PROTECTION FOR NORTH KOREANS IN CHINAWhile the case for the presumption of refugee status for North Koreans in China may be clear, translating it into practical protection measures remains elusive. China continues to deflect political pressure, whether brought by UNHCR or by governments, to modify its stance that all North Koreans in China are illegal economic migrants. The Chinese position fits well within a global trend of reducing opportunities for asylum seekers to receive an impartial review of their claims. In fact, the relative tolerance by China of the presence of North Koreans in Yanbian contrasts favorably with the United States interception and deportation of Haitian asylum seekers, the European proposal to confine African asylum seekers to internment camps in Libya, and Australia’s “Pacific Solution,” which dumps Asian asylum seekers on tiny islands in the Pacific far from Australian shores. The public profile of the issue of the human rights of North Koreans in China is increasing, however. Activists on this issue, who belong primarily to Christian evangelical churches and affiliated conservative organizations with close ties to the Bush Administration, and their supporters in the U.S. Congress, have a proven record of tenaciously working on an issue until it begins to achieve critical mass in the public consciousness, at least in the United States.36 China is such a powerful country, and therefore so essential to the achievement of long-term U.S. strategic objectives in east Asia, that the North Korea refugee issue is unlikely ever to rise to the level of disrupting bilateral relations. But it will be an irritant, and China’s hosting of the Olympics in 2008 provides a medium-term organizing target for activists seeking more direct action to protect North Koreans in China. China has two legitimate security concerns: criminal acts committed by North Koreans on Chinese soil and the prospect of a large-scale influx of North Koreans into their territory, triggered either by social upheaval inside North Korea or by massive response to a more liberal asylum regime. As is its right, China is taking steps to enforce security in the border region and clamp down on criminal activity. The likelihood of social upheaval in North Korea relates directly to the need to work for de-nuclearization and some form of peaceful political evolution in the DPRK, a process with which China is fully engaged. As for liberalizing its treatment of North Korean migrants, China has policy options which would be unlikely to provoke a massive outflow in response. The simplest option for China is to halt all deportations of North Koreans, except for those who commit criminal acts. This step could be taken quietly so as not to provoke a large response from North Koreans in their home country. As an immediate humanitarian gesture, China could also grant legal residency to the spouses of Chinese citizens and their children. The next level of policy options for China requires greater political commitment to resolve the issue of North Korean migration than is likely to be demonstrated in the near term. Additional steps could include granting all North Koreans in China indefinite humanitarian status37 or providing North Koreans with a special resident visa if they can show that they have employment and shelter.38 A blanket, one-time amnesty for all North Koreans in China, with permission to remain in the country, is another possible approach.39 These options share the advantage of allowing North Koreans to live in China rather than being based on an approach that envisages their eventually being settled as refugees in South Korea or the United States. One of the striking aspects of Refugees International’s interviews in Yanbian was the number of North Koreans who saw remaining in China as their best option, due to cultural compatibility and proximity to their homes in North Korea in case they wished to return to see their relatives, to respond to a family emergency, or to return in the event of a fundamental political change. Few people that RI interviewed were prepared to make the definitive break with their lives in North Korea that going to South Korea or to the United States would entail. This attitude may be changing as activists raise expectations among North Koreans in China in response to the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, with its large sums of money allocated for support to refugee programs and its commitment to the resettlement of North Koreans in the United States. The next level of policy options for China enters the utopian realm in which it would honor its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol and allow UNHCR unimpeded access to North Koreans in China to review their overall situation and conduct individual status determinations, which would lead inevitably to the granting of refugee status to the majority of North Koreans in China. From a refugee rights perspective, this is really the only acceptable policy option, but it is the one that is least achievable. Nonetheless, advocating for this option has to be the starting point for any principled campaign to protect North Koreans in China. |
Executive Summary Introduction The Scope of the Problem The Motivation for Leaving The Situation in China Treatment Upon Deportation The Case for Refugee Status for North Koreans in China Protection for North Koreans in China South Korean Policy United States Policy and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 Recommendations ----------- Notes Appendix: Interviews between Refugees International and North Korean Refugees Acknowledgments |
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Acts of Betrayal: Protection for North Koreans in China
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