| UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE NORTH KOREAN
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2004 The United States government has been powerless to involve itself directly in protecting North Koreans in China and has been unable to effect a change in Chinese policy. High-level officials in the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration insist that Chinese treatment of North Korean asylum seekers does enter into the bilateral human rights dialogue, but if so, it does so at the level of quiet diplomacy rather than through public statements at the annual meetings of the UNHCR Executive Committee, of which China is a member, or the annual meetings of the UN Human Rights Commission. U.S. diplomacy on this issue has produced few, if any, results to date. With the government stymied and U.S.-based activism on North Korea human rights issues increasing in 2002 and 2003, the U.S. Congress took action in 2004 through the passage in October of the North Korean Human Rights Act. This ambitious and broad-based bill includes two provisions of relevance to the protection of North Koreans seeking safety and material support outside their homeland. Title II of the Act authorizes an annual expenditure of $20 million to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, defectors, migrants, and orphans, which may include support to refugee camps and temporary settlements, and to women victims of trafficking. Title III clarifies that North Koreans should not be barred from eligibility for resettlement in the U.S. due to any legal claim they may have to citizenship in South Korea and that the Department of State should seek to facilitate the submission of resettlement applications by North Koreans. The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 is valuable as an expression of Congressional concern regarding the plight of North Koreans outside their country. Without a change in Chinese policy, however, its provisions related to North Koreans outside of their homeland are likely to remain a statement of Congressional intent rather than having an immediate practical impact. Current assistance efforts, for example, are carried out either clandestinely or on a scale deliberately limited so as not to provoke a crackdown by the Chinese authorities. There is no way to program $20 million effectively on assistance activities in China, as responsible agencies would refuse to devise programs on that scale. Further, large-scale programs would inevitably provoke a Chinese response, which could escalate to a clampdown on all assistance or a decision to attempt to close all movement across the border. The State Department’s 2005 report on the status of North Korean asylum seekers, submitted to comply with a specific provision of the North Korean Human Rights Act, states pointedly that “governments hosting North Korean refugees would strongly oppose direct USG [U.S. Government]-funded assistance for North Korean refugees on their territories.”42 As for camps as a protection strategy, their establishment in China is neither necessary nor politically feasible. South Korean activists have proposed establishing camps for North Koreans in Mongolia, but the Mongolian government is ambivalent about this proposal. Any large-scale movement of North Koreans into Mongolia could only happen with the concurrence of the Chinese, who are likely to view any such movement across their territory as having a negative impact on their security and on their relations with the North Korean government. Accepting North Koreans for resettlement is equally problematic. China blocks independent access to North Koreans on their territory, so a diplomatic agreement with the U.S. would be necessary to establish an open refugee resettlement process. This is unlikely without a dramatic change in Chinese policy. Small numbers of North Koreans are reaching countries as far away as Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, and Thailand. American embassy staff in Southeast Asian countries should be on the lookout for North Korean asylum seekers and be prepared to consider them for possible resettlement in the U.S., especially for family reunification cases. Post-9/11 security concerns, however, present another obstacle. The U.S. refugee resettlement program has slowed dramatically as the Departments of State and Homeland Security work out procedures to screen potential resettlement populations. Given the real possibility of deliberate infiltration of U.S. territory by North Korean government agents, the screening of North Korean refugees seeking resettlement in the U.S. is likely to be painfully slow. The U.S. needs to pursue a more serious and persistent diplomatic strategy with China, which remains the primary obstacle to improving the protection available to North Korean asylum seekers. Changing Chinese policy requires a consistent and effective interlocutor, one whom the Chinese trust. The Bush Administration should consider the quiet appointment of a senior retired official of ambassadorial rank or higher who has credibility with the Chinese to engage government officials in informal discussion of this issue. If the Chinese authorities hear consistent messages of concern about the plight of North Koreans in China from an individual that they trust, perhaps the government will be moved to adopt at least the minimalist protection strategy of quietly halting arrests and deportations. |
Executive Summary Introduction The Scope of the Problem The Motivation for Leaving The Situation in China Treatment Upon Deportation The Case for Refugee Status for North Koreans in China Protection for North Koreans in China South Korean Policy United States Policy and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 Recommendations ----------- Notes Appendix: Interviews between Refugees International and North Korean Refugees Acknowledgments |
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Acts of Betrayal: US Policy
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