SOUTH KOREAN POLICYThe official policy of the South Korean government, “[b]ased on brotherly love toward fellow Koreans and universal humanitarianism,” is to “accommodate all those North Korean refugees who wish to come to the South.”40 Annual arrivals have increased from the single digits in the early 90s to 583 in 2001, 1,141 in 2002, 1,281 in 2003, and 1,894 in 2004.41 While the increase is significant, the numbers are still small compared to the numbers of North Korean refugees presently residing illegally in China and the potential number of migrants who would seek freedom and economic opportunity in the South if the border between the two countries were open. In an interview with Refugees International (RI) in December 2003, Ministry of Unification officials clearly stated that they are not interested in providing impetus or encouragement for more North Koreans to leave their country. The South Korean government is not sympathetic to any strategy that would involve stimulating a large-scale refugee exodus to help destabilize the North Korean regime. In the words of a senior Ministry of Unification official, their job is “to manage Korean affairs in a stable manner” and in this context the government provides support to all North Koreans who can make it to the South. If the numbers are low, so be it. The South Korean government and South Korean citizens have a striking ambivalence about the suffering of North Koreans. Citizens fear economic turmoil if North Koreans are admitted in large numbers, while their solidarity is limited by disdain for the poverty and lack of sophistication of North Koreans. As for the government, commitment to reconciliation on the Korean peninsula locates the fundamental solution of humanitarian issues in gradual political change in North Korea that will result from engagement, rather than in large-scale acceptance of refugees, an act that would anger the leaders of North Korea. The result is a marked lack of commitment by South Korea to offer resettlement to North Koreans. With proactive measures unlikely, the low annual arrivals reflect the sheer difficulty of reaching the South. As described above, Chinese policy is to arrest and deport North Korean asylum seekers and block their access to the South Korean and other consulates on their territory. Thus, North Koreans must brave incredible dangers to reach the South, traveling across China from the border region to Beijing with the goal of reaching an embassy or, assisted by brokers out for profit or a network of refugee activists operating illegally on Chinese soil, heading south to neighboring countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Thailand, where they purchase illegal travel documents or present themselves at South Korean consulates. Along every step of these journeys of several thousand miles, they risk arrest and possible deportation to North Korea. Officials from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification told RI that the government has entered into discussions with China about their treatment of North Korean refugees. They have urged them to stop arresting and deporting law-abiding refugees and to allow those who wish to seek asylum in South Korea to do so. China has cooperated on individual cases, allowing, for example, 50 North Koreans, out of a total of 120 occupying the South Korean consulate in Beijing, to enter South Korea in 2003. But the basic Chinese policy of treating North Koreans as illegal economic migrants remains in place. Refugee activists with South Korean NGOs questioned South Korea’s ability to influence China on this issue, considering South Korea’s dependence on cordial relations with China to maintain its economic growth and to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Those refugees lucky and brave enough to reach the South are first subject to interrogation to weed out any spies or security risks. They then spend eight weeks at Hanawon, a special processing facility where they receive training that addresses the psychological stress of the journey and the adaptation to a new country and how to overcome cultural differences; basic vocational and life skills training is also provided. While the early refugee populations consisted largely of single men, recent arrivals include more families and unaccompanied women and children. Until 2004, the refugees received a generous financial package that dated from the early days of the refugee program when individual defectors were lavished with support to make a political statement about the wealth and generosity of the South Korean government compared to the impoverished North. Each head of household received a cash stipend of $32,000, paid in three installments, and dependents received an additional $6,500 each. The South Korean government, recognizing that such large cash payments were helping to fuel expensive payments to brokers charging high fees for facilitating movement from North Korea and China to South Korean consulates, has taken steps to reduce the cash component of the support package. Individuals now receive about $10,000 in cash upfront, with the $25,000 balance going towards direct payments for subsidized housing in public rental apartments, support for education and further vocational training, and job placement. Despite this generous financial support, North Koreans face tremendous challenges adapting and integrating into South Korean society. North Korea is a cradle-to-grave welfare state, albeit at a level of absolute poverty and deprivation for all but the elite, in which the omniscient North Korean Workers Party intrudes in every aspect of the life of its citizens. According to South Korean NGO workers with extensive experience working with North Koreans, the refugees feel totally lost and without support in the atomized modern culture of South Korea. This feeling of isolation is compounded by the fact that despite public expressions of intra-ethnic solidarity, South Koreans have little empathy for their Northern brethren, considering them unsophisticated visitors from a hostile country. North Korean children have an especially tough time. The Southern school system is hyper-competitive and exam-oriented, and North Korean children just can’t cope. Further, South Korean children isolate and reject North Korean students, leaving the latter with little choice but to express their frustration in random acts of disobedience. South Korean religious groups are actively involved in trying to develop alternative programs to ease the transition for North Korean refugees. The Exalting Freedom School, run by a pastor and his wife, provides supplementary education to 45 refugees, mainly young adults trying to make their way through Korean universities. The confidence and ease of expression of the students were striking, especially compared to the fearful refugees whom RI interviewed in China. Good Friends, a Buddhist human rights NGO, has established a “good neighbors” program, which pairs refugees with South Korean volunteers who assist them with the basics of surviving daily life in Seoul and other Korean cities. These programs are small, however, and are meeting only a fraction of the needs for transitional support for the North Korean refugees. The success of refugee resettlement programs in the United States has derived from local-level partnerships between the government and non-governmental volunteers and professional service providers. As generous as the South Korean government is to North Korean refugees, similar partnerships would make a substantial contribution to easing the transition and integration of North Korean refugees into the South. The South Korean government should increase its financial support to Korean non-governmental organizations for alternative education, vocational training, and life skills programs for North Korean refugees. South Korea should also strengthen its protection efforts on behalf of North Korean refugees, engaging with China to allow more North Koreans to seek asylum legally and making efforts to identify and protect North Koreans in other Southeast Asian countries. If these efforts are successful, the numbers of North Koreans entering the South will increase. The South Korean government should be open to this possibility, resisting the temptation to keep refugee resettlement numbers artificially low. |
Executive Summary Introduction The Scope of the Problem The Motivation for Leaving The Situation in China Treatment Upon Deportation The Case for Refugee Status for North Koreans in China Protection for North Koreans in China South Korean Policy United States Policy and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 Recommendations ----------- Notes Appendix: Interviews between Refugees International and North Korean Refugees Acknowledgments |
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Acts of Betrayal: South Korean Policy
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