has allowed the CBP to speed up processing through land border ports of people waiting in northern Mexico. The app can be used by people of any nationality—there are no passport or visa requirements or special eligibility criteria—but appointments can only be made within a geofenced area north of Mexico City. A particular number of appointments are available per day, depending on the port and are these allotted mostly randomly and selectively to those who have been registered the longest without getting an appointment.16 At the designated appointment time, the vast majority of migrants not deemed a security risk and with no record of criminal or immigration violations are granted two-year parole (temporary permission to remain in the United States), a notice to appear in immigration court where they can have their asylum claim considered, and the ability to immediately apply for work authorisation.
The other carrots are processing queues that fewer migrants are eligible to join from countries of origin or certain countries of transit. These pathways allow those eligible to enter the United States through airports rather than the land border.
Parole scheme for nationals of four countries
One such pathway, which the president referenced in his speech and which began in January 2023, is the CHNV parole programme.17 This allows supporters (i.e. sponsors) with legal status in the United States to apply online for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela to be considered for travel authorisation to the United States from their home countries or from countries of transit, with the exception of Panama or Mexico, if entered without authorisation after the start date of the programme. (The latter restriction is designed to deter migration through the Darien Gap and the southern border of Mexico). Applications submitted online are chosen for processing in part randomly and in part based on time since the application was filed. Department of Homeland Security officers remotely vet supporters for public safety and national security concerns and for their financial ability to support the parolee. Potential parolees must similarly pass public safety and security screening and must also have a valid passport. They are ineligible if they have been deported from the United States or crossed the US border unauthorised or were interdicted at sea, have refugee status or permanent residency in another country, or are a minor not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian. The programme allows up to 30,000 people each month to fly into US airports where they can be paroled into the United States. At airports upon arrival, CBP does additional vetting and registers biometric data. Those granted parole can remain in the United States for two years and apply for work authorisation. Because of a previous law applicable to Cubans and Haitians, parolees of only those two nationalities can apply to receive food and cash support, health insurance, and support with job placement.18 Only Cuban parolees can adjust to permanent status after one year; parolees of other nationalities must apply for asylum if they want to gain permanent status, unless they have a relative or employer who can sponsor them for a permanent visa.
The CHNV programme is larger than other parole programmes created in the last decade or two, and the Biden administration’s creation of new migration pathways to the United States marks a departure from the policies of the previous administration, which ended parole programmes, tried to terminate other discretionary and temporary statuses, and dramatically reduced refugee resettlement. The CHNV programme is also innovative in that it is mostly handled electronically: a supporter fills out an application online and, once it is reviewed, the potential parolee submits their information and received travel authorisation electronically. Unlike refugee resettlement, the process involves no in-person interviews by Department of Homeland Security personnel abroad. Officers assess whether an applicant’s parole is justified based upon “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Approval rates for parole are much higher than refugee status, which requires applicants to prove they have a well-founded fear of persecution based upon their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Unlike refugees, though, parolees, as already mentioned, are not accorded permanent status, but only temporary permission to stay in the United States. The Biden administration’s promised increase in refugee resettlement from the region is still mostly aspirational: as of July 2023, 715 refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean had arrived in the US in fiscal year 2023 (6 Cubans, 70 Hondurans, 36 Nicaraguans, 370 Guatemalans, 136 Salvadorans, 107 Venezuelans and 90 Colombians)19 But setting the target for resettlement at 15,000 refugees from the Americas region is an historical departure because, since 1980, the region has contributed fewer refugees to the US Refugee Admissions Program than any other.20
New family unification pathways
In the summer of 2023, the Biden administration announced new family unification parole pathways for Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Hondurans and Colombians with close US resident or US citizen relatives in the United States who have sponsored them for family-based permanent immigration visas. These programmes allow beneficiaries (typically older children and siblings of US citizens and spouses and children of permanent residents) to wait within the United States for their visas to become available.21 The United States has an annual cap on family based immigration visas so the wait for can last several years. The Biden administration assumes that some who are fed up with waiting travel to the United States border, so this new parole programme is expected reduce such irregular migration.
Safe Mobility Offices
On June 12, 2023, the Biden administration announced the opening of “Safe Mobility Offices” (SMOs) in Latin and Central America where certain people are screened for their eligibility for pathways to the United States.22 At the time of writing, SMOs had been set up in Colombia for the screening of Cubans, Haitians and Venezuelans who have a regular status or are in the process of regularisation in Colombia; in Costa Rica for the screening of Venezuelans and Nicaraguans; and in Guatemala for Guatemalan nationals.23 The US negotiated eligibility for screening by these offices bilaterally with the Colombian, Costa Rican and Guatemalan governments. Negotiations to set up a somewhat similar office in southern Mexico where Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan and Venezuelans would be screened were being held at the time of writing.24 The goal of these offices is not to “pull” new migrants to them but rather to screen migrants already in the country with the SMO as of the date of the start of the program so as to prevent them from turning to smugglers to travel irregularly from there to the US-Mexico border.25 Depending on how they answer initial screening questions, applicants are interviewed by IOM or UNHCR. UNHCR refers those who may be eligible for resettlement to US officials for refugee status determination. Those deemed not to qualify as refugees can also be considered for parole.
The Biden administration’s approach of bilateral and regional collaboration to prevent irregular migration through the use of legal pathways is an updated version of a strategy used by the United States in the 1990s to address irregular Vietnamese and Cuban migration.26 In the 1990s, US policy required irregular migrants to return to their home countries (Cuba and Vietnam) if they wanted to be considered for a resettlement or parole pathway to the United States. In 2023, the Biden administration’s pathways are accessible from home countries and from certain countries of transit, where the administration is also funding local integration (particularly in Colombia) and migration and border enforcement (particularly in Guatemala and Mexico) to prevent further movement northward over land.
Effects of the new approach
Researchers have found that many migrants at the US border do not understand the consequences of the new asylum regulation.27 The result is that it does not deter further unauthorized crossings—one of the chief aims of the new approach. Further, the stated assumption in the transit and entry regulation that people who cross irregularly are less likely to
have meritorious asylum claims28 is not being borne out in the statistics that show irregular crossers are passing their initial credibility screening.29 And so they are released to pursue their cases in immigration court, as will most people coming into the United States on parole without paths to permanent residency. Thus, two (hypothetical) Nicaraguans who had fled their country for the same reason would now be eligible for different forms of protection, and subject to different standards of proof in immigration court, if one crossed the border without authorisation and the other entered with a CBP One appointment.
Challenges with mobile app
The demand for CBP One appointments outstrips supply and the app’s high-tech format also limits its accessibility and has led to new forms of abuse. The “geofencing” aspect of the app that allows migrants and asylum seekers to make appointments only when in northern Mexico has led to scams involving the selling of fake appointments and the use of VPNs to apply for appointments further south. Mexican immigration authorities and bus companies have also taken advantage of the process by demanding payments of migrants with CBP One appointments who are trying to make their way north to the US border.
The app is accessible only on certain brands of phones, is available only in limited languages, and registration requires taking a live picture. The application frequently crashes, uses photo technology that has difficulty capturing Black faces, requires literacy and tech savvy and is inaccessible to those without access to the internet. Migrants and asylum seekers wait from a few weeks to a few months to get an appointment, frequently in dangerous and precarious conditions in northern Mexico where they lack access to shelter, services and employment. Some of the most vulnerable migrants in northern Mexico—such as families who speak indigenous languages—have been unable to access the app and so have desperately crossed the US border without authorisation, thereby becoming ineligible for asylum under the new regulation.
Mixed results for CHNV programme
By August 2023, over 1.5 million supporters had applied to sponsor beneficiaries through the CHNV program and over 200,000 parolees had arrived in the US through the program.30 The existence of the CHNV program since January 2023 has correlated with a reduced number of irregular crossings of the US-Mexican border by Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans. But there is significant variation in how the programme is working for the different nationalities.
Haitians have a large diaspora in the United States and had not been crossing the border without authorisation in significant numbers just before the CHNV programme began. Between January and August 2023, about 68,000 Haitians arrived in the United States through the CHNV programme, more than double the number of Nicaraguans paroled through it during the same period. The number of single adult Haitians encountered by CBP after crossing the border without authorisation in September 2022, three months before the CHNV programme started, was 116,31 and in April 2023, three months after the programme had gotten underway, was 117.32 Almost 60,000 Venezuelans had entered the US through the programme as of August 2023. The number of single adult Venezuelans encountered by CBP after crossing the border without authorisation declined dramatically at the beginning of the parole programme but began increasing in the spring of 2023. At the start of the programme, Venezuelans were stranded in transit countries and were subject to enforcement by Mexican authorities and pushbacks by Guatemalan authorities.33 As the wait time for approval for parole through the CHNV programme has increased with the growing number of applications, some applicants may have set off irregularly. Many Venezuelan migrants have never heard of the CHNV programme and lack the valid passports (and the means to procure them) or sponsors in the United States required for it. If processing through the SMOs in Colombia remains limited to those who arrived by June 2023, Venezuelans will continue migrating northward via the Darien Gap through which more migrants had passed in the first seven months of 2023 than the whole of 2022, itself a record year.34 Just as in 2022, so far this year more Venezuelans have transited the Darien Gap than migrants of any other nationality, undeterred by their ineligibility for the CHNV programme after unauthorised crossings into Panama.
Diverting asylum seekers onto parole pathways helps them after arrival in the United States in some ways but not others. Unlike asylum seekers, who must wait six months, parolees can immediately apply for work authorisation. But parole just pushes off adjudication of asylum claims; all but Cuban parolees remain uncertain as to what their status will be within two years of arrival. Most sponsors of CHNV parolees are extended family members (rather than churches, organisations, employers or strangers). Not all relatives are equally supportive after arrival, finding housing is particularly difficult, and, just like asylum seekers, Venezuelan and Nicaraguan parolees are ineligible for federal benefits that would help them integrate.
Unlike the “build the wall” approach of the Trump administration and the Illegal Migration Act passed by the UK’s Parliament in 2023,35 the Biden administration’s approach pairs restrictions on the asylum eligibility of those who migrate irregularly with substantial alternative pathways. The goal of the Biden administration is to reduce border crossings. Its strategy is not tied to particular foreign policy goals, does not clarify how to adjudicate certain common asylum claims from people in the region, nor does it address the causes of increased forced displacement or provide a long-term solution for parolees to the United States. The pathways the Biden administration has created are imprecise. They recognise that people migrating to the US border have mixed motives. But the reasons people migrate vary not only by country of origin, but also according to class and diaspora networks. The Biden administration’s nationality-based approach offers pathways to all people coming from very different contexts and with different resources. Pathways are not available to newly displaced migrants, the most vulnerable of migrants, or those most likely to migrate towards the border irregularly. And parole does not distinguish between people migrating in order to work, to unite with family, or to seek asylum, but rather lumps them together.
Requiring CHNV parolees to have valid passports and sponsors makes the programme more like an extension of some aspects of the US family-based immigration system than geared to those who are most vulnerable. In Haiti, procuring a passport to use the CHNV programme is difficult and has fuelled corruption and violence. Haitian parents in the United States would like to bring over their minor children through the CHNV programme but cannot because the children must travel with a parent or legal guardian to access it. Relatives and friends with whom a child was left in Haiti might, in their desperation to leave, find CHNV sponsors of their own and leave the children behind.
The SMOs and CBP One are not currently set up to stop irregular migration. Eligibility for access to the SMOs in Colombia favours putting on pathways to the US migrants who have more stability in Colombia than new arrivals, who will keep migrating. There are no pathways at SMOs for people from Ecuador, where rising violence is fuelling outmigration.36 Though the Biden administration has made additional temporary guest worker visas available specifically to Guatemalans and Haitians, SMOs are not currently linking potential migrants to these visas (which require a job offer from a US employer) nor to Canadian foreign labour programs.37 Recognizing that CBP One is drawing people to northern Mexico, some officers at ports of entry are choosing to deny parole to those who do not fear returning to their home country or who managed to enter or travel through Mexico by paying bribes or using smugglers or organized crime actors. CBP also frequently updates the CBP One app in a bid to thwart the use of VPNs to circumvent geofencing limitations. Mexican bus companies are also increasingly refusing to sell bus tickets to migrants heading north. There has been no effort to assess whether enforcement and barriers to migration through Mexico alone account for most reduction in U.S. border crossings.
To be effective in managing migration and to serve as models for use elsewhere, pathways to the United States need to be refined so that they serve both more and fewer people—more people with particular needs that don’t currently have a pathway (like those displaced by the impacts of climate change) and fewer people who wouldn’t have otherwise migrated (like those who just happen to know someone willing to sponsor them in the United States). Migrants will wait in queues, but not if they are in extreme danger, if they lack information about (or lose hope in) the process, or if the queue is simply too long or if eligibility is limited in important ways. Paths for the most vulnerable must be faster and should not penalise those unable to wait. Nevertheless, the US is making an effort to stop irregular, mixed migration early on, and to some extent replace it with legal pathways. This is also what Europe wants—or at least claims to want—to do, but there’s a chance that through this programme the US is coming up with alternatives, some of them quite progressive. But it is complicated, as we have seen, and it is too early to judge how successful these policies are or will be, although experience cautions us to be circumspect.
In conclusion, this essay has aimed to assess the impact of the current ‘carrot and stick’ approach of the Biden administration, which combines well tried and innovative policies. The United States continues to be a destination for migrants and refugees from the Americas and beyond, where forced displacement and outmigration are increasing. Whether the government is led by Republicans or Democrats the management of mixed migration on such a large and continuous scale will continue to test policy-makers.
 The White House (2021) Executive Order on Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration… and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Border.
 Blinken, A. (2021) Suspending and Terminating the Asylum Cooperative Agreements with the Governments El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; National Security Council (2021) US Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration from Central America.
 Isacson, A. (2022) A Tragic milestone: 20,000th migrant deported to Haiti since Biden Inauguration.Washington Office on Latin America.
 Department of Homeland Security (2023) Migrant Protection Protocols Cohort—December 2022.
 Edelman, A. (2022) Migrants from Texas dropped off outside VP Harris’ home on freezing Christmas Eve. NBC News
 The White House (2023) Remarks by President Biden on Border Security and Enforcement.
 Selee, A. (2023) The Border Crisis That Wasn’t: Washington Has Found a Formula for Managing Migration—and Now Must Build on It. Foreign Affairs; America First Legal (2023) America First Legal & Texas File For Emergency Injunction To Block Biden’s Most Extreme Open Borders Decree In Lawsuit Joined by Twenty States.
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al (2023) Circumvention of Lawful Pathways.
 National Immigrant Justice Center (2023) East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden.
 Erfani, A. (2023) Explainer: Biden Administration Plans For Rapid Deportation Of Asylum Seekers Detained At The Border. National Immigrant Justice Center.
 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (2023 ) Statement regarding the Family Expedited Removal Management Program.
 Customs and Border Protection (2023) CBP One™ Mobile Application.
 Center for Constitutional Rights (2023) Groups Sue Over Government Turnbacks of Asylum Seekers.
 Lind, D. (2023) CBP’s Continued ‘Turnbacks’ Are Sending Asylum Seekers Back to Lethal Danger. American Immigration Council.
 Customs and Border Protection (2023) CBP One™ Appointments Increased to 1,450 Per Day.
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (2023) Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans.
 Office of Refugee Resettlement (n.d.) Factsheet: Benefits for Cuban and Haitian Entrants.
 Refugee Processing Center (2023) Refugee Admissions Report as of July 31, 2023.
 Refugee Processing Center (2022) Refugee Admissions by Region Fiscal Year 1975 through September 30, 2022.
 Department of Homeland Security (2023) DHS Announces Family Reunification Parole Processes for Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
 Movilidad Segura (n.d.) General information on the ‘Safe Mobility’ initiative.
 ACNUR/IOM (2023) Safe Mobility Initiative.
 US Department of State (2023) Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Mexican Foreign Secretary Alicia Bárcena at a Joint Press Availability.
 US Department of State (2023) Conferencia de prensa virtual con Blas Núñez-Neto, subsecretario de Política Fronteriza e Inmigración en el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional y Marta Youth, subsecretaria de Estado Interina de la Oficina de Población, Refugiados y Migración.
 Schacher, Y (2023) Expert Declaration in Texas et. al. v. Biden et. al., Civil Action No. 6:23-CV-00007. US District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
 Human Rights First (2023) At Two Months, Biden’s Asylum Ban Threatens Lives.
 As the explanation for the rule states: “The proposed lawful pathways condition is expected to increase asylum processing efficiency by increasing to some degree the percentage of meritorious asylum claims that are considered. It rests in part on the understanding … that those who would circumvent orderly procedures and forgo readily available options may be less likely to have a well-founded fear of persecution than those individuals who do avail themselves of an available lawful opportunity.” Department of Homeland Security and Executive Office of Immigration Review (February 23, 2023). Proposed Rule—Circumvention of Legal Pathways. 8 Federal Register 11737.
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. July and August 2023. Congressional Semi-Monthly Report Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Receipts and Decisions.
 Montoya-Galvez, Camilo (August 24, 2023) Biden policy that has allowed 200,000 migrants to enter the US faces key legal test. CBS News.
 US Department of Justice (October 18, 2022). Defendants’ monthly report for the month of September pursuant to the court’s preliminary injunction. Louisiana et. al. v. CDC et. al., Civil Action No. 6:22-CV-00885-RRS-CBW. US District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
 US Department of Justice (May 16, 2023). Defendants’ monthly report for the month of April 2023 pursuant to the court’s preliminary injunction. Louisiana et. al. v. CDC et. al., Civil Action No. 6:22-CV-00885-RRS-CBW. US District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
 Schmidtke, Rachel (October 31, 2022). Pushbacks of Venezuelans on the Guatemalan Border. Refugees International.
 Suarez, Karol and Tara John (2023) Number of people crossing Darien Gap hits new record, officials say. CNN.
 See “Normalising the extreme” on page 22 of this review
 Loza León, C. (2023) Ecuador’s rapid descent from regional haven to gang-ridden cauldron of fear. The New Humanitarian.