Beyond the Fall: Rebuilding Syria After Assad

By Jesse Marks , Hardin Lang | May 2, 2025

Executive Summary

Syria’s transition has reached a moment of great fragility. The jubilation of Assad’s overthrow is still tangible. But the hard realities of the road ahead are now sharply in focus. The country’s ongoing humanitarian and displacement crisis continues to affect millions of Syrians. Large segments of the population remain abroad or subsist in internal displacement camps. The communities from which they fled remain devastated with few if any services.

For over a decade, the United States provided the bulk of the foreign assistance that served as a lifeline to millions of Syrians and helped stabilize communities across the country. Now, the Trump administration has largely cut that lifeline while keeping in place a punishing sanctions regime. Together, these policies threaten to upend Syria’s transition.

Across Syria, aid experts estimate that roughly $237 million in U.S. aid was cut, bringing humanitarian operations to a crawl. While the administration has reportedly moved to restore some of this funding, aid agencies have yet to receive new money and translate it into a resumption in programming. Medical systems are collapsing under fuel and medicine shortages. Food and water distributions have slowed or stopped entirely. Aid officials warn that the collapse in services could drive new waves of displacement across borders or force premature returns to destroyed and insecure areas.

Since December, the UN estimates that 1.4 million people out of an estimated 14 million displaced Syrians have returned to their areas of origin. This includes an estimated 1 million internally displaced people and 370,000 refugees from neighboring countries. Many found their homes in rubble and their communities gutted by years of war and economic collapse. Meanwhile, over 600 civilians have been killed by landmines and UXOs, many of whom were families attempting to return to their homes.

For those dispossessed by regime-linked demographic engineering, there are no viable mechanisms to reclaim land or property. As sectarian tensions persist, the risk of renewed conflict remains. With no credible framework for safe, voluntary return in place, the prospect of sustainable reintegration remains bleak.

Meanwhile Syria’s humanitarian coordination system is in flux. The interim government is piecing together an emerging national framework to guide aid efforts – at times leaning on policies instituted initially by the Assad regime. The United Nations is transitioning from a “Whole of Syria” model with delivery hubs both inside Syria and in neighboring countries to a cluster system run entirely out of Damascus. Finally, the NGO-led aid coordination mechanism in the northeast of the country has been largely defunded by U.S. aid cuts. The resulting situation is sidelining key actors and undermining efforts to deliver to communities in need.

Meanwhile, comprehensive U.S. sanctions remain in place, exacerbating economic distress, blocking recovery, and contributing to a worsening liquidity crisis. A more targeted approach is needed—one that distinguishes between punitive sanctions on individuals and broader country-level economic restrictions. Easing restrictions on humanitarian transactions, essential goods, and private-sector investment would reduce suffering and bolster U.S. standing. Sanctions relief, if carefully calibrated, could preserve U.S. leverage while offering a lifeline to a country on the brink—advancing both strategic and humanitarian goals. The European Union is already reassessing its sanctions framework to open space for engagement. Without a parallel shift in U.S. policy, American sanctions risk becoming the principal obstacle to international recovery efforts.

Recommendations

To the U.S. Government:

Restore lifesaving humanitarian assistance to stabilize Syria’s transition and support those in protracted displacement in neighboring countries: The Trump administration should reverse the termination of U.S. humanitarian programs and resume funding for essential services, particularly in high-need areas such as Northwest and Northeast Syria, and newly liberated urban centers like Damascus and Aleppo. They should also continue providing aid to neighboring refugee-hosting countries to avoid pushing millions of Syrians to return prematurely.
Ease or lift sanctions that hinder basic services and recovery beginning with renewing and expanding General License 24: The administration should relax U.S. sanctions that obstruct access to electricity, clean water, healthcare, UXO clearance, and reconstruction. This does not require lifting Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designations but does require tailored waivers and expanded general licenses through OFAC. The first step would be renewing GL24 before it expires in July 2025 indefinitely (or multi year at a minimum) and expanding its scope to all of Syria. Another immediate option is for the Administration to use Section 7432 of the Caesar Act to authorize humanitarian and reconstruction-related exemptions.
Pursue measures to improve cash flows to Syria: The Treasury Department should strengthen and expand legal pathways to move money into Syria for humanitarian aid, family remittances, and essential civilian recovery activities. This should include (i) broadening existing general licenses to cover a wider range of humanitarian and early recovery transactions; (ii) providing clear, public guidance to banks, money transfer services, and other financial actors on how they can safely support authorized flows; and (iii) approving and monitoring select financial institutions and licensed hawala networks to handle humanitarian and remittance payments under strong compliance safeguards.
Reassess sanctions hindering humanitarian work, economic recovery, and refugee return: Congress should conduct a comprehensive review of legislative sanctions—particularly the Caesar Act—to assess which measures are harming humanitarian efforts and impeding Syria’s recovery. Specific exemptions should be introduced for early recovery activities and essential civilian sectors. Congressional oversight should ensure that pressure remains on human rights abusers, while allowing humanitarian actors the legal and financial clarity to operate without obstruction.

To the Syrian Caretaker Government:

Remove structural barriers to humanitarian access: The caretaker government should eliminate inherited bureaucratic constraints—such as INGOs registering through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and mandatory partnerships with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and Syrian Development Organization. These policies restrict flexibility and slow service delivery. Lifting them would lower transaction costs, speed up aid deployment, and demonstrate goodwill to the international community.
Improve coordination with UN, local, and international aid agencies: The caretaker government—through the Office of Humanitarian Action & Coordination (HAC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)—should engage in transparent coordination with humanitarian actors across all regions. That means opening clear and consistent communication channels with international partners to expand access and scale up services. This is especially urgent in areas of return like Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus.
Establish a comprehensive, practical mechanism to restore housing, land, and property rights for displaced populations and returnees: This should include the recovery of ownership documents, property records, and other personal assets left behind during the war. This should be developed collaboratively by UN agencies, Syrian NGOs and civil society, and local administrative authorities. The mechanism must provide transparent legal processes, equitable dispute resolution, and targeted support for vulnerable groups. It should prioritize local accessibility, basic restitution or compensation options, and include alternative housing solutions and financial assistance for those evicted from properties to prevent new waves of displacement and promote social cohesion.

To UN and Aid Agencies:

Preserve the Whole-of-Syria (WoS) framework for at least 12 months to maintain cross-border access to Syria from Jordan and Türkiye: The WoS remains critical for accessing people in hard-to-reach areas, especially as Syria faces an uncertain transition and the risk of renewed violence. The UN in Damascus is seeking to scale down cross-border aid and centralize operations by June, but it is not yet equipped to manage a nationwide response on this timeline without the support of neighboring hubs. To get this right, UN leadership should pause the transition for one year and use the intervening period to conduct formal consultations with the Syrian interim authorities and coordinate closely with aid agencies to build a transition and implementation plan that avoids disrupting humanitarian access.
Coordinate with Syrian interim authorities and neighboring countries to ensure a safe, secure, sustainable, and dignified return of Syrians: Syria is not ready to receive refugee returnees en masse, but UN agencies should work closely with Syrian interim authorities and neighboring countries to avoid pressuring Syrians to return before conditions for a safe and secure return are plausible. UN agencies must ensure the protections of those who do return, but should sustain aid and services for refugees who will remain in neighboring countries. Donors should continue to support neighboring refugee-hosting countries.
Ensure smooth humanitarian transition in Northeast Syria: Support the humanitarian transition in Northeast Syria by reinforcing the role of local Syrian NGOs and INGOs through access to humanitarian pooled funds and sustaining NGO participation in humanitarian working groups where possible. The UN should avoid a top-down takeover and instead facilitate an inclusive, locally driven response that builds on the Northeast Syria (NES) NGO Forum’s experience and community trust.
Expand programming into newly liberated areas without undermining existing operations: Support NGOs expanding into Damascus, Aleppo, and rural areas by providing flexible funds and technical support to avoid compromising existing operations in the Northwest and Northeast. Aid should follow vulnerability, not geography.

To the Governments of Jordan, Türkiye, and Lebanon:

Comply with international law and refrain from pushing Syrian refugees to return prematurely or adopting policies that exert undue pressure on them. Although the collapse of the Assad government has eased some security concerns, ongoing instability, humanitarian needs, and the absence of sustainable reintegration options continue to prevent safe return. Syria will require significant investment to create the conditions for widespread, voluntary repatriation. Neighboring countries must avoid refoulement and policies that force or pressure refugees to return before conditions genuinely allow for it.

Methodology

In February 2025, Refugees International conducted a research trip to Syria to assess the prospects for wide-scale refugee returns and the impact of U.S. aid cuts on Syria’s recovery. The team interviewed local authorities, local councils, and administration officials, UN and international aid agencies, Syria civil society, and displaced Syrians and Syrian returnees in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Idlib, and surrounding areas. The research team also visited Syrian displacement camps to assess the conditions and direct impacts of U.S. aid cuts on displaced Syrians. This paper is further informed by ongoing research and advocacy that Refugees International has conducted inside Syria and in neighboring countries over the past decade in coordination with international and local partners. The research trip concluded just a week before Syria experienced its worst violence since Assad’s fall in December, as deadly clashes erupted between Assad loyalists and the new Islamist leadership, leaving hundreds of civilians dead and wounded.

Ousting Assad: Syria at a Crossroads

The fall of Bashar al-Assad marks a generational shift for Syria, but the challenge of rebuilding a fractured nation has dampened the excitement of ending the war. The caretaker government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, struggles to establish legitimacy, with international recognition uncertain and sectarian violence and insurgent attacks threatening stability. While Kurdish and Druze factions have been integrated into the new order, Christian and Alawite communities remain marginalized, and Assad loyalists and ISIS remnants continue to destabilize key regions. Meanwhile, the fate of millions of Syrian refugees remains unresolved, with host countries pressing for repatriation while returnees face security risks, economic collapse, and uncertain reintegration.

U.S. Foreign Aid in Syria

Amidst the jubilation of Assad’s ousting, tens of millions of Syrians continue to suffer from the ongoing humanitarian crisis, which has deepened since December 2024. The country’s survival now hinges on international aid—most critically, from the United States. Since the start of the conflict, the U.S. has provided as much as $17 billion in humanitarian assistance for Syria and the region, making it the largest single donor to the response.

In 2024, the U.S. contributed over $1.1 billion in support to Syria, including hundreds of millions for essential services in Northeast and Northwest Syria. This funding kept hospitals running, water and electricity grids functional, and millions of displaced people alive in overcrowded camps. The majority of the 16.2 million Syrians in need depended on services supported by U.S. foreign assistance.

Funding flowed through USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the Middle East Bureau, and the State Department’s PRM and Conflict Stabilization Operations, totaling nearly $580 million for Syria in FY2024. Additional U.S. funding to host countries like Lebanon ($268.7 million) and Jordan ($183.5 million) further bolstered regional support systems for refugees.

U.S. foreign aid served as critical scaffolding for Syria’s post-Assad stability—especially in areas outside regime control. While it could not meet all humanitarian needs, it kept millions alive and created enough predictability for political and security tracks to advance.

In 2025, the Trump administration terminated most U.S. aid programming in Syria, and the consequences are immediately visible. Longer term consequences are still unfolding. The aid response across Syria is on the verge of collapse and is forcing greater pressure on Syrian authorities to concurrently manage a humanitarian catastrophe, rebuild state institutions, and prevent a total economic collapse.

Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis and the Prospect of Returns

Returning to Rubble

The departure of Assad has opened the door to return, but not to recovery. The overhaul of the regime’s oppressive state lifted some security concerns, but the scale of devastation left behind by the regime’s scorched earth policy – leaving entire regions uninhabitable – has made return a painful and complicated proposition.

Since December, the UN estimates that 1.4 million people have returned to their areas of origin–including more than 1 million internally displaced people and 370,000 refugees. Yet it remains unclear how many of these returns are permanent. In Northwest Syria, for example, only 160,000 of 2 million displaced residents living in over 1,700 camps have returned home. Many are conducting “go and see” visits, only to find cities flattened by barrel bombs, homes rigged with explosives, and basic infrastructure gutted by years of looting and neglect. As one returnee put it:

“We saved our money, built homes, and settled down. We lost everything [in 2019]. The regime [Assad government] destroyed our homes, cut down our trees, and destroyed our water wells… We were excited about [Syria’s] liberation, but this joy was undermined by the sight of our damaged homes.”

Today, most displaced Syrians remain in limbo—unable to return for good, but finding little to sustain them where they are. Many are waiting for basic services and a minimal degree of stability before rebuilding their lives. Refugees International interviewed Syrians who had returned from neighboring countries only to find their towns uninhabitable. Some ended up back in IDP camps in Idlib, still searching for shelter. Meanwhile, pressure to return is growing. As schools close for the summer, local authorities expect returns from inside Syria and neighboring Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan to accelerate.

Despite these challenges, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) expects as many as 3 million IDPs and refugees to return to their home communities by the end of 2025.

Many areas along Syria’s western spine–Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Idlib–are expected to absorb the bulk of returnees. But these regions remain, for the most part, uninhabitable. Entire towns and neighborhoods have been destroyed at various stages of the war. The areas have few to no services available, and vast areas are contaminated by mines and UXOs. Recovery will take a generation—and it is already being delayed by the continuation of sanctions. One displaced Syrian father shared his experience with Refugees International:

“We’ve been here for six years. Camp support is barely enough—we might get one food basket a month. We want to go home, but we’re waiting for schools to close. In summer, we’ll move the whole camp to our village. We have no ties to Idlib. But there’s no aid back home either. Still, it’s where our roots are.”

While there is no definitive timeline, aid officials expect major returns to begin this summer, once the school year ends and conditions ease. In Homs, officials anticipate as many as 250,000 returnees within a few months. But communities are not ready to receive returnees at that scale. The caretaker government is developing local response plans and coordinating with aid agencies to address critical service gaps—particularly in urban areas under strain. Still, local officials told Refugees International they expect returns to exceed their capacity.

Aid that is being provided is largely concentrated in cities. Many rural communities lack this same access and are forced to travel for medical care and import basic supplies—food, water, and fuel—from nearby cities with better functioning economies.

Mar’at Numman: A Portrait of Post-Assad Syria

In Mar’at Numman, a town with a pre-war population of nearly 160,000 and an additional 450,000 people in the immediate area, local officials say only 500 families have returned since December 2024. Now, a single mobile medical unit operates while the local council works to rebuild the town’s hospital, once a critical facility for the surrounding region before it was destroyed in airstrikes. These medical points serve both the town and nearby rural areas. However, Mar’at Numman lacks basic infrastructure, including a local bakery or water management system. Residents depend on food and clean water deliveries from Idlib City, over 15 kilometers away.

Unresolved Housing Land and Property Issues

For Syrians seeking to return, one of the most significant—and volatile—challenges is the question of housing, land, and property (HLP). Local authorities told Refugees International they still lack a coherent mechanism to resolve HLP disputes, leaving returnees and current occupants in legal limbo. Without a structured framework, tensions over land rights could easily escalate into localized violence.

These challenges are particularly acute in communities across Homs and its surrounding areas. Under Assad, demographic engineering policies, like Law No. 10 in 2018, which legalized state land seizures of properties owned by displaced Syrians, systematically dispossessed displaced Syrians and reshaped the region’s social fabric. Now, returnees risk displacing those who have since occupied their homes—whether legally or informally. These concerns are becoming increasingly urgent following sectarian violence in the Homs countryside, Latakia, and Tartous in March.

Restitution is even more fraught in areas where regime-affiliated militias or armed groups have taken control of land. Local councils—understaffed and overburdened—lack the legal tools and institutional capacity to resolve claims fairly or consistently. Civil registries are still paper-based, and sanctions block access to digitization tools that could help modernize the process.

Without an internationally supported effort to resolve HLP disputes—especially in areas reshaped by forced demographic change—reintegration efforts could stall or fail altogether, fueling renewed displacement and local conflict.

UXO Contamination and Disposal

As Syrians return, the tools they need to stay safe—funding, equipment, trained staff—are vanishing. Since December, over 600 civilians have been killed by landmines and UXOs, many of whom were returnees. Every area of Syria struggles with UXO contamination, but the impact of these hazards continues to remain a primary threat to the safety of Syrians. The threat is pervasive in the towns and villages along former front lines where many displaced Syrians hope to return.

One Syrian displaced from northern Hama told Refugees International:

“I saw a missile. I did not know what to do with it. Is it safe to move? I do not know how to recognize a landmine. Most people in our community who died since liberation were killed by landmines. They did not know any better.”

The White Helmets, Syria’s only local UXO clearance force, are stretched thin. Once serving 5 million people, they now support over 20 million, and still remain the only viable clearance team. That burden has grown heavier since the U.S. suspended key funding—cutting 30 percent of their budget—and making it harder for them to deploy teams and equipment to high-risk areas.

Other clearance organizations told Refugees International they have mapped more than 38 million square meters of contaminated land in Northeast Syria. But that work is now at risk. U.S. aid cuts are threatening to stall operations. In Northwest Syria and newly liberated areas, the outlook is even bleaker. Baseline contamination data is still missing, and demining teams are inundated with requests they cannot meet.

In response, some international agencies are shifting toward local capacity-building—training the White Helmets and other partners to conduct non-technical surveys and map hazardous zones. But critical UXO clearance tools are often classified as dual-use technology, meaning sanctions prevent their transfer to Syrian partners. One group, which had been clearing homes and buildings in return areas, has already scaled back due to funding shortfalls. Without immediate support, these life-saving efforts could grind to a halt.

A single family returns to an empty housing block in the destroyed Damascus suburb of Daraya, February 2025. Photo by Refugees International.

The Consequences of the Withdrawal of U.S. Foreign Aid

Syria’s future is threatened by the potential collapse of the humanitarian relief effort. The Trump administration’s decision to halt, and later terminate, an estimated $237 million in U.S. foreign aid delivered a devastating blow to Syria’s fragile recovery. Administration officials have reportedly moved to restore some of this funding, but aid agencies have yet to receive new money and translate it into a resumption in programming. For Syrians in camps and war-torn communities, U.S. programs were lifelines. Syrian and international aid organizations—most of which rely heavily on U.S. support—have warned of deep, severe, and far-reaching consequences from the aid cuts.

At the 2025 Paris Donors conference, the U.S. offered no new support for Syria and neighboring refugee-hosting countries. Worse still, aid groups told Refugees International that no major donor plans to fill the gap left by Washington’s aid cuts. Instead, European donors, the few still supporting Syria, plan to scale back their global humanitarian and development aid. The Netherlands is cutting as much as 30 percent of its aid budget. France reduced its aid budget by 37 percent, and Belgium plans 25 percent cuts in foreign aid. Meanwhile, the UK plans to reduce its aid budget by 40 percent. As funding contracts, Syria will feel the impact acutely, further straining an already collapsing aid system.

Northwest Syria

In Idlib and northern Aleppo, the impact of the cuts on more than 2 million displaced Syrians was catastrophic. Displaced Syrians expressed frustration with the abrupt end of services and shared that the aid cuts have impacted every aspect of their daily lives. Hospitals are shutting down. Heating and fuel are in short supply. Winterization programs stopped. Food deliveries and water trucking halted. Camp residents were pooling their funds to buy water. At least 13 international and local aid agencies have been forced to suspend operations, according to aid officials. Organizations granted waivers were unable to resume programming due to funding shortfalls caused by the simultaneous suspension of payments. One NGO reported that the freeze resulted in a lack of services across various sectors for 1.2 million people.

Over 600,000 people have lost access to food assistance, nearly 1 million people are now without WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene) support—including over 120,000 in the remote Atmeh camp, according to local aid providers—and more than 70,000 Syrians have been cut off from emergency health services. These losses immediately eroded communities’ first line of support, compounding vulnerabilities and forcing difficult choices. One Syrian elder who oversaw the needs of several hundreds of displaced families in his camp told Refugees International:

“From the first day [of the USAID cuts], we felt the impact. People could not get bread to eat or access clean water. Now, people have to choose between buying food or water. We could not even wash before our prayers.”

Aid officials told Refugees International that as conditions worsen, more Syrians may consider fleeing to neighboring countries where economic prospects, though limited, are perceived to be better. In one camp, aid officials highlighted the number of internally displaced people leaving tripled—from 5,600 to 17,000—in the month after water services were cut. A Syrian camp leader told Refugees International:

“We want to return [home] and get aid there. The return of U.S. aid might give us some hope.”

Syria’s local health infrastructure was another major casualty of the aid freeze. The aid terminations severely reduced access to healthcare for the 2.5 million IDPs relying on the region’s remaining hospitals. Administrators at the largest hospital in Northwest Syria reported that, due to funding cuts, they were not able to pay their staff, who were now working voluntarily. Emergency medical supplies were being rationed to sustain basic operations, while critical resources like oxygen and fuel were running dangerously low throughout the winter and spring. Most patients had no access to heating. Pediatric surgeries plummeted from 30 to just 5 per month, and dialysis capacity dropped from 900 to 100 monthly. One doctor told Refugees International:

“We are begging for fuel, medicine, and medical equipment.”

The suspension of food aid, clean water, sanitation, and sewage removal risks overwhelming an already collapsing healthcare system, which is being forced to slash staff and reduce patient capacity. One INGO facing major cuts estimated it would have to close as many as 24 health facilities. Many facilities had lost half their administrative capacity, while some were operating at just 20 percent of their normal levels. While years of war have devastated Syria’s medical infrastructure, the aid freeze has further crippled healthcare providers, drastically limiting their ability to deliver critical care to patients.

Displacement camps in Idlib province in Northwest Syria, February 2025. Photo by Refugees International.

Northeast Syria

In Northeast Syria, the situation is also dire. The U.S. foreign assistance pause wiped out the single largest source of humanitarian and stabilization funding, delivering a devastating blow to aid operations. More than 20 INGOs and at least 10 local Syrian partners lost anywhere from 5 percent to a staggering 95 percent of their funding—$117 million in terminated projects that provided life-saving support, from food and water access to protection services for women and girls.

Aid groups also told Refugees International that funding cuts crippled aid agencies’ ability to assess the fallout, monitor deteriorating conditions, or coordinate what little aid remains. Al Hol Camp, the region’s largest displacement camp, has been hit particularly hard. While the primary contractor remains operational, many organizations working inside the camp saw their funding abruptly cut, leading to the termination of essential services. While coordination for the camp continues, critical programs—including those providing medical care, education, and protection services—have disappeared, leaving tens of thousands of camp residents, including women and children, with even fewer lifelines. The consequences have already rippled beyond the humanitarian sphere: in Washington, alarms were raised when security guards at an ISIS detention facility at Al Hol failed to show up after receiving stop-work orders issued by their contractor from the U.S. government. While this particular crisis was rectified after extensive intervention, the overwhelming majority of aid programs remain either suspended or fully terminated.

Meanwhile, in eastern Syria, Syrian health officials told Refugees International that cities like Deir Ezzor have no functioning healthcare infrastructure. In other war-damaged towns and cities, primary and emergency health systems remain severely degraded, unable to rebuild or rehabilitate at the scale needed to meet growing demand.

Liberated Areas

Years of authoritarian rule left Syria’s public institutions hollowed out. Under Assad, national aid agencies were weaponized, civil service salaries collapsed, and the ministries responsible for essential services—healthcare, water, electricity, and social welfare—were gutted. Even after Assad’s departure, the legacy of that devastation remains. In newly liberated areas like Damascus and Aleppo, hospitals are barely functional. Doctors earn as little as $30 a month—salaries that, according to one former official who spoke to Refugees International, were propped up through regime allocations of narcotics revenues. By contrast, doctors in neighboring Idlib reportedly make ten times more. For civilians, daily life in these “liberated” areas remains as difficult—if not worse—than in opposition-held parts of the Northwest or Northeast. There is little to no social safety net, and basic services remain out of reach.

In this vacuum, U.S.-funded Syrian NGOs—many of which had been active in Northwest Syria—stepped in to help. After Assad’s fall, these organizations expanded operations into newly accessible urban areas, delivering life-saving services to populations that had been neglected or punished by the regime. In places like Damascus and Aleppo, they helped fill massive gaps in healthcare, protection, and basic aid. But these organizations were never designed to scale this quickly—and with recent USAID cuts, their capacity to respond has been severely undercut.

Many NGOs have been forced to downsize, shutter programs, or reprioritize existing services. The impact has been particularly severe in the health sector. Mobile health clinics—some of the only sources of medical care in rural towns and villages—have been among the first casualties. These clinics once served thousands in areas where returnees were slowly rebuilding their lives. Now, several providers told Refugees International that, due to funding shortfalls, these services will be shut down. Remaining clinics are overwhelmed, as demand surges with other organizations scaling back or disappearing entirely.

While U.S. aid was never directly funneled to Syria’s Health Ministry, USAID-funded NGOs often worked in coordination with local health officials to keep services running in the hardest-hit urban areas. But this front line assistance is also fraying.

At the same time, UN agencies operating from Damascus have carried the burden of supporting civilians in Assad-held and newly liberated areas, functioning as the de facto provider of basic services. These agencies have played a critical role in propping up Syria’s skeletal ministries—offering everything from training and hardware to institutional support—thanks in large part to voluntary contributions from UN member states, particularly the United States. These same agencies were also manipulated by the Assad government and, at times, had aid diverted.

Now, that system is under immense strain. The U.S. pause and termination of funding to UN agencies triggered steep and widespread cuts across the humanitarian response. Further reductions have been threatened, including an estimated $111 million cut to the World Food Programme (WFP) for food and nutrition assistance—initially withdrawn, then partially restored. Multiple grants supporting lifesaving medical care, WASH interventions, and food assistance across the country have also been suspended or are at risk. Cuts have gutted health, protection, and recovery programs, with devastating implications. In many newly accessible areas, UN agencies remain the final barrier preventing complete institutional collapse.

Some NGOs that previously operated only in Northwest Syria have begun expanding into Damascus and Aleppo to fill critical service gaps—but doing so requires diverting already limited resources from existing operations. This leaves both old and new areas underserved, compounding the crisis across the country.

Nowhere will the next wave of cuts be felt more acutely than in Syria’s largest cities, where food insecurity is rising fast. In Damascus and Aleppo, where millions still depend on aid for daily survival, the collapse of food assistance threatens to push families over the edge. Aid groups warn that without a rapid reversal in donor commitments—particularly from the United States—Syria’s newly liberated areas face another downward spiral.

Undermining INGO Operations

The abrupt halt, reversal, and underfunding of USAID programs in Northeast Syria have left INGOs financially crippled, operationally frozen, and unable to deliver life-saving aid—even when granted partial waivers. Across Syria, organizations that relied heavily on USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) faced sudden funding freezes, program terminations, and conflicting directives. Emergency exemptions allowed some to continue critical services. However these exemptions were accompanied by limited to no new funding or reimbursements, forcing relief groups to suspend programs, lay off staff, and take on debt. Those few organizations that were able to access previously withheld funds only have funding sources through the end of FY 2025.

In Northwest Syria, a survey of aid agencies showed that at least half are now in debt due to unreimbursed U.S. contract expenses. Seven organizations reported liabilities between $21,000 and $1.5 million—totaling over $5.3 million. With no clarity from the State Department on the scope of waivers, agencies face escalating financial risk. Many have frozen hiring, grounded staff travel, and slashed operations. Even those with full or partial waivers say they remain unable to proceed with any certainty, given persistent ambiguity over what costs are considered allowable.

Neighboring Countries

U.S. foreign aid cuts also hit neighboring Jordan and Lebanon, which collectively host millions of refugees. These cuts amplified pressures on both countries, who may inherit the costs of continuing support if funding is reduced or fully terminated. UN agencies in Jordan and Lebanon, which have largely managed the refugee response, are expecting major cuts in funds, staff, and programming as a result of the aid shortage. Without these funds, states are ill equipped to provide refugee populations with aid and services, and may resort to accelerating premature refugee returns to Syria. If services diminish or states ramp up pressure on existing refugee communities, many more could be forced to Syria from neighboring countries where neither funds nor services await them. Thus, it is critical to sustain support both for the emergency in Syria and in neighboring countries to ensure Syrians can return voluntarily to their homes when there are stronger opportunities for reintegration.

A Crisis in Coordination

Syria’s humanitarian coordination system is entering a pivotal and dynamic phase. Three aid coordination mechanisms are now active in Syria: the caretaker government’s emerging national framework; the UN-led “Whole of Syria” cluster system in Damascus, Jordan, and Türkiye; and the now–defunded NGO Forum in the northeast. As humanitarian needs surge nationwide, these systems are struggling to integrate. The lack of coherence and coordination threatens to undermine Syria’s recovery and risks sidelining key aid actors at a moment when inclusive, collaborative engagement is urgently needed.

A New National Framework

The new Syrian caretaker authorities managing Syria’s humanitarian response appear more pragmatic and competent than their predecessors. However, they are also overwhelmed and constrained by deep structural challenges. The authorities show limited interest in engaging with the UN system and are mistrusting of INGOs. While they do engage with the humanitarian cluster system, they are intent on building their own structure.

A number of leaders now overseeing humanitarian efforts—whether in Damascus, provincial capitals, or local councils—hail from the Idlib Salvation Government or the Humanitarian Action Coordination (HAC) office, the institution previously responsible for coordinating aid in Northwest Syria. More specifically, Syrian authorities have designated the HAC as the primary national aid coordinator, tasked with managing humanitarian coordination across Syria, except for the Northeast. It has become the backbone of local aid management. HAC authorities appoint or directly communicate with community leaders in villages and IDP camps. These local representatives identify community needs and relay them to HAC authorities, who then direct NGOs to provide targeted assistance.

For aid agencies active in Syria, the authorities have implemented a dual track humanitarian process, one for Syrian NGOs and one for INGOs.

Local Syrian NGOs are required to register and coordinate programming with the HAC office. Most Syrian-led NGOs who were previously operational in Northwest Syria told Refugees International that their operations have not been hindered as a result. Meanwhile, Syrian NGOs from newly liberated areas, notably Aleppo and Damascus, reported restrictions when registering with the HAC, complicating their legal status with the new government.

For international NGOs, caretakers have continued a number of Assad-era policies, some of which are actively restricting INGOs. The most troubling is a policy requiring INGOs to obtain a temporary license through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and formalize registration by entering into a MoU with either the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) or Syria Development Organization (SDO), formerly the Syria Trust for Relief and Development. Aid agencies told Refugees International that these arrangements drastically curtail their operational flexibility—forcing them into restrictive agreements that undermine their ability to assess needs or implement programs independently. Though SARC and SDO have taken steps to improve its credibility, it remains encumbered by the same logistical hurdles and regime-era legacy, and still lacks the authority to challenge central state control. If Syrian caretaker authorities continue to push this policy, it could fracture its standing with INGOs, and by extension, international donors.

To rebuild confidence and improve aid efficiency, the caretaker authorities must begin dismantling these inherited obstacles. A clear first step would be to eliminate the requirement that INGOs partner through national aid providers, allowing direct engagement with the government while reducing costs, improving flexibility, and restoring trust with the international humanitarian system.

Dismantling the UN ‘Whole of Syria’ Approach

The UN’s humanitarian coordination system in Syria is undergoing a major reconfiguration. UN leadership in Damascus is actively working to consolidate all UN programming under a centralized Damascus-led model and sunset the decade-long “Whole of Syria” approach, which had allowed cross-border aid operations from Türkiye, Jordan, and previously Iraq. Most UN agencies now view this transition as inevitable, with the formal drawdown of the Whole of Syria architecture expected by June 2025.

However, this shift comes at a precarious moment. The UN in Damascus continues to face legitimacy and trust deficits—not only among segments of the Syrian population and the INGO community, but also with the caretaker authorities themselves. Aid agencies repeatedly told Refugees International that the caretaker government limits its engagement with UN leadership due to lingering mistrust. While high-level engagement with the UN remains limited, there are signs of growing cooperation at the technical and ministerial levels. UN cluster leads and Syrian ministries have begun engaging in lower-tier coordination, creating some limited but functional channels of engagement that help sustain a degree of operational continuity.

Meanwhile, international NGOs are grappling with how to navigate a handover of coordination responsibilities to the UN, particularly in the northeast, where many fear being excluded from future programming as UN agencies assume a larger operational footprint [see the section below].

In Northwest Syria, the UN’s Gaziantep hub continues to operate, providing cross-border aid to communities across the region. These include areas where displaced populations are returning. But within regime-held areas, UN agencies in Damascus have struggled to scale up activities beyond the capital, particularly in peripheral and rural regions.

The Whole of Syria mechanism remains the most viable and operationally resilient framework for reaching all parts of Syria. Built around regional hubs in Türkiye, Jordan, and Iraq, it has provided scalable, adaptable infrastructure throughout the conflict—ensuring that aid could be delivered across conflict lines and across political boundaries. This system continues to play a critical role in facilitating large-scale cross-border operations, supporting displaced populations, and maintaining contingency capabilities in the event of renewed violence. Abandoning it now—without a fully functional, trusted, and countrywide alternative—would leave critical gaps in humanitarian delivery, particularly in hard-to-reach and opposition-held areas.

Collapsing Humanitarian Coordination in Northeast Syria

In Northeast Syria, the coordination system has all but collapsed. USAID funded 80 to 90 percent of the Northeast Syria (NES) NGO Forum, the region’s coordination body. Following U.S. cuts, 22 of 36 cluster leads responsible for coordinating lifesaving humanitarian assistance across the entire region were fully defunded, while another 8 were partially defunded. This coordination role is critical—these staff not only oversee the assessment of aid needs across their respective sectors but also ensure that aid and services are delivered in an orderly and effective manner.

With the UN’s operational presence limited in the region, NGOs have played a globally unique role in coordinating the humanitarian response—yet they can no longer even manage the few resources that remain. Meanwhile, as the UN struggles to establish itself with the new authorities in Damascus, it is also attempting to backfill coordination efforts in Northeast Syria. However, this will be extremely difficult. The NES Forum’s ability to operate across the region was underpinned by the trust carefully built between the U.S. government and the local administration in Northeast Syria—trust the UN does not enjoy to the same extent. Without that foundation, the UN lacks the same access, permissions, and operational flexibility to assume the Forum’s role.

The loss of the NES Forum’s coordination capacity has been deeply destabilizing for local authorities, who relied heavily on U.S. support channeled through Forum INGO partners to stabilize conditions across the region. Now, with that coordination mechanism largely dismantled, aid agencies told Refugees International the humanitarian response in Northeast Syria has descended into disarray, leaving already vulnerable communities at even greater risk.

It remains unclear if the NES Forum can be salvaged. The abrupt funding cuts forced key staff to step down and relocate, dismantling much of its operational capacity. The UN had initially planned a gradual year-long transition with the NES Forum to expand its role in Northeast Syria, but the sudden collapse in aid has created a massive operational void, forcing the UN to scramble for solutions. Adding to the complexity, the long-awaited Damascus–SDF agreement and pathway to reintegration of Northeast Syria with the Damascus-based caretaker authorities has positioned the HAC authorities to also project their own coordination model into the Northeast. Without a viable, trusted coordination framework or sustained humanitarian presence, U.S. troops and partners will be forced to operate in a more hostile, unstable, and ungoverned environment—undermining both mission effectiveness and the strategic logic of the U.S. deployment in Syria.

U.S. Sanctions and a Growing Liquidity Crisis

For many Syrians, the euphoria of Assad’s departure is overshadowed by mounting economic uncertainty. The lack of foreign assistance and investment and the country’s worsening liquidity crisis, all compounded by the continuation of U.S. sanctions, are fueling concerns that they will be unable to rebuild, let alone afford basic necessities. Without urgent economic relief, the window of opportunity for stabilization and recovery may close before it ever fully opens.

Overview: U.S. Sanctions on Syria

U.S. sanctions on Syria are among the longest-standing and most comprehensive in the world. They date back to 1979, when the Assad regime was designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). Over the next five decades, these measures expanded into a dense web of executive and congressional sanctions targeting the Assad family, its network of benefactors, and key sectors including telecommunications, energy, and arms, as well as foreign actors accused of supporting the regime. Sanctions dramatically escalated in 2011 in response to the Syrian civil war and the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on civilians—a campaign that, over fifteen years, resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions. The most far-reaching of these measures, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act—passed by Congress in 2019—aimed to sever the regime’s access to economic lifelines and force a political transition.

U.S. sanctions also extend to registered foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) who were operating in Syria during the civil war. These sanctions are administered by the State Department and the Treasury Department and target listed armed groups, including ISIS, Hezbollah, and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, of which Syria’s current president was a member.

The collapse of the Assad government in December 2024 was due in part to the consequences imposed by sanctions, including economic isolation. However, the sanctions that once effectively targeted regime elites are now exacerbating civilian suffering, limiting access to cash, reconstruction materials, and essential services—ultimately hindering Syrians’ ability to return home and rebuild their lives.

Sanctions are Punishing Syria’s People

For years, IDPs and vulnerable communities in Syria have been forced into deeper reliance on relief aid because of the sanctions on the country. Ironically, the dependence on aid imposed by U.S. sanctions has only magnified the suffering caused by recent U.S. aid cuts.

Syrians in Northwest Syria expressed to Refugees International their appreciation for past U.S. humanitarian support, particularly via the UN cross-border aid operation, which enabled early recovery efforts and marginal economic recovery. Many continue to view U.S. foreign assistance favorably, and highlighted their desire to see it turned back on. However, goodwill toward the United States is quickly eroding. Together, the recent aid freeze and ongoing sanctions are increasingly perceived as punitive rather than supportive, deepening resentment among affected communities. Most individuals Refugees International interviewed argued that while U.S. sanctions may have initially weakened Assad’s regime, they continue to punish ordinary Syrians through unintended consequences—limiting their ability to rebuild and entrenching economic suffering. One displaced Syrian father and camp elder told Refugees International:

“Bashar [al-Assad] destroyed our entire village as punishment. As a result, we have been stuck in this displacement camp for five years. Bashar was the reason for the sanctions. Now, he is gone. We need sanctions to stop. We are not Bashar, we are not at fault.”

Another shared similar testimony:

“Some of us have been displaced since the beginning of the war. We hope the Americans and Europeans will help lift the sanctions so we can leave the camps and return to our homes to rebuild.”

Without access to aid or financial means, Syrians can barely sustain themselves. One Syrian father told Refugees International:

“After liberation, everything became more expensive, and the humanitarian situation got worse.”

Those residing in newly liberated areas highlighted a particularly acute degree of economic hardship due to the country’s liquidity crisis and lack of employment and basic services. If left unaddressed, these grievances, coupled with the potential for large-scale IDP returns, could undermine Syria’s fragile stability, creating deeper vulnerabilities and increasing the risk of unrest.International and Syrian aid groups repeatedly highlight the immense challenges of operating under U.S. sanctions. This issue is particularly severe in areas fully subject to restrictions on the Assad regime, including medical supply chains, fuel for hospital generators and ambulances, telecommunications used for humanitarian coordination, financial systems required for aid transfers, and construction materials needed to restore clinics and water infrastructure. These sanctions rank among the most complex in the world, with some in place for decades. Although the U.S. Treasury issued a general license in 2022 and again in 2025 allowing for humanitarian exemptions, none of the aid agencies Refugees International interviewed reported a meaningful improvement in financial access or operational capacity as a result. In practice, the license has done little to offset the legal ambiguity and the banking institutions that continue to block transfers, stall procurement, and freeze payments for frontline actors.

Overview: U.S. General Licenses and Sanctions Exemptions

Sanctions have a direct effect on the ability of UN and aid agencies to deploy humanitarian aid across the country. To address these challenges and permit humanitarian aid, the U.S. government issued General Licenses (GL), which granted permission to UN agencies and humanitarian actors to conduct lifesaving assistance and non-commercial recovery. These are issued by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and offer broad exemptions to sanctions under authorities granted by president executive orders.

A Liquidity Crisis is Strangling Aid

Syria’s post-Assad economy is buckling under the weight of a deepening liquidity crisis driven by converging factors: elite cash hoarding, the collapse of domestic banking infrastructure, and prolonged economic isolation under international sanctions that have drained Syria’s foreign reserves. With the regime having depleted the central bank’s reserves, aid agencies now face critical shortages of accessible currency, severely hampering their ability to sustain life-saving operations. Despite the issuance of a U.S. general license authorizing certain transactions, international banks continue to be risk-averse and remain reluctant to re-engage. The sharp decline in U.S. humanitarian assistance has further compounded the crisis.

What remains of Syria’s economy is held together by an improvised multicurrency system that includes the Syrian lira, Turkish lira, and U.S. dollar. In the absence of a functioning central authority, cash is funneled into the country primarily through Turkish PTT branches in the north and informal hawala networks. These mechanisms support limited financial flows that enable some basic economic activity to persist in an otherwise fractured monetary environment.

Syria’s liquidity crisis is crippling humanitarian operations, particularly in areas recently liberated from regime control. Aid agencies in Damascus and Aleppo report severe cash shortages that are undermining their ability to purchase goods or deliver services. Without access to hard currency, aid organizations are unable to pay staff, contractors, or implement essential relief programs. Several groups told Refugees International they have been forced to pause life-saving interventions simply because they cannot withdraw funds from ATMs.

The crisis is compounded by the continued refusal of correspondent banks to engage with Syria due to sanctions on the Central Bank of Syria (CBoS) and the ban on U.S. services to Syria, which include financial services, despite the existence of a U.S. general license authorizing certain transactions. This effectively blocks formal channels for importing U.S. dollars and other foreign currencies or carrying out most transactions with Syria in U.S. dollars. While humanitarian organizations operating in northwest Syria can still access foreign funds via Turkey’s PTT banking system, NGOs working in areas recently liberated from regime control remain cut off due to their entanglement with Syria’s sanctioned financial system. The European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada have loosened their sanctions on Syria’s banking sector and, in some cases, have de-listed the CBoS, but U.S. sectoral sanctions and blocking sanctions against the CBoS have remained, which continue to obstruct most international transactions.

This crisis has been intensified by a suspension in U.S. humanitarian funding, creating a perfect storm that has left few viable paths to recovery outside of sanctions relief. The Trump administration’s second round of aid terminations in April signaled that the return of U.S. support is increasingly unlikely. Restoring U.S. humanitarian assistance remains essential to Syria’s survival. However, if the administration opts not to resume funding at scale, it must urgently pursue alternative measures to stabilize the economy and prevent a wider collapse. Most critically, this should include seriously considering the easing or lifting of sanctions on Syria as early as July 2025, when General License 24 is up for renewal.

Conclusion: Finding a Way Forward

The United States should restore humanitarian funding for Syria to at least cover baseline needs that went unmet following the termination of USAID assistance. In the absence of sufficient funding, targeted sanctions relief becomes a moral, ethical, and political imperative—and the only viable form of humanitarian support the United States can offer. The Trump administration and Members of Congress should reassess current sanctions with the specific goal of improving Syria’s capacity to deliver public services, support early recovery, and allow Syrians to begin rebuilding their homes and lives. A more calibrated approach—one that distinguishes between targeted measures against sanctioned individuals and broader economic restrictions that are impeding recovery—could ease humanitarian suffering while preserving U.S. strategic leverage.

In an initial phase, the Executive Branch, through the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), should renew and indefinitely extend General License 24 (GL24) in July or shift to multiyear approvals, and expand the the NGO license to explicitly permit transactions related to electricity, water, sanitation, and demining—sectors essential for restoring lifesaving services. The United States should also facilitate the supply of fuel and electricity from neighboring countries, and enable humanitarian actors to move funds more easily by authorizing the use of specific financial institutions and correspondent accounts for transactions supporting humanitarian and essential services and easing restrictions on remittances and early recovery programming. These actions would help stabilize critical infrastructure, reduce suffering, and enhance U.S. credibility with affected communities—mitigating anti-American sentiment and the risk of radicalization. The Treasury Department could also clarify or expand existing guidance to reassure banks that such activity—when conducted under approved licenses and for non-sanctioned recipients—will not result in penalties or legal exposure.

A second phase would involve further executive action to suspend or carve out targeted sanctions, especially under Executive Orders 13582 and 13894—which respectively block all U.S. transactions with the Syrian government and authorize sanctions on actors destabilizing Syria or obstructing peace—to enable investment and recovery in civilian sectors such as agriculture, housing, and telecommunications. One avenue would be broadening GL22, which currently permits economic investments in Northeast and Northwest to cover all of Syria. OFAC could also issue specific licenses or waivers allowing vetted foreign investment in critical infrastructure, while maintaining sanctions against regime-aligned entities and designated individuals, including Assad’s inner circle. The administration could also issue broad general licenses or waivers for key U.S. partners—including the European Union, South Korea, Japan, Türkiye, and GCC countries that are actively preparing to invest in Syria’s recovery—permitting their engagement in legitimate reconstruction activities without risk of secondary sanctions.

One available pathway is for the administration to exercise its Section 7432 waiver authority in the Caesar Act, which allows the President to suspend Caesar Act sanctions, such as those concerning Syria’s construction, energy, and financial sectors—if the President makes certain findings outlined in the Act and doing so is deemed to be in the national security interest of the United States. This authority can be used to permit early economic recovery and provide legal clarity for U.S. allies seeking to engage in reconstruction. A full repeal of the Caesar Act would require congressional action and is likely to remain contingent on meaningful political progress in Syria. However, the executive waiver authority within the law can be used immediately to reduce the chilling effect on humanitarian and recovery efforts. This would preserve U.S. leverage while allowing targeted stabilization efforts that could prevent further deterioration of Syria’s humanitarian and economic conditions.

A third phase—triggered by a credible political transition or settlement—would require congressional action to amend or sunset legislative sanctions such as the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act and initiate a formal review of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) under 22 U.S.C. §2371. These steps would open the door to international lending, foreign investment, and broader economic normalization, while retaining the ability to impose sanctions on individuals responsible for war crimes or ongoing destabilization. Importantly, this approach would not require lifting the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designations applied to certain Syrian figures in the interim governing structures.

Such a policy shift is politically viable and enjoys rare bipartisan support in Congress. Leading Republican and Democratic lawmakers have urged the Trump administration to reduce sanctions risks on critical sectors essential for Syria’s recovery, and to expand the scope and duration of existing general licenses facilitating humanitarian relief. Several members of Congress have even traveled to Damascus for direct discussions with Syrian officials, signaling a growing willingness to reassess the contours of U.S. sanctions policy in light of the worsening humanitarian crisis.

This would also complement ongoing EU efforts to lift sanctions to Syria. While other major donors—particularly in the European Union—are also scaling back aid to Syria, they are simultaneously reviewing their sanctions regimes and weighing partial or full relaxation of restrictions. These shifts could unlock new investment opportunities and support EU-Gulf cooperation on economic recovery. However, U.S. sanctions remain the primary barrier to broader international engagement in Syria’s reconstruction. A phased, strategic adjustment of U.S. sanctions could help avert Syria’s economic collapse and give Syrians a chance to return and rebuild their lives.

Featured Image: Returnee schoolchildren standing by graffitti reading “King of the Future” at the only functional local school in a destroyed town in Idlib, Syria. Photo by Refugees International.