A Closing Window: How Aid Cuts are Undermining Rohingya Possibilities

By Daniel P. Sullivan , Lucky Karim | May 22, 2025

Executive Summary

The Rohingya crisis has entered a critical juncture. Tentative progress is now at risk due to severe aid cuts that threaten rapidly deteriorating conditions in the camps. A new interim government in Bangladesh and evolving dynamics inside Myanmar have opened a fragile but important pathway toward improved conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and the potential for voluntary return. However, this progress is already being undermined by declining international attention and sharp reductions in humanitarian assistance. Although a high-level conference on the Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar is scheduled for September 2025, with Rohingya civil society participation being considered, the extent to which Rohingya voices will be included in these discussions remains unclear. For any progress to be sustainable, aid must be urgently restored and Rohingya refugees must be meaningfully engaged in shaping their future.

Since taking office in August 2024, Bangladesh’s interim government has shown greater openness toward addressing Rohingya needs, including previously off-limits issues such as durable shelters, education, and livelihoods. Meanwhile, in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA)—an ethnic armed group—has gained control over parts of the region, creating new opportunities for cross-border aid and renewed dialogue on voluntary repatriation. Yet these dynamics remain delicate. The interim government’s capacity is limited, and its political capital is already stretched. Within the camps, multiple and sometimes conflicting narratives are emerging. While some officials explore dialogue with the AA’s political wing, reports suggest that other actors are informally encouraging Rohingya armed groups to return and join the fight against the AA. At the same time, deep mistrust persists between the Rohingya and Rakhine communities, and many Rohingya civil society members and human rights defenders continue to feel excluded from key discussions about their future.

Engaging the AA is particularly complex given its role in atrocities against the Rohingya. Understandably, refugees are deeply reluctant to return without concrete guarantees of safety and accountability. Still, many within the community recognize that coexistence with the Rakhine people and engagement with the AA will be essential to any viable return process. Progress will require inclusive dialogue, confidence-building measures—such as the safe return of Rohingya IDPs, organized “go-and-see” visits for refugees, access for cross-border humanitarian aid, and international monitoring—as well as steps toward accountability. Cross-border possibilities are particularly urgent as many areas of Rakhine State already face stark increases in food insecurity.

There is a narrow window of opportunity to engage the interim Bangladeshi government on education, livelihoods, and the inclusion of Rohingya in future discussions with the AA, other Myanmar stakeholders, and at the upcoming global conference on the Rohingya. These conversations could help lay the groundwork for durable solutions.

But this window is closing fast. Recent aid cuts have already eroded gains in health, safety, and stability. Although the worst-case scenario—cuts to food rations by more than half—was narrowly averted, broader reductions in humanitarian funding are taking a visible toll and pushing refugees toward increasingly desperate coping mechanisms. Lives are at risk. Restoring and increasing aid must be an immediate global priority—not only to meet urgent humanitarian needs, but also to preserve the fragile openings that could allow the Rohingya to envision a future beyond displacement.

Recommendations

The United States and other donor countries should:

Renew humanitarian funding for the Rohingya response, including for food rations and emergency medicine, as well as for key health and protection efforts.
The United States should release funds already pledged to NGOs and clarify a broader range of humanitarian activities that will continue to be eligible for funding, including those related to Gender-Based Violence, psychosocial support, and preventative health.
Engage the interim Bangladeshi government to support and expand access to education and livelihood opportunities for Rohingya refugees.
The United States should resume resettlement of the most vulnerable and at risk Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.

The Interim Government of Bangladesh should:

Work with humanitarian actors to improve access to and quality of education in learning centers in the camps, to accredit education received in the camps, to allow access to higher education, and to expand paid volunteer, skills training, and livelihood opportunities for Rohingya.
Meaningfully include Rohingya civil society and diaspora in preparations for and the holding of the High-Level Meeting on Rohingya in September 2025
Engage with Rohingya civil society in the refugee camps, including through information sharing and participation in discussions with local Rakhine authorities over returns, to prepare refugees for safe return to their homeland when conditions allow.
Initiate and facilitate cross-border delivery of aid through continued dialogue with the political wing of the Arakan Army, the de facto Arakan authorities, across the border in Myanmar. Engage the Myanmar junta on cross-border aid delivery as well, but do not allow it a veto over delivery of lifesaving aid.
Ensure that talks with the AA over eventual repatriation of Rohingya to Rakhine state under safe conditions include Rohingya representation, international monitors, and confidence building measures such as safe return of Rohingya IDPs to areas of origin, go and see visits, and discussion of accountability measures for atrocities committed by the AA.
Work with the World Bank and private sector to explore opportunities – including work permissions and pilot employment projects in special economic zones, in the spirit of and with lessons learned from the Jordan Compact and similar concepts – to support the self-reliance of Rohingya refugees and host communities in Bangladesh.

UN Agencies should:

Facilitate the meaningful inclusion of Rohingya in the planning and execution of the international high-level conference on Rohingya in September 2025.
Engage the interim government of Bangladesh toward improving access to and quality of education in learning centers in the camps, accrediting education received in the camps, allowing access to higher education, and expanding paid volunteer, skills training, and livelihood opportunities for Rohingya refugees.
Work with the interim government and Arakan authorities to facilitate cross-border delivery of aid to Myanmar. Engage the Myanmar military junta on cross-border delivery of aid, but do not allow it a veto over delivery of lifesaving aid.
Monitor any future repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar and engage with Rohingya civil society in the refugee camps, including through information sharing and participation in discussions with local Rakhine authorities over returns, to prepare refugees for safe return to their homeland when conditions allow.

Methodology

In February and March 2025, Refugees International visited Dhaka, Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, and several of the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh to assess the humanitarian response and present conditions Rohingya refugees face. The team included Refugees International’s fellow and former Rohingya camp resident Lucky Karim who is now resettled in the United States. This was her first return to the camps since being resettled in December 2022. The team met with government and UN officials, international and local NGOs, Rohingya refugee-led organizations, and refugee focus groups.

Aid Cuts

Drastic U.S. aid cuts—compounded by smaller reductions from other donors—have had widespread negative impacts on the Rohingya community and are undermining prospects for durable solutions for refugees. These effects persist even without factoring in the narrowly avoided crisis of slashing monthly food rations by more than half, an alarming measure announced in early March 2025 that was ultimately averted.

In January 2025, the new Trump administration announced a global freeze on U.S. foreign aid pending a 90-day review. Waivers were later issued for “lifesaving” programs. However, ambiguity around what qualifies as lifesaving—and the continued failure to disburse previously committed funds—has led to severe cutbacks in Rohingya aid operations in Bangladesh. One aid official told Refugees International that at least $15 million was initially cut to key UN and NGO programs covering child protection, gender-based violence (GBV) prevention, girls education, medical supply chains, and disaster preparedness and recovery. Uncertainty around when discussions for the next round of funding through the U.S. State Department’s Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) bureau will soon leave another $100 million in funding in question. The administration’s broader dismantling of USAID has further contributed to confusion and a sharp decline in essential services for Rohingya refugees.

The 2024 Joint Response Plan (JRP)—the primary framework outlining humanitarian needs and response for the Rohingya in Bangladesh—was only 65 percent funded, with over half of that funding provided by the United States. The suspension of U.S. support therefore had an outsized and immediate impact, threatening both emergency relief and longer-term prospects for stability. In addition, countries including the United Kingdom and Germany have announced their own cuts. The recently launched 2025 plan is seeking $934.5 million for lifesaving aid to 1.5 million Rohingya and host community individuals. To date, the plan is just 16 percent funded. While this is not unusual early in a response plan year, prospects for additional funds are much lower for 2025 than they have been in recent years.

A Rohingya refugee child waiting outside a health clinic that had to reduce all but emergency services due to recent aid cuts. Photo by Khin Maung Thein for Refugees International, February 2025.

During a visit to the camps in March 2025, the Refugees International team observed the widespread impact of recent aid cuts. These included the suspension of non-emergency medical services and a sharp reduction in support for mental health care, GBV prevention, and services for people with disabilities. The main NGO serving people with disabilities was forced to suspend all operations. Five health clinics halted all but emergency treatment, and one NGO estimated that more than 300,000 people had been affected by the loss of medical services. As a result, patients in need of prenatal care, preventative treatment, or chronic illness management were forced to travel long distances—sometimes outside the camps—to obtain prescriptions, often resulting in delayed or forgotten care and worsening health outcomes. Humanitarian officials also reported that plans to provide Hepatitis C treatment to 7,000 people through the World Health Organization were put on hold due to the aid freeze.

Additional service reductions included cuts to GBV prevention and awareness programs, limited support for survivors, shortened operating hours for Women Friendly Spaces, and decreased availability of mental health and psychosocial support—just as demand for such services has spiked amid growing uncertainty and stress caused by the aid cuts.

As one Rohingya man told the team, “In our already dire situation, the U.S. aid freeze is greatly affecting us.”

The dismissal of hundreds of key personnel, including refugee volunteers who received small stipends, has meant both a reduction in services and a significant hit to the ability of individuals and families to supplement their already meager rations. As one refugee shared, “We are already facing numerous hardships in our daily lives, such as fire incidents, human trafficking, kidnapping, domestic violence, and both mental and physical health issues – all of which are directly or indirectly linked to our daily income.”

One former volunteer for an NGO providing care for people with disabilities stated that he can no longer support his family after losing his volunteer stipend. He also expressed concern that due to the lack of opportunities in the camps, he might be forced to undertake a perilous journey by sea in search of work to provide for his family.

The cuts have also caused loss of programs for capacity building among youth, including activities ranging from psychosocial counseling to fire safety and first aid, which one local NGO worker described as “things that make you a community leader.”

At the same time, educational opportunities are also being disrupted. One education-focused NGO reported that previous funding cuts had already led to a significant rise in absenteeism at learning centers. An aid worker further noted that efforts were underway to identify Rohingya girls from the camps to attend the Asian University for Women or BRAC University through Diversity and Inclusion Scholarships—opportunities made possible by USAID funding. However, these were cancelled likely due to the U.S. government’s crackdown on anything with the word “diversity” included.

Halting Refugee Resettlement

Separate from the aid cuts—but closely related—the pause in U.S. refugee resettlement has brought to a standstill a small yet vital pathway to durable solutions for the most vulnerable Rohingya refugees. For 12 years prior to 2022, the government of Bangladesh had stopped any resettlement of Rohingya refugees to the United States, citing fears of creating a pull factor. This continued even after the clear push factor of the genocide in Myanmar in 2017. The United States and Bangladesh finally agreed to restart this pipeline in late 2022. Significant time and resources were invested in re-establishing a resettlement pipeline, but many refugees now remain in limbo. Since Bangladesh began permitting resettlement in late 2022, at least 2,800 Rohingya refugees had been resettled to the United States before the program was halted.

The Trump administration’s suspension of refugee resettlement to the United States since January 20, 2025, has left thousands of people across the globe in limbo, including hundreds of Rohingya refugees who have already gone through extensive background checks, interviews, and medical examinations. Some even had scheduled flights to be reunited with family in the United States that were then cancelled.

Testimony of Rohingya mother of two who lost her husband to suicide following suspension of their resettlement to the United States

“I was born and raised in the refugee camps. I have never seen my country Burma, Myanmar, and my life has always been dangerous, risky. Since my birth, I have always been dependent on humanitarian aid and the small amount of food ration I get from WFP [World Food Program]. So, I only had two hopes, either to get resettled to a third country or to be repatriated to my country Burma one day. So, when finally UNHCR started my process and took me under consideration, I was so happy and waited with excitement. I sold all my belongings, gave my shelter to a new arrival family from Myanmar, my kids left their schools, we had a family gathering party, and I borrowed a lot of money from my relatives and neighbors to buy some warm clothes, shoes, and luggage. The last meeting I had with IOM was about our preparation for the departure. They guided us on what we can take in our bag or what we can’t, and in just two days the announcement from the U.S. came that the resettlement program is stopped. So, immediately my 45 year old husband committed suicide, and we lost him forever. My two young children and I are still sharing the tiny shelter of my in-law’s family, so I hope to get the materials again to rebuild my shelter.”

Narrowly Avoiding a Nightmare Scenario

Cutting food rations in half was narrowly avoided and would have been devastating for more than 1 million Rohingya refugees. In early March, the World Food Program (WFP) announced that, due to funding shortages, as of April 1, it would be cutting rations by more than half. Had the proposed cuts gone forward, more than 1 million refugees would have been forced to survive on just $6 per month. UN agencies and NGOs began communicating the potential impact to refugees, prompting widespread concern across the camps. Just days before the cuts were set to take effect, the United States and other donors stepped in to restore funding. WFP announced it would be able to maintain monthly rations at nearly the same level—$12 per person, down slightly from $12.50. This last-minute intervention was both welcome and lifesaving, averting a humanitarian catastrophe.

However, the broader effects of ongoing aid reductions continue to worsen conditions and cost lives. It remains uncertain how long the current level of food assistance can be sustained. A previous temporary reduction in food rations by one-third led to documented declines in food consumption, spikes in malnutrition, increased incidents of gender-based violence, and lower attendance at learning centers for children. During the reduction, Global Acute Malnutrition in the camps rose above the emergency threshold, reaching the highest levels since hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled genocide in Myanmar to seek safety in Bangladesh in 2017.

UN and NGO officials told Refugees International that, to date, careful prioritization and internal reallocation of funds had helped mitigate the immediate impacts of aid cuts. However, they emphasized that this approach is not sustainable and warned that conditions will deteriorate further—even without drastic reductions in food rations. As one humanitarian official put it, “In the coming months, it’s going to be much worse.”

Interim Government and Camp Conditions

The aid cuts hit just as a new path was taking shape for improving camp conditions under a new interim government of Bangladesh. That government came to power in August 2024 following mass student protests that led to the resignation of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The new government, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, has markedly shifted the tone on Rohingya policy and taken several positive steps—many of which were non-starters under the previous administration.

Notable changes include the appointment of a High Representative on the Rohingya, public support for a global conference on the crisis, and endorsement of more durable materials and designs for safer refugee shelters. The interim government has also openly discussed expanding education and livelihood opportunities for Rohingya refugees. These shifts were reflected in the 2025 Joint Response Plan (JRP), which, for the first time, includes references to livelihoods and spans more than one year. Humanitarian actors also reported more constructive and effective engagement with Bangladeshi officials, particularly on day-to-day problem-solving at the field level.

Despite this progress, the interim government faces serious constraints. With national elections expected between December 2025 and July 2026, it has a short window to implement meaningful change. Bangladesh’s broader governance and economic challenges continue to take precedence over Rohingya policy. These limitations have hindered the impact of recent policy shifts and led to the continuation—or reintroduction—of restrictive measures, especially toward new arrivals.

Rohingya refugees told Refugees International that they have yet to see tangible improvements in their daily lives. Conditions within the camps remain largely dependent on the disposition of local officials, known as Camps-in-Charge (CiCs). Meanwhile, the treatment of newly arriving Rohingya reflects a painful continuity with previous problematic practices. Humanitarian officials reported that over the past year, at least 70,000 Rohingya fled renewed violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State seeking refuge in Bangladesh. More than 9,000 were reportedly pushed back at the border by Bangladeshi authorities.

A young Rohingya refugee boy walks through the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh. February 2025. Photo by Khin Maung Thein for Refugees International, February 2025.

Those recent Rohingya refugees who managed to enter Bangladesh were initially denied official registration. It was only after sustained advocacy by donors and humanitarian actors that the interim government allowed biometric registration of new arrivals, enabling limited access to food assistance. For months, these refugees had to rely on food borrowed from relatives already registered in the camps. New arrivals remain without official UNHCR registration or shelter assistance, forcing many to either crowd into existing shelters or pay high rents to host communities for small plots of land to construct makeshift housing.

One positive, though nuanced, development has been an improvement in camp security. This has been attributed to a truce brokered by Bangladeshi authorities in October 2024 between rival Rohingya armed criminal groups operating within the camps. At the height of inter-group violence, hundreds of refugees were being assaulted or abducted. The ceasefire has helped stabilize the situation, offering some relief to camp residents. According to one report, at least 90 Rohingya were killed in the camps by Rohingya militant groups in 2023 and at least 65 in 2024. Since the agreement, the number of reported killings and shootings in the camps has significantly declined.

However, Rohingya refugees and humanitarian workers reported ongoing forced recruitment of refugees to fight the AA in Rakhine State and kidnappings even amid the relative lull in broader violence. Some observers reported quotas calling upon each household to provide one male recruit. The situation remains volatile, with new killings reported shortly after Refugees International’s visit and the arrest of Ataullah the leader of ARSA, one of the main armed groups, by Bangladeshi authorities in mid-March.

More concerning, Rohingya refugees Refugees International interviewed reported receiving messages from various actors within the camps encouraging them to take up arms and return to Myanmar to fight the AA. The idea that Rohingya refugees could successfully confront the AA—one of Myanmar’s most capable ethnic armed groups—is highly unrealistic and poses serious risks to the safety and well-being of the refugee community. This narrative directly undermines the interim Bangladeshi government’s stated commitment to engage in dialogue with Arakan authorities to facilitate cross-border aid and eventual voluntary repatriation.

While the interim government continues to publicly endorse safe, voluntary, and dignified returns in line with international law, the contradictory messaging circulating within the camps threatens to destabilize conditions and jeopardize long-term prospects for return. This counter-narrative not only endangers individual refugees but also weakens momentum toward a political resolution.

Despite these challenges, the interim government’s constructive public stance has opened space for meaningful improvements in the lives of Rohingya refugees and the long-term prospects for safe and sustainable repatriation. However, sustained international support will be essential to capitalize on this opportunity.

The United States and other donors should urgently reconsider recent aid cuts and work with the interim government to expand access to education and livelihood opportunities for Rohingya refugees. This should include increased support for learning centers, the establishment of additional female-only classes, and the expansion of higher education access both within Bangladesh and through international scholarships. Vocational training and volunteer stipend programs should also be scaled up, and pilot initiatives launched to extend livelihood opportunities to both Rohingya and host communities. To advance this agenda, the interim government and donors should engage with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the private sector to identify and support sustainable, inclusive solutions. The World Bank has already provided millions of dollars in development grants in recent years that have sought to help the host community and refugees alike. Additional grants will be an important part of building self-reliance, but are unlikely to cover the gap in humanitarian funding. The private sector can play a bigger role through government partnerships that address local hiring needs and employ refugees and host communities alike, along the lines of – and with lessons learned from – the Jordan Compact, as proposed by various experts in recent years. For example, such pilots should ensure that safe means and permissions for transport to areas of work are well planned and recognized. A key part of this compact was to drive growth and job creation for all in the country, including through work permits for refugees and the use of special economic zones.

A Women’s Center inside the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh where limited skills training activities are taking place. Photo by Refugees International, February 2025.

Rakhine and the Arakan Army

The hopes of both Bangladesh and the Rohingya community writ large are for the safe return of the Rohingya to their homeland in Rakhine state. Recent dynamics on the battlefields of Myanmar have opened up the glimmer of a way forward. Namely, the AA has taken control of most of Rakhine state, including along the Bangladesh border. Bangladeshi officials have already opened a dialogue about cross-border aid and repatriation of Rohingya. This is an avenue worth exploring, but it will require careful dialogue, including the Rohingya community, and confidence building measures.

However, the reality is that the AA is responsible for committing atrocities against the Rohingya people, and the Rohingya community retains a fundamental distrust of them. Working towards some semblance of social cohesion and safety for returns will take significant and sustained effort. There is a path, if confidence building measures are taken and some form of monitoring and guarantees are provided by Bangladesh and the United Nations.

Several Rohingya refugees with whom Refugees International spoke expressed incredulity about the idea that they could return in the short term to a Rakhine State under AA control. However, over time, they also recognized the need for the Rakhine and Rohingya to co-exist in peace and safety. As one civil society leader said, referring to Rakhine state as Arakan, “there is no Arakan without Rohingya and no Arakan without Rakhine. We need peaceful coexistence.”

Bangladesh and the international community hold some leverage with the AA as it seeks legitimacy and a stable border with its relatively powerful neighbor. The Myanmar military has not gone away, maintaining a foothold in Rakhine’s capital city of Sittwe, and retains the ability to conduct air strikes across Rakhine. It is also worth noting that in early April 2025, the military junta in Myanmar announced that it had approved 180,000 Rohingya for repatriation to Myanmar, but without control over most of Rakhine state the announcement is largely symbolic.

For its part, the AA could quickly demonstrate goodwill via its treatment of the several hundred thousand Rohingya still living in Rakhine, including allowing them to leave IDP camps and return to rebuild their original villages. They could also allow in crossborder aid and international observers and investigators. The Bangladeshi government is seeking to facilitate a dialogue between Rohingya refugees and representatives of the AAs political wing. Who represents the Rohingya community in these talks, however, remains unclear. It will be important to ensure that it is not the voices of only a chosen few that are included, but rather a broader swath of Rohingya civil society.

Most immediately, delivery of cross-border aid should be initiated and facilitated. This will be an important lifeline for many in Rakhine state, parts of which are already facing stark increases in food insecurity. Earlier calls for cross-border aid faced opposition by the Myanmar junta and the Bangladesh government, but the new reality of AA control of the border and a recognition by the interim government of Bangladesh that getting aid into Myanmar is in its interests has created new possibilities. Such aid will face several challenges, including land mines along the border, armed criminal groups outside the control of the AA, and the ability of the military junta to carry out airstrikes in areas outside its control. The Myanmar military junta can also complicate discussions over cross-border aid and repatriation through the United Nations, which has indicated that the junta would need to agree to cross-border aid. But such lifesaving aid should not be subject to a veto by the junta. Global aid cuts further challenge the prospects of scaling up cross-border aid as humanitarian efforts both in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and across Myanmar have been diminished in capacity amid growing need. But these challenges are not insurmountable and Bangladeshi officials, supported by the UN and donor countries, should continue to pursue the delivery of lifesaving aid.

Global High-level Conference on the Rohingya

During Refugees International’s visit to Bangladesh, many of those interviewed raised hopes around a global conference on the Rohingya, initially proposed by Bangladesh and championed by Malaysia and Finland. The high-level international conference on the Rohingya has now been made official through a UN General Assembly resolution and is set to take place in New York on September 30, 2025. The resolution, importantly, includes references to inclusion and consultations with Rohingya refugees. It also comes following several high-level visits to Bangladesh and the Rohingya refugee camps (including the UN Special Envoy for Myanmar, the UNHCR chief, and the UN Secretary General). This display of high-level and sustained diplomatic attention is welcomed.

International officials who spoke with Refugees International expressed intentions to consult the Rohingya community in advance of the upcoming global conference. However, identifying a representative and inclusive mechanism for such consultation remains a significant challenge. There is no unified leadership among the Rohingya—whether in the diaspora, in the camps, or within Myanmar. In the camps, those most able to speak publicly are often perceived by the broader community as being influenced by Bangladeshi security and intelligence services, while many others are unable to express themselves freely due to safety concerns. Rohingya civil society members Refugees International interviewed voiced deep frustration at being excluded from key discussions about their future.

Despite these obstacles, it is critical that Bangladesh, along with the conference co-hosts—Malaysia and Finland—and other supporting countries, work proactively with the Rohingya community to ensure the inclusion of representative and diverse voices. This could include camp-wide surveys, structured consultations, and roundtables that connect diaspora leaders with camp residents, and should intentionally include youth and women leaders to reflect the diversity of the Rohingya population.

Lucky Karim, co-author of this report, looking over the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Photo by Khin Maung Thein for Refugees International, February 2025.

Conclusion

After nearly eight years of displacement and restricted living conditions in Bangladesh, early signs of a potential pathway toward durable solutions for the Rohingya refugee crisis have begun to emerge. Though fragile and facing significant challenges, the new openness of Bangladesh’s interim government—combined with evolving dynamics in Myanmar—has created an opportunity to advance both greater self-reliance for Rohingya refugees in the camps and the long-term goal of safe, voluntary return to Rakhine State.

The months ahead represent a narrowing window to engage constructively with the interim government and to meaningfully involve the Rohingya community in the lead-up to the global conference. Failing to seize this moment risks undermining both immediate conditions in the camps and the broader prospects for a just and sustainable resolution. International donors, who have long invested in these efforts, should not walk away now.

Featured Image: Lucky Karim, co-author of this report, visiting the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh for the first time since being resettled to the United States. Photo by Khin Maung Thein for Refugees International, February 2025.