The Refugee Convention in the 21st Century – Myths and Facts

The United States government is proposing to “jump-start a new international conversation on protection and asylum, with the aim of tangible reforms to the international protection regime.” However, the U.S. reform proposals fundamentally mischaracterize the Refugee Convention and its relationship to state sovereignty. The Refugee Convention does not do or say the things the U.S. government is proposing to change. As detailed below, enacting changes suggested by the U.S. would in fact restrict sovereign law and policymaking; weaken global burden-sharing; and ultimately increase harm for refugees. 

Myth One: The Refugee Convention undermines sovereignty.

The Refugee Convention commits states not to return displaced people within their borders to harm (non-refoulement) but does not dictate how or where countries process asylum claims or conduct removals after fair procedures. The Convention does not shift asylum processing authority from states to international institutions (though they may opt to do so); rather it looks to states to apply Convention commitments within their own legal systems. The Convention also builds in safeguards for governments: people who committed serious crimes are not covered by its provisions and refugees who pose a genuine security threat can be subject to removal with due process.  States retain wide sovereign discretion on institutions, timelines, evidentiary standards, and post-denial outcomes, provided they do not return at-risk people to persecution.

Myth Two: The Convention must be revised to make asylum temporary.

The Refugee Convention does not require permanent asylum – it leaves this to each country’s law and policy. It does commit states to grant refugees rights and access to courts, schools and work. It also encourages states to “as far as possible” facilitate integration and naturalization (Art. 34). In the U.S. it is federal law—not the Convention—that enables resettled refugees and people granted asylum to apply for permanent residency after one year to support effective integration. Refugee integration has major benefits for host countries: research shows that integrated refugees contribute more to the U.S. economy than they receive in benefits; OECD, World Bank and EU studies show similar gains in other countries. Integration and naturalization also do not foreclose safe return to home countries.

Myth Three: The Refugee Convention must be revised to require asylum seekers to stay in the first country they reach.

The Convention does not give asylum seekers a right to immigrate to a specific country. In fact, three quarters of the world’s refugees remain close to their country of origin in low- and middle-income neighboring countries.  What the Convention does call for is responsibility sharing. Its preamble recognizes that “certain countries” will shoulder “unduly heavy” asylum burdens and that others should help—through financing, resettlement, and practical cooperation. Rigid “first country” rules ignore this logic. They shift costs disproportionately to frontline hosts, strain weak systems, and erode incentives for cooperation upstream. They turn proximity into obligation, even as wealthier states reduce aid or close lawful resettlement pathways. The U.S. reforms would lock in these imbalances, placing even a greater share of responsibility on frontline host countries. These moves come just as the United States is slashing humanitarian aid and resettlement opportunities for refugee populations in these same countries. 

Myth Four: The Refugee Convention is an outdated relic of the mid-20th century. 

The Convention’s continued relevance has been reinforced consistently over the years: the United States (and other countries) endorsed non-refoulement by acceding to the 1967 Protocol; the U.S. Congress codified it in 1980 (against the backdrop of the Vietnam boatlift); and reaffirmed individualized screening for asylum seekers at the border in 1996. Those choices were not historical accidents; they reflect a hard-learned lesson that mass pushbacks fuel abuse, instability, and repeat, unsafe migration.  Non-refoulement is the Convention’s core safeguard for refugees: countries commit not to send people to places where their life or freedom is at risk. Policies that sidestep those assessments or declare countries “safe” despite credible risk will simply return refugees to harm and invite large scale rights violations—especially for members of minorities or social groups. Refoulement does not deter movement – it leads to persecution of those returned, or leaves them desperate to migrate again to safety. Upholding non-refoulement is a legal duty, an ethical imperative, and a practical tool to preserve orderly management of displacement.

Myth Five: Weakening the Convention will help states manage migration.

Watering down the Refugee Convention solves nothing and will not stop people from fleeing persecution to seek safety. Today’s major drivers of migration—conflict, state failure, climate impacts, economic shocks—will not abate because a treaty is weakened. If anything, today’s landscape requires expanding and modernizing cooperation to manage forms of forced displacement not covered by the Refugee Convention. The Convention exists to give states a framework for consistent cooperation and approaches, tailored within the context of each state’s respective sovereign policymaking.  Weakening this would undermine predictability and invite unilateral moves that shift even greater burdens onto frontline states.