Refugees International recommends that:
Improving
security
1. Invest in the FARDC:
- The DRC request that the United States and
other donors invest in the FARDC by increasing salaries, extending and
improving training, and supporting the prosecution of soldiers and
their superiors as necessary for abuses, especially rape.
- All countries and donors supporting the
FARDC, including regional actors such as South Africa and Angola as
well as MONUC, participate fully in security sector reform coordinating
mechanisms, with a particular focus on standardizing training.
- The Congolese military and government
officials fully commit to the reform of the FARDC and develop a plan
for a new phase of integration, including recruiting more qualified
candidates while weeding out current unqualified troops; improving
training; and setting a realistic timeline for integration that
responds to needs rather than political pressure. Training must include
specific components to eliminate abuses, particularly rape.
2. Expand MONUC:
- The new Congolese government request, and
the UN Security Council authorize, a twelve-month expansion of MONUC,
adding four additional battalions to protect civilians and facilitate a
strong humanitarian response; deter armed groups while encouraging
their disarmament and demobilization; support FARDC reform; and enforce
the embargo on weapons and natural resources.
- MONUC deploy additional battalions to North
Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, and Ituri as soon as possible, with longer
deployments to priority areas, including borders and custom points.
- The U.S. pay its full assessed contribution
for UN peacekeeping missions to ensure that the Security Council
resolutions it approves will actually be implemented.
- Troop contributing countries such as
Bangladesh, Morocco, Uruguay, Pakistan, and Nepal fully implement all
aspects of MONUC’s mandate.
- The U.S. and others with the appropriate
capacity work with MONUC to increase its intelligence capacity or the
information available to it, especially for monitoring weapon flows and
other support for armed groups.
3. Modify the military strategy in the east:
- MONUC and the FARDC use their increased
military capacity as a complement to peaceful, practical efforts to
disarm and demobilize armed groups.
- MONUC, the multi-country demobilization and
reintegration program, and UNDP organize a special disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration process for Congolese members of the
ADF/NALU
- in North Kivu to balance the amnesty
program offered by Uganda for Ugandan members.
- MONUC deploy troops closer to FDLR bases to
facilitate the voluntary demobilization of those wishing to leave the
FDLR.
- Rwanda do more to draw back FDLR members to
Rwanda, clarifying amnesty policies and modifying current radio
broadcasts aimed at the FDLR to be more positive and consistent.
- MONUC, UNHCR, and the Congolese authorities
consider resettlement options for FDLR combatants who want to disarm
but are unwilling to settle in Rwanda.
- MONUC and the FARDC provide security
guarantees for the Congolese Tutsi minority, to reduce support for the
rebel general Laurent Nkunda.
4. Rwanda and Uganda begin enforcing the embargo on weapons and natural
resources, with the U.S. and the United Kingdom, as supporters of the
two countries, assisting them as well as holding them accountable
(through the UN Security Council if necessary) for violations.
Improving
humanitarian assistance
- The new president of the DRC appoint a
high-level
coordinator for humanitarian affairs; the new prime minister promote
the most technically qualified staff to head relevant ministries both
at the national and provincial levels; and the new national assembly
establish a committee to monitor humanitarian needs and response.
- OCHA and UNICEF, as the lead agencies
responsible for the
Rapid Response Mechanism, pursue improvements to the system with NGOs,
by conducting ongoing risk assessments and contingency plans for new
and unexpected crises, and supporting specific efforts to assess and
meet needs for small, previously unassisted groups of IDPs or other
vulnerable groups affected by the conflict.
- Donors continue to fund the Rapid Response
Mechanism,
either through the Pooled Fund or directly to UNICEF and OCHA.
- Donors, OCHA, and NGOs confer to identify
and address needs
and trends related to camp management.
- Donors and WFP ensure that there is enough
food delivered
and distributed in a timely and effi cient manner to meet the needs in
the DRC.
- The Congolese government, donors, and
implementing agencies
expand assistance to survivors of rape, replicating current projects
that combine trauma counseling and medical care with legal assistance
and community support.
- Donors, UN agencies, government agencies,
and NGOs
accelerate efforts within the Early Recovery Cluster to develop and
implement a comprehensive plan to encourage and facilitate the return
and resettlement of IDPs, refugees, and excombatants. In particular,
those involved need to identify and support model return and
reintegration projects and prioritize efforts to deal with the
overwhelming number of people and communities needing assistance.
- The Congolese government ensure that an
appropriate
judicial process is available to adjudicate land disputes as IDPs and
refugees return home.
- International NGOs engage more fully in the
DRC, in all
areas requiring a humanitarian response: assessing needs, soliciting
funds, implementing projects, advocating for the displaced, and
building local response capacity.
- NGOs improve recruitment and retention of
qualified,
experienced staff.
- Donors and UN agencies work to improve
their relationship
with NGOs, to regard them more as collaborative partners with specific
knowledge and strategies based on field experience rather than as
contractors hired to execute a predetermined work plan.
- Donors begin immediately to channel funding
to address the
chronic problems of underdevelopment that are exacerbated by the
conflict, without waiting for a new government or large-scale
development agencies to establish themselves.
- Humanitarian agencies, as the best placed
to meet immediate
needs in the transition from relief to development, demonstrate that
they can work in a way more sustainable than traditional relief
activities require, in order to attract the kind of development funding
that will increasingly replace humanitarian funding in the DRC.
Improving funding
- Donors increase funding for humanitarian
response in the
DRC, including security and peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and
coordination. Current donors must increase their already substantial
contributions; other governments must make their first contributions.
- Donors, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in
the DRC, and the
World Bank work to manage the shift from humanitarian to development
funding, ensuring that implementing agencies do not have to suspend
projects and lay off experienced staff while development funding is
approved and development agencies establish themselves.
- The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC,
UNDP, donors
such as the UK, and OCHA improve the Pooled Fund. The process must be
shortened and made more efficient; UNDP must revise its
procedures to disburse funds quickly.
- The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC
make sure that
impact increases through the use of the Pooled Fund, with a critical
eye on the possibility that UN agencies are being favored in the
process at the expense of efficiency, flexibility, and community
collaboration available through NGOs.
- Donors to the Pooled Fund remain aware that
accepting funds
from it could compromise NGO operational effectiveness and security
through association with MONUC, and continue to fund NGOs directly if
necessary.
- The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC
and OCHA develop
a new strategy for increasing donor contributions for projects outlined
in the 2007 Action Plan. The strategy should take into account donor
misgivings over the needs expressed by UN agencies and their ability to
manage funds efficiently associated with the 2006 appeal.
Improving
coordination
- MONUC ensure that its military commanders
maintain
professional and open communication with their humanitarian
counterparts, to ensure the best coordination possible between these
two parts of the mission.
- UNHCR and UNDP move quickly to complete the
rollout of the
Early Recovery Cluster, especially in Katanga, the Kivus, and Ituri.
UNHCR, given its involvement in both groups, should join with MONUC to
ensure a strong link with the Protection Cluster to make sure
that durable solutions for displaced persons meet humanitarian
needs without putting returning IDPs at risk.
- The Congolese government, the UN
Humanitarian Coordinator
in the DRC, and OCHA, with guidance from the IASC, reform the Cluster
Leadership Approach to include local actors. Local government
authorities, ministry offi cials, and local NGOs should be welcome to
contribute to the Clusters, given their potential to help achieve
Cluster objectives.
- UNDP, under the leadership of the UN
Humanitarian
Coordinator in the DRC (who is also the head of UNDP), take immediate
steps to strengthen its coordination capacity and boost the confi dence
of the humanitarian community in the DRC in its ability to assume its
role as the coordinator of reconstruction and development.
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