EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
North Koreans fleeing deprivation
and political oppression
in their homeland have no choice but to cross the border into the
People’s Republic of China.
The exodus,which increased substantially with the advent of
famine in North
Korea in
the mid-90s, presents acute humanitarian and human rights dilemmas to:
- The government of China,
which
must assure its security and the integrity of its borders while
fulfilling its obligations
under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees;
- The Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, which is prevented by the Chinese from
assessing the
situation for North Koreans in China
directly;
- The government of South Korea,
which, while willing to accept North Koreans who reach South Korean
consulates
as refugees, is not proactive in providing protection for North Koreans
in
China for fear of offending the Chinese and North Korean
governments;
- The government of the United States, which, while concerned
about the
situation of North Koreans in China,
is unwilling to make their treatment a major point of discussion in its
ongoing
political and human rights dialogue with the Chinese government.
The actual number of North Koreans in China
is
unknown. In its 2005 report on the status of North Korean asylum
seekers, the
U.S. State Department estimates that the current number is between
30,000 and
50,000.
The primary motivation for North Koreans to leave their
country is survival. China
considers all North Koreans entering the country to be economic
migrants, but this does not do justice to the level of suffering
and deprivation that they experience.
The North Koreans interviewed by Refugees International (RI) in
2003 and 2004 were almost all
facing extreme circumstances when they left their homeland: food
deprivation as the
result of the collapse of the Public Distribution System, which
supplied the basic food basket to
North Korean families until the mid-90s famine; loss of
employment as state enterprises
ceased to function; death of family members in the famine, which
shattered the support networks
for the individual; health problems, either personal or of a
family member, which led
the individual to seek money for medicines in China.
The vast majority of the North Koreans that RI interviewed were from North Hamgyong province,
one of the poorest provinces in the country and one deliberately cut
off from national and international food assistance
during the famine as part of a “triage” strategy to husband
scarce food resources.
The lives of North Koreans in China are ones of constant
fear of
arrest and deportation. They have no good options to live freely
and meet their
basic needs, and the few courageous individuals and organizations
seeking to provide protection
and assistance, whether Korean-Chinese, South Korean, or the rare
few from outside the
region, are themselves under constant pressure from the Chinese
authorities to curtail
their activities or risk expulsion.
Men have a difficult time finding
sanctuary in China
because
they need to support themselves outside the home and traveling to
find day labor exposes
them to police searches. The overwhelming majority of North Korean
women
seeking to stay in China
establish relationships with Chinese men, either through brokers
or directly, as a
survival strategy. While North Korean women sometimes find
compatible companions and end up
in loving relationships, most are — in effect — trafficked,
sold to Chinese men or to
the owners of brothels and karaoke bars. North Korean children
are also vulnerable.
Only a small percentage has access to education. They stay at
home or in shelters all day to avoid
detection. They cannot work. They are constantly worried about
their families, either in North Korea
or China.
In the poignant words of one teenage boy, “The situation here
does not allow
me to dream about my future.”
There is a compelling case for the majority of North Koreans in China
to be considered refugees. It rests on two pillars:
1. The nature of the North Korean political system and its impact on
access to public goods, especially food;
2. The North Korean treatment of those arrested and deported from China
as mandated by the country’s Criminal Code.
In North Korea access to public goods — food, education, health care,
shelter, employment — cannot be separated from the all-pervasive system
of political
persecution. The North Korean population is divided into three classes:
core, wavering, and hostile.
The class status of each family is for life and transfers from
generation to generation. Members
of the hostile class are the last to receive entitlements, which is
disastrous when a
comprehensive welfare regime such as that established in North Korea
collapses, as it did from 1994
onwards. Thus, an entire class of individuals is persecuted through the
functioning of North Korea’s
political system. In this context, there is no meaningful way to
separate economic deprivation
from political persecution.
In addition to the fundamental
discrimination within the North Korean
political system, the government further limits access to food and the
economic means of
survival through a variety of policies that control the lives of North
Korean citizens. The
government controls movement within the country by requiring travel
passes to move outside one’s
community of origin. Since foraging for food or looking for employment
wherever it can be
found are essential survival strategies at times of food shortages,
limits on travel
further prevent North Korean citizens from meeting their basic needs.
The government restricts the
activities of international relief agencies, declaring certain areas of
the country off limits and
preventing independent monitoring of the relief supplies provided.
Thus, most North Koreans crossing the border into China are fleeing
state-sponsored denial of their human rights. Members of the “hostile
class” and residents of
areas deliberately cut off from international food assistance have an
especially strong case to be
considered refugees in the sense of fleeing targeted persecution. But
the denial of basic
rights extends more broadly, and the hunger that drives people to flee
is the direct result of the
political system that has been created by the leaders of the North
Korean government. Not since
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge has a government succeeded in creating
such an
all-encompassing reality of oppression and restrictions on the basic
rights of the majority of its
citizens. North Koreans fleeing their country, therefore, have a case
for refugee status as
compelling as those fleeing Cambodia from 1975 to 1978.
The second pillar of the case for considering North Koreans in China
for refugee status is the treatment they receive upon deportation.
Leaving the country without
permission is illegal under the North Korean Criminal Code. North
Koreans arrested in China
and deported are subject to punishments ranging from several months in
a labor training
center to long prison terms and even execution for individuals
suspected or confirmed to have
met with foreigners or converted to Christianity with the intention of
becoming
missionaries inside North Korea. Conditions in the labor training
centers and prisons are harsh. Food
rations are minimal and the work consists of hard labor such as digging
canals and constructing
roads. No medical care is available and prisoners too ill to work are
often released so that
the individuals do not die while in custody.
The universality of the punishment for leaving the country violates
thefundamental right to leave one’s own country, a right enshrined both
in the Universal
Declarationof Human Rights, Article 13(2) and the International
Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Article 12(2), to which the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) is a
state party.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The case for granting refugee status to North Koreans in China is
compelling, but without changes in the policy of the People’s Republic
of China, it is impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, any principled
campaign to protect North Koreans in China must start by convincing
China to: 1) Honor its obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention
and 1967 Protocol; and 2) allow UNHCR unimpeded access to North Koreans
to review their overall situation and conduct individual status
determinations. This would likely result in the granting of refugee
status to a significant number of North Koreans.
In the meantime, a practical, near-term protection strategy must first
and foremost seek to establish greater security for North Koreans in
China. China, South Korea, and the United States have policy options
available to them which would significantly enhance the protection of
North Koreans outside their country without jeopardizing regional or
national security.
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REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT:
The Government of the
People’s
Republic of China:
- Take immediate humanitarian steps to
protect North Koreans in China, including halting all deportations of
North Koreans, except for those who commit criminal acts, and granting
legal residence to the spouses of Chinese citizens and their children.
- Take additional steps to normalize
the
situation for North Koreans inChina, including the granting of
indefinite humanitarian status and providing North Koreans with a
special resident visa if they can demonstrate that they have employment
and shelter.
- Grant a one-time blanket amnesty,
with
permissio to remain in the country, for all North Koreans in China.
- Fulfill its obligations under the
1951
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and
allow the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees unimpeded
access to North Koreans in China to review their overall situation and
conduct individual status determinations. China should abide by
all UNHCR decisions regarding the granting of refugee status.
The Government
of South Korea:
- Become more proactive in its efforts
to
protect North Korean refugees by engaging with China to allow more
North Koreans to seek asylum legally and making efforts to identify and
protect North Koreans in other Southeast Asian countries. If these
efforts are successful, South Korea should increase the number of North
Koreans accepted as refugees.
- Recognize that North Korean refugees
need
more time to adapt to life in South Korea and provide financial support
to Korean non-governmental organizations for alternative education,
vocational, and life skills programs.
The Government
of the United States:
- In the context of its ongoing human
rights
dialogue with Beijing, press the Chinese government to adopt measures
to protect North Koreans in China, starting with immediately halting
arrests and deportations and granting legal residence to the spouses of
Chinese citizens and their children.
- Quietly appoint a senior retired
official
of ambassadorial rank or higher who has credibility with the Chinese
authorities to engage in informal discussions of this issue and convey
consistent messages of concern about the plight of North Koreans in
China.
- Move cautiously to implement the
assistance
provisions of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 for North
Koreans outside their country, being careful to ensure that funding is
provided on an appropriate scale for the operating environment in the
border region. Avoid support for the establishment of camps for North
Koreans in China or in neighboring countries.
- Offer technical support to the
Government
of South Korea in the area of refugee resettlement and integration. If
the offer is accepted, the United States should support technical
missions of U.S. non-governmental organizations with experience
resettling isolated refugee populations.
The Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees:
- Continue to press the Chinese
government to
fulfill its obligations under the 1951 Convention Related to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and allow UNHCR unimpeded access to
North Koreans in China.
- Increase the agency’s public profile
on the
issue of protecting North Koreans in China, taking advantage of
opportunities for senior officials to raise concerns regarding
protection and lack of access in UNHCR Standing Committee and Executive
Committee meetings, open forums and the international media.
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