Dangerous Territory: A Deepening Humanitarian Emergency in Northern Mozambique

Executive Summary

A spike in insurgent attacks in northern Mozambique is driving a growing humanitarian and displacement crisis, even as donors and security forces are withdrawing. The result is a boiling crisis that threatens to create a hotbed for expanding extremism and spread displacement and humanitarian suffering across the region. More than 70,000 people have been displaced since the latest outbreak of violence in February 2024, bringing the total number of people displaced by the insurgency to some 1 million. The attacks, led by ISIS-affiliated armed groups, are brutal, including beheadings, abductions, sexual violence, burnings, and beatings. A combination of security forces, including Mozambican troops, Rwandan troops, and South African Development Community (SADC) troops, have offered some protection of civilians, but are struggling to contain the latest spate of attacks. 

But the situation may be on the brink of becoming much worse. SADC troops are set to leave by the end of July 2024, with South Africa and Tanzania extending their mission until the end of 2024 and Rwanda sending an extra 2,000 troops in a bilateral agreement with the government of Mozambique. Internally displaced people (IDPs) fleeing the new attacks – some of whom have been displaced multiple times – are struggling to survive and have limited access to humanitarian aid. As these forces leave, civilians in Mozambique’s north will likely find themselves in an even more precarious situation. To prevent these outcomes, the government of Mozambique must work with partners to fill the impending security void. Mozambique’s leaders must also overcome misguided failures to publicly recognize the situation as a humanitarian crisis and give the emergency the sense of urgency it needs to catalyze the United States and other international donors to respond to the growing humanitarian gap.

The recent attacks have increased humanitarian needs. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recently petitioned donors for another $413 million in emergency assistance for some 2.3 million people in Cabo Delgado and neighboring Nampula province. In March 2024, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) indicated that nearly 90 percent of those who are displaced are women—many pregnant—people with disabilities, or the elderly. More than half of the newly displaced are children. Many IDPs in the region face daily uncertainty over security conditions, local discrimination, and lack the most basic of items, including soap, food, clean water, sanitation, and health services. Few have been able to find work to support themselves, and many children have no access to education. Many have also been separated from family members when they fled with just the clothes on their backs. 

The government of Mozambique has been reluctant to recognize and address the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the north. Since the end of the country’s civil war in 1992, international actors have typically considered Mozambique a country ripe for development. Unlike Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or other states that regularly have displacement crises, Mozambique has been a hub for development investment and wider anti-poverty work. In fact, the government of Mozambique is still resistant to portray the north as being in crisis, in part because it does not want to appear to lack control, and also because of a long history of neglecting the region. As one humanitarian worker told Refugees International during a recent trip, “The government does not want this to be seen as a humanitarian problem.” This posture is limiting the ability to adequately scale the humanitarian response.

In addition to the security threats, northern Mozambique also faces mounting effects of climate change, which compound the needs of displaced people. Many vulnerable populations and IDPs live along the coast in low-lying areas, where they are at risk of cyclones and floods from other storms. They are more likely to be in tents and makeshift shelters, or buildings that owners could not afford to rebuild after storms

Moreover, chronic underfunding means that relatively little aid is reaching people. UNHCR’s $49 million requirement was only 17 percent funded as of March 2024, and the wider Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was only 14 percent funded as of March 2024. Without immediate steps to ensure the safety and security of IDPs and an increase in humanitarian funding, northern Mozambique’s population – and IDPs in particular – could face a wider humanitarian and security crisis. The international community must also reckon with a painful reality: Mozambique is a reminder that the world’s failures to sustain investments in peace produce humanitarian fallout and widespread displacement.


To the government of Mozambique:

  • Declare a humanitarian emergency in Cabo Delgado, led by the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGD), and develop a response plan across national and subnational levels of the government. This includes appealing for emergency funding, promoting access to external monitoring and humanitarian intervention, and scaling up resources and attention to the region to prevent further crisis among an already traumatized population. Mozambique should draw across sectors in government – from health, to education and labor – to respond to the needs of IDPs.
  • Create a branch of the INGD to focus on conflict-related displacement. While the INGD has shown leadership and taken strides in its response to climate-related displacement, the office needs more training on how to respond to IDPs fleeing a security crisis.
  • Accelerate the implementation of the Kampala Convention – a regional tool that lays out the rights of IDPs and a state’s obligations before, during, and after displacement. This should be done in partnership with UN and international experts on human rights of IDPs. In particular, the INGD should facilitate the implementation of the Kampala Convention at the sub-national level by ensuring that IDPs are aware of their rights through training and dissemination.
  • Establish local IDP councils – akin to those in Ukraine – to help with planning, coordination, and logistics in humanitarian and IDP-specific responses.  These should comprise diverse IDP leaders and organizations who can interface regularly with government officials at local and regional levels, and can build on community consultations that are already carried out by the protection cluster.

To donors, development actors, and international aid actors, including the UN and international NGOs:

  • International donors and security partners should ensure that Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania are resourced to maintain temporary troop presences to prevent further destabilization of northern Mozambique following the withdrawal of SADC forces. Over the longer term, these actors should work with the government of Mozambique to devise a comprehensive and long-term stabilization strategy for Cabo Delgado. One option to explore would be the deployment of an African Union peace and security mission with UN support under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 2719, which would provide funding for African Union-led missions.
  • Prioritize work with local partners to identify humanitarian shortfalls and gaps that need to be addressed. Funding and building partnerships with local groups will help to improve access, quality, and reach of humanitarian aid. Local groups could lead on a range of tasks, including, for example – but not limited to – registration, food distribution, health screenings, shelter, and mental health.
  • Increase coordination and information-sharing about programs and activities that relate to displaced people with development and financing actors, such as the World Bank. As many aid workers said they had little familiarity with World Bank projects, this will help actors better sync their programs and efforts.
  • Construct information-sharing platforms where displaced people can access up-to-date security information to make more informed decisions about return, further movements, livelihood activities, efforts to find family members, and wider safety conditions.
  • Provide training for the INGD and local authorities on IDP protection specific to the violence, given that Mozambique has less experience in conflict-related humanitarian emergency response.
  • Invest in gender-specific programming, including access to hygiene kits, mental health services, women safe spaces, child safe spaces and other services. Programs should be available for all women and girls, including survivors of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV). For young women in particular, facilitate education catch up and for teen parents, assist in childcare options. 
  • Invest in one-stop-shop models, which have demonstrated success in helping IDPs with acquiring essential documentation, such as birth certificates. The World Bank’s model in Mozambique, for example, allows people to obtain a birth certificate and national identity card at the same location at the same time.
  • Invest in livelihood programming and vocational training among displaced groups and affected communities, and scale up accordingly at the outset of displacement.

Research Methodology

In March 2024, Refugees International visited Mozambique as part of its Bosch Stiftung-funded work on internal displacement. The Refugees International team spoke with a range of stakeholders, including IDPs, civil society and local groups, local and international NGOs, the United Nations, donors, and government officials. In addition to this report, which focuses on displacement due to conflict in northern Mozambique, a brief on climate-related displacement in central Mozambique will be forthcoming.

Context and Background

Since 2017, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province has seen attacks by jihadist insurgents. Referred to as al-Shabaab (unrelated to al-Shabaab in Somalia), the group is linked to the Islamic State, and has drawn fighters from Tanzania, Kenya, and other parts of the region. However, most fighters are young Mozambican men who are poor and disenfranchised. Scholars note, “The conflict has ebbed and flowed over time, and the situation is extremely fluid. Nevertheless, the level of violence perpetrated by the insurgents has been consistently extreme…. (Feijó 2021).” 

The growth of extremism is tied to a number of factors, ranging from the influx of radical Islamic teachings from neighboring states, deprived youth, and long-standing power imbalances, laid bare in the struggle to profit from newly discovered liquified natural gas off the coast of Pemba. Some 4,000 people have been killed since 2017, and approximately 1 million people have been forced to flee. The majority (80 percent) of those affected by terrorist threats in Mozambique are small-scale farmers who rely on agriculture for their livelihoods.

Mozambique was slow in its response to the crisis in the north, which began to fester in 2017. However, in 2020, the government shifted its approach and changed its rhetoric from one that considered the group internal criminals, to one that is linked to the threat of international Islamic terrorism. The government petitioned Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for troops and other forms of military assistance.1 In response, regional governments deployed around 3,000 in combined forces, which helped to re-establish relative stability in some areas affected by the conflict. By 2023, this multinational force allowed some commerce to resume and for IDPs to return home. Aid actors were also to expand programming as security conditions improved. As of late 2023, UNHCR estimated that some 571,468 people had returned to their areas of origin.

Unfortunately, attacks began to rise again in December 2023, which led to new rounds of displacement. Some 100,000 people have fled over the last six months. For many, it is not their first time being displaced. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that 41 percent of IDPs were displaced once; 24 percent twice, and 35 percent more than three times. IDPs who spoke to Refugees International described difficult journeys – some in dangerous boats in the middle of the night, others walking through dense bush for days on end. “We had to run away in the middle of the night,” one man told Refugees International. Nearly all mentioned family separation, and many were still unsure of where some of those family members were. Many fled with only the clothes on their backs, leaving behind important documentation and other precious belongings. These new arrivals join IDPs who fled years ago, deepening the humanitarian need in areas that are ill-equipped to receive new displaced people.

Even amid the increase in attacks and violence, the SADC mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) has begun withdrawing its forces in the region. This is in part due to a lack of sustainable funding for troop deployment. While member states have contributed funds, the mission was never fully resourced, and funding fell far short of the mission’s budget. Troops could not realistically be expected to bring stability to northern Mozambique on a shoe-string budget. The troops are scheduled to fully pull out of the country in July 2024, and the peacebuilding program that SAMIM introduced will exit with it. 

The departure of SADC troops will likely result in a security vacuum that further increases risk to civilians and deteriorates the environment in which aid agencies operate. As one humanitarian worker put it: “brace yourself for July.” Insurgents have already taken advantage of the draw down by recently attacking the strategic town of Macomia. Without security guarantees, those engaged in humanitarian action may struggle to carry out new programming. 

In April 2024, Rwanda announced that it would deploy an additional 2,000 troops to help fill the gap created by the SADC drawdown. In addition, South Africa has recently decided to maintain a bilateral residual force in Cabo Delgado until the end of the year. Finally, Tanzania has deployed a small troop presence in the north of Mozambique to quell any cross-border recruitment. The EU has made €40 million available to support non-lethal equipment and airlift for Rwanda’s deployment, but more support will likely be required. For its part, South Africa has indicated that it will need some $50 million to maintain its presence. International donors and security partners will need to step in to help cover some of the costs to avoid a precipitous pullout. 

Despite these efforts to backfill ahead of the withdrawal of SADC forces, the security situation remains precarious. Existing aid programs and projects are at risk of being destroyed or halted indefinitely. In addition, aid actors have also had to scale back and, in some cases, pull out of areas deemed too dangerous. One humanitarian worker said “we have to learn to live with the attacks,” signaling little hope that fighting will subside anytime soon. Attacks are difficult to predict. Interviews with aid workers, civilians, IDPs, and local actors revealed difficulty in getting clear and up-to-date information on security conditions, making any attempts at solutions more difficult.

Prior to the insurgency in the conflict in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique had generally been considered by the international community to be a relatively stable state able to manage natural disasters. This is starting to change. In recent years, devastating cyclones have increased in frequency and intensity, in large part due to climate change.2 These disasters have taken lives, displaced hundreds of thousands, destroyed livelihoods, and pushed people into poverty. They will surely exacerbate the challenges facing displaced and host communities in under-development provinces like Cabo Delgado. For example, the World Bank estimates that the effects of climate change could push some 1.6 million people in Mozambique into poverty by 2050. In a country where 18 million people are already living in poverty, this would have a profound effect. In addition, other parts of the country may also begin to feel the effects of the violence as displaced people flee further afield into provinces like Nampula.

A Building Humanitarian Crisis

IDPs Struggle to Feed their Families

Jihadist attacks have forced people to flee their homes to the relative safety of IDP sites in other parts of Cabo Delgado. But the situation changes regularly and safety is elusive. Chronic poverty, climate shocks, and limited aid and livelihood opportunities put them at risk in other ways. Even before displacement, much of Cabo Delgado was poor and underdeveloped. Many of the region’s displaced people, including farmers and fishers, have faced food insecurity in recent years. 

In 2019, Cyclone Kenneth hit Cabo Delgado, ravaging the region. It was the strongest storm on record to hit Africa, and it caused floods and landslides, and wreaked havoc on infrastructure and entire villages. It hit just before the harvest season, and destroyed much of the crop yield, as well as fishing boats and equipment. This year’s El Niño cycle, which according to the World Meteorological Organization is one of the five strongest ever recorded, is already negatively affecting the harvest and has driven up prices compared to this time last year. The World Food Program has also had to limit or discontinue some of its food assistance amidst an increase in global prices and donor cuts.

Against this backdrop, many IDPs find little to no food assistance after arriving at IDP settlements. In Chiure district, newly arrived IDPs told Refugees International that they had no idea where their next meal was coming from, and were not sure how they would fend for their families. One woman said, “…last year I had rice and beans. This year I don’t have anything. I have no land to cultivate.”

Aid agencies would like to increase livelihood programming so people can support themselves and feed their families. However, they lack the resources and consistent access to IDP sites. Moreover, many IDPs have traveled long distances, and may not be well-equipped to become self-reliant in their new communities without livelihood support. Refugees International met with a number of IDPs from fishing communities who were now expected to support themselves by farming. One interviewee recounted an IDP receiving donated seeds and saying: “What should I do with these? The sea is my farm.” ODI’s recent study noted a similar challenge, finding that aid has not always focused on livelihoods that are relevant to IDPs, which “explains why IDPs travel back for several weeks at a time to the familiar coastal areas they had fled…” During flight, many people also left behind important assets, such as cooking pots, telephones, chickens, goats, money, seeds, hoes, fishing nets, and documentation, all of which can make it difficult for people to support themselves and feed their families. Efforts to assist displaced populations – both new arrivals and long-term IDPs – thus require tailored sustained solutions.

A Lack of Services and a Need for Documentation

It is difficult to predict the pattern of Islamic State attacks and the resulting displacement. As a result, IDPs are arriving in towns and villages that are not well-equipped to receive them. Many IDPs walk for days or even weeks, finding themselves in settlements where – if they are lucky – they are able to register with local authorities and receive some support from local or international groups. Most, however, have found little support and find themselves in settlements that are ad hoc and lacking in services in almost every way. Refugees International met with IDPs in Chiure who, besides the tent or tarp over their heads, had almost no belongings. People had arrived with almost nothing but the clothes on their backs.

In some cases, IDPs are also not officially registered, meaning they may not be able to access assistance. In response, programs like the World Bank’s Northern Crisis Recovery Project fund one-stop-shops where people can obtain new birth certificates and a national identity card at the same location. This solves the critical issue of obtaining documentation, which is essential to obtaining services and assistance. Indeed, many IDPs left important documents – such as birth certificates, marriage licenses, national identity cards, or employment skills certifications – behind when fleeing. Or a new baby may have been born during displacement, and the family needs to obtain a birth certificate. 

Waves of displacements are creating tensions with local communities that are receiving IDPs – in some cases, thousands overnight, without warning. Moreover, while attention tends to be given to settlements and camp-like sites, research indicates that most IDPs – some 70 percent – stay in borrowed rooms of family members or retained houses, with some hosting as many as 20 families. These additional pressures on host families strain public services, as well, such as health and education. Aid actors emphasized that programs must be designed and developed in a way that benefits both host communities and IDPs, with the aim of minimizing any tensions between the two groups. In addition to alleviating existing tensions, this may allow for a quicker and more deliberate response from actors involved should new IDPs arrive. While it is difficult to predict where new influxes will occur, some towns and cities can make preparations, including planning for settlements and shelter locations and bolstering existing education and health facilities for existing populations. Regrettably, as one aid worker noted, there is “very little appetite to fund preventable measures.”  

Women and Girls

In regions ensnared by conflict, women and girls face increased challenges and risks to their safety. Refugees International spoke to a group of young teenage mothers in Chiure, Cabo Delgado, who emphasized a range of issues, including lack of education. The conflict interrupted primary and secondary school for these displaced girls. They have had few opportunities to return to school or to pick up where they left off in their new host community. Some indicated that they had been out of school for four years, and it was unclear how they would ever make up for those lost years. And even if they were able to enroll in school, most host communities also lack adequate educational infrastructure. The entire province struggles to provide even sufficient primary education for the wider population, and Cabo Delgado does not have a single university. 

Some of the displaced girls that Refugees International met with in Chiure were now pregnant, or had infants or young children, making them feel even further removed from the prospect of returning to school. This reflects a stark reality: Cabo Delgado has the highest adolescent pregnancy rate in the country: 55 percent. Indeed, high rates of teenage pregnancies are common among girls who are unable to access education. Beyond a limited access to education, girls spoke of not having basic health kits or dignity kits, “We don’t have any soap. We can’t wash ourselves,” one teenage girl told Refugees International.  

This, in turn, makes it more difficult for them to find stable jobs and become financially independent. As a result, they remain trapped in poverty. This situation not only affects individual women but also poses significant challenges to the overall economic development of the country. By limiting the educational and economic opportunities of its female population, the nation’s progress is hindered, perpetuating a cycle of socio-economic marginalization that impacts the wider population. 

Furthermore, the toll of conflict has led to the loss of male breadwinners within households, leaving women and girls to shoulder the burden of financial responsibility. With governmental services failing to reach those in need, a significant number are left with no choice but to resort to transactional sex in exchange for the basic necessities needed for survival. This is a grim reality that further entrenches their exposure to exploitation and abuse.

Many displaced women and girls fear returning home due to ongoing conflict, citing the persistent threat of violence and insecurity. However, amidst these challenges, progress has been made in raising awareness about women and girls’ rights. Local leaders and humanitarian organizations have collaborated to combat early marriages and promote gender equality. Notwithstanding some successful awareness raising, humanitarian actors and the government of Mozambique need to do much more to practically improve the lives and safety for displaced women and girls. They need additional support, including resources to continue schooling, safe spaces, and access to mental health services.

Coordination, Framing and Scaling Up

Aid actors interviewed emphasized that coordination amongst aid actors and the government needs to be improved to alleviate the burdens facing displaced communities. A range of actors are operating throughout the region, and clusters are meeting regularly. However, discrepancies between government data and that provided by the humanitarian cluster system make it difficult to craft a cohesive strategy. Additionally, the government’s reluctance to frame the situation as an emergency limits the ability of aid agencies to appeal for humanitarian funding. Several aid actors told Refugees International that the government wants a “development intervention.” For example, in Cabo Delgado’s Montepuez district, local administrators are highlighting that their challenges are development-induced. However, this development framework makes it difficult to plan for and finance humanitarian needs. As a result, Cabo Delgado has been left without a clear policy, and a split approach to programming and funding.

UNHCR leads efforts to strengthen protection mechanisms, collaborating with the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGD) to address gender-based violence and conflict-related challenges. However, a range of aid actors emphasized that the INGD has traditionally focused on displacement from natural disasters, and there was considerable need to scale up its capacity, funding, and skill set to respond to conflict-related crises. Additional training and capacity-building by donors, the UN and other aid groups with protection expertise will help the INGD lead and coordinate the response in Cabo Delgado. The INGD should also create a new division, which focuses on humanitarian crises resulting from conflict. This would involve a greater focus on rights and protection concerns that may differ from disaster-oriented humanitarian response.

Chronic underfunding of the humanitarian response in Cabo Delgado also limits coordination and protection activities. Indeed, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HNRP) in Mozambique remains at a meager 14 percent despite escalating displacement needs. Underfunding is happening across the world, but is particularly pronounced among protracted conflicts in Africa, and reflects a broader disparity in global humanitarian priorities.

Overall, addressing these multifaceted challenges requires a stronger collaboration between governmental and humanitarian actors, and a concerted effort to enhance implementation capacity, foster community ownership, secure adequate funding, and improve data coordination. This can be done through expert consultations and technical assistance, centralizing data, and establishing standard operating mechanisms. This will allow for all actors to provide and access the necessary data that will help guide programming. Only through such comprehensive measures can the humanitarian response effectively meet the evolving needs of conflict-affected populations in Mozambique.

A Clear Opportunity: Support Local Groups and IDP-led Organizations

A clear opportunity for progress lies in shifting power and resources to local groups and IDP-led organizations. Civil society leaders emphasized the extensive capacity of local leaders and IDP leaders at the community level, and international organizations recognized that these groups have far better access to communities in need than they do.

While not promoting “risk transferring,” which can be problematic in localization agendas, it is clear that security conditions are blocking some INGOs from visiting parts of Cabo Delgado that are deemed too risky for staff. Community-level groups and local NGOs are better able to remain in these areas and deliver assistance. These groups will also be better-placed to work on longer-term development initiatives and even reconciliation efforts. Examples like “committees of peace,” which focus on conflict-resolution among IDPs and locals in six IDP camp areas, are a good start, and could also build on community consultations led by the protection cluster.

Placing greater trust, resources and decision-making with local groups can also improve the impact of humanitarian activities in Cabo Delgado. As one interviewee noted, “a lot of money is being wasted on projects designed in offices and not in the field.” Working more closely with local groups can help to overcome the disconnect between programs implemented and the actual needs of communities, and to avoid resources being misallocated.

Thus, fostering greater community ownership of projects emerges as a crucial imperative, alongside the development of a cohesive strategy to anticipate and address areas of heightened risk. Adopting a proactive approach not only optimizes resource allocation but also mitigates the challenges associated with reactive responses.

Lessons for the Global IDP Response: Kampala and Beyond

As in other IDP crises, protecting the rights of IDPs is first and foremost the responsibility of the state. International experts are optimistic that Mozambique will lead the way in domesticating aspects of the Kampala Convention, which enshrines the rights of IDPs in one of the most forward-leaning ways in the world. This means incorporating the rights of IDPs in national laws, and ensuring that legal processes are in place to uphold these rights.

However, aid actors interviewed in Cabo Delgado were skeptical that the Kampala Convention’s domestication would have impact on IDPs anytime soon, namely because implementation requires a greater level of peace and security, as well as local leaders knowing about it, buying into it, and possessing the resources to protect IDP rights. For example, preventing displacement from the get-go requires security forces to contain the jihadist group.

To move from an aspirational document that is only part of national-level conversations to a living document that helps protect the rights of IDPs, more resources are needed. Municipal-level actors need resources and training to understand and implement the tenets of the Kampala Convention. 

To that end, the government of Mozambique needs more resources and a much more rigorous and focused security and humanitarian response in the north. Donor states can and should support this, including through training that increases the INGD’s knowledge of protection in conflict. Among international actors, UNHCR is likely to be the best-placed to increase the protection capacity of the INGD and other parts of Mozambique’s government at national and local levels, even as IOM and other agencies continue leading on other aspects of IDP response.


Northern Mozambique has faced a humanitarian and displacement crisis for years, at the hands of brutal and unpredictable jihadists. Rwandan and SADC forces have worked with Mozambicans to help bring stability. However, the situation is at a concerning moment: attacks have spiked this year, and the very forces that brought stability are expected to depart in the coming months. Unless other security actors scale up – Mozambican forces or another outside force – civilians will be left in a dangerous position.

Humanitarian needs in Cabo Delgado remain dire. Newly displaced people lack adequate food, shelter, registration, documentation, and other basic services, such as healthcare and education. Local authorities and NGOs are constrained in their support capabilities, and international actors are limited in their access due to security conditions. Long-term and cyclically displaced individuals also struggle with uncertainty about returning home and limited livelihood opportunities making self-reliance unlikely.  Women and girls in particular are bearing the brunt of the violence and displacement, and need additional physical and mental support.

There are steps to elevate these burdens. The government must take greater responsibility to protect civilians and assist IDPs who have fled climate-related events and natural disasters, it must now take greater responsibility for protecting civilians in Cabo Delgado. Donors must also seek new ways to increase funding. And, in the context of ongoing underfunding, the government of Mozambique, the UN, and INGOs should allocate more resources to local groups, and build relationships with community-level and IDP-led organizations, who have the clearest understanding of protection and solutions to internal displacement and can also access the population more directly.


[1] SADC is a regional economic bloc comprising 16 member states that aims to promote sustainable economic development within the region.

[2] Refugees International will produce a report on the climate-related dimensions of internal displacement in the coming months.

Featured Image: A woman holds a pot on her head in the Internally Displaced Person camp ’25 de junho’, in the Cabo Delgado Province on May 20, 2021. Photo by John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images.