The Debate Over Aid and Engagement
United Nations Burma has been a source of growing concern among UN members since 1990, when the country’s military regime prevented the NLD from assuming power. In 1997, Secretary- General Kofi Annan appointed Álvaro De Soto of Peru as Special Envoy for Burma to help facilitate national democratization and reconciliation. In 2000, Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail replaced De Soto. The mediation efforts of Razali led to the release of political prisoners and limited progress on the political front; his most notable achievement was the unconditional release of Suu Kyi from house arrest in May 2002. Razali was last permitted to visit Burma in March 2004 but at that time he was not provided with the opportunity to hold substantive discussions with the regime. Despite repeated requests, Razali was denied permission for further visits and in January 2006, he resigned from his post. According to some analysts, the biggest limitation in the Special Envoy’s mandate is that it is too loose and does not have the support of a binding UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution or of a key power like China. The Secretary-General has provided reports on the Special Envoy’s efforts to the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. These reports have included observations on the political situation in the country. In the March 2005 report to the Commission on Human rights, the Secretary-General urged authorities to demonstrate their commitment to a genuine and credible process of democratization.69 The UN Commission on Human Rights has had a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma since 1992. The Special Rapporteur, currently Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro of Brazil, has reported annually to the Commission and the General Assembly. The Rapporteur has not been allowed to visit Burma since November 2003. Pinheiro has highlighted the plight of internally displaced persons in his reports to the Human Rights Commission and General Assembly. The Rapporteur’s access to the ethnic nationality areas, where the most displacement is occurring, has been extremely limited and many of his sources of information are Thailand based agencies. At the UNSC, the United States has been the driving force behind efforts to address Burma with the argument that the situation there, with its refugee flows and drug trade, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It has raised the issue in private consultations under “other matters,” and sought to move it onto the agenda. By the beginning of December 2005, ten UNSC members were willing to place Burma on the Council’s agenda. A decision was made by consensus that the UNSC would receive a briefing on Burma from a senior Secretariat official under an “other matters” item during informal consultations.70 On December 16, 2005, Burma was discussed for the first time at the UNSC. The UN Under-Secretary General for political affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, told Council members in a closed meeting that despite hopes of reform the past year had proven very disappointing. He also spoke about the rapid rise of aids, malnourishment of children, limited health care and inadequate education opportunities. Many diplomats described the briefing as a “good first step,” and the Secretary general, who attended the meeting, said afterwards the UNSC should now be given a bit of time to see how things progressed.71 United States The political relationship between the United States and Burma worsened after 1988 and remains estranged. In 1990, the United States downgraded its level of representation in Burma from Ambassador to Chargé d’Affaires. Immediate US policy objectives in Burma include securing the release of Suu Kyi, other key opposition leaders and political prisoners, encouraging a dialogue on democratic political reform and national reconciliation, and the re-opening of all NLD offices.72 US sanctions are applied under various legislative and policy vehicles. Soon after a violent attack on Suu Kyi’s motorcade on May 30, 2003, during which several NLD officials were killed, and following which she was once again placed under house arrest, the US Congress adopted the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA), which includes a ban on imports from Burma, a ban on the export of financial services to Burma, a freeze on the assets of certain Burmese financial institutions and extended visa restrictions on Burmese officials. Congress renewed the BFDA in July 2004 and July 2005.73 The trade ban introduced by the United States under the BFDA had a big impact on several of Burma’s export sectors, particularly garments and textiles. In 2002, exports to the United States made up some 13 percent of Burma’s total exports, bringing revenues of US $345 million.74 the US market had become Burma’s second largest export destination. Garments are one of Burma’s principal exports and it is estimated that 90 percent of garment exports went to US markets prior to the ban.75 as a result of the ban an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 jobs were lost in the garment sector.76 In October 2003, the deputy assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and pacific affairs, US department of State said, “in the long term, the garment sector will likely lose 100,000 jobs, most of which are filled by young women. We have credible reports that the concern voiced by some international NGOs concerning the fate of these women is well founded and that some have entered the flourishing illegal sex and ‘entertainment’ industries…much of the garment industry in Burma was already threatened by the impending end of quotas under the WTO’s [World Trade Organization] agreement on textiles and clothing in 2005. It is therefore unlikely that the textile companies and their associated employment will return to Burma even if we elect to lift sanctions at some future point.”77 Critics of the trade ban have noted that the entry of more women in the sex trade may contribute to higher numbers of HIV/AIDS cases. Research has shown that in Burma unprotected paid sex is a major driver of the epidemic.78 Others have argued that the sanctions did not create a large pool of unemployed garment workers with no option but to join the sex industry. Instead many ex-factory workers were reabsorbed into the local economy, working in markets or as day laborers. Under the BFDA, the United States banned remittances to Burma, and the Act prohibits money transfers into Burma. Previously most trade was conducted in US dollars and Burma’s international transactions and money transfers were largely cleared through US banks.79 Local NGOs in Burma report problems with transfer of funds since the BFDA came into effect. On the humanitarian front, the United States suspended assistance to Burma after 1988. A 1993 fiscal year earmark of $1 million reinstated assistance, initially through the Department of State’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Since 1998, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has co-managed the Burma assistance program with the department of State. Funding has been used to support democracy in Burma and pro-democracy groups outside Burma, and to meet the humanitarian needs of Burmese in Thailand.80 Researchers contend there are differences in the position of Congress and the Administration on the scope of the sanctions, with the latter favoring humanitarian aid to Burma. Two areas in which the United States remains involved inside Burma are HIV/AIDS and drug eradication. The US Congress earmarked funds for HIV/AIDS in Burma in 2001, and USAID began supporting international NGOs working on HIV/AIDS in the country. Implementation of program activities is through an agreement with the US NGO population Services international, which in turn is funding other agencies like Save the Children US and Doctors Without Borders-Holland. In 2004-2005, the US provided $2 million to address the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic through international NGOs. No assistance was provided to the government through this program.81 The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issues licenses to US-based NGOs which want to engage in humanitarian or religious activities in Burma that are otherwise prohibited. The US-based NGOs, including those able to use non-US government funds, are often discouraged from working in Burma due to the cumbersome and uncertain license application process. The United States has been engaging with the Burmese government in regard to narcotics control on a very limited level. The US Drug Enforcement Administration, through the Embassy in Rangoon, shares drug-related intelligence with the Burmese government and conducts joint drug-enforcement investigations with Burmese counter-narcotics authorities. Additionally, the United States carried out opium yield surveys in Shan State in 1993 and 1995 and annually from 1997 through 2004 with assistance provided by Burmese counterparts. These surveys gave both governments an understanding of the scope, magnitude, and changing geographic distribution of Burma’s opium crop.82 In Shan State, the United States had been supporting the UNODC-Wa project since 1998. The project was initially a five-year supply-reduction program to encourage alternatives to poppy cultivation in territory controlled by the ethnic Wa army. In order to meet basic human needs and ensure the sustainability of a projected United Wa State army-imposed opium ban in 2005, UNODC extended the project until 2007 and broadened the scope of the program to include a more systematic approach to alternative community development. In 2003, the agency also established a new project in the Wa and Kokang areas known as KOWI.83 Under this initiative, UNODC has been coordinating 22 UN and NGO partners to provide for the basic needs of poor farmers and their families in the absence of their income traditionally derived from opium cultivation. The total funding required for the UNODC-Wa project from 1998-2007 was about US$16.5 million; out of this the United States contributed approximately $8 million. While there were discussions in 2002 to have the United States augment its contributions to KOWI, these plans were shelved after the political events of May 2003. The United States decided to stop funding the UNODC-Wa project altogether since the indictment by the US Justice Department of Wa leaders in early 2005 on charges of heroin and methamphetamine trafficking. The decision to stop the funding surprised a number of people as the project is benefiting the vulnerable population of former poppy farmers and the Wa leadership was not being helped by this project in any way. Most of US funding related to Burma is presently directed towards activities and beneficiaries outside of Burma. There is a general agreement among missions and agencies in Rangoon that funds being spent outside the country have minimal impact inside Burma. They would like to see different approaches tried, which would be of greater benefit to the millions of people living well away from the border areas. European Union In 1996, the European Union adopted a common position on Burma. It confirmed previously imposed sanctions, such as an arms embargo and the suspension of all bilateral aid other than strictly humanitarian assistance, and introduced a visa ban on members of the regime and their families. It also suspended high-level governmental visits to Burma.84 The 1996 common position was strengthened in October 1998, by widening the visa ban on Burmese officials. In April 2000, the EU Council added an export ban on equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism, published the list of persons affected by the visa ban, and imposed a freeze on the funds held abroad by persons on the list. At the same time, the Council reiterated its desire to establish a meaningful political dialogue with the SPDC. The Council agreed in October 2004 to revise the common position and further tighten sanctions on Rangoon. Specifically, it extended the visa ban on senior military officials traveling to the European Union to cover all officers holding the rank of Brigadier general or higher, while authorizing new restrictions on EU companies investing in Burmese state-owned enterprises. The common position was renewed for one year on 25 April 2005.85 EU sanctions are more limited in scope than those of the US. Investment sanctions prohibit EU companies from making financing available to certain businesses owned by the state, but place no ban on actual investment by EU companies or citizens. No action has been taken to halt the import of goods and services from Burma, and the most profitable sectors for the junta such as oil, timber and gas are omitted from sanctions.86 Some EU members favor stronger economic sanctions, but others are concerned about the legality of trade embargoes against a fellow WTO member, as well as the social costs of these measures on the Burmese population.87 Since 1994, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has funded programs aimed at helping vulnerable groups inside Burma and along the Thai-Burma border. In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, ECHO has tripled its annual funding from €6.5 million in 2001 to €19.4 million in 2004. In Burma, 60 percent of ECHO financing is spent on the fight against malaria and the provision of basic health care in remote areas. The rest is dedicated to water and sanitation projects and nutrition programs with special emphasis on women and children.88 In 2005, ECHO opened an office in Rangoon and during the past year the European Union has made available a €6 million grant for projects related to uprooted people in Burma. It is seeking proposals for this grant. Japan Japan has attempted to bring about improvements in human rights and democratization in Burma through diplomatic contact and aid incentives. It is believed that Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995 due to Japanese diplomatic efforts. Japan was promising to resume full-scale development aid if the regime restored political and economic openness in Burma.89 While the Japanese government is eager to see democracy restored, it is worried that if it does not maintain influence with the Burmese regime, China will monopolize political and economic access to Burma.90 the Japanese government has expressed concern that Western criticism of the junta will make the SPDC stiffen its position and isolate itself further, making the chances of democratization even more remote. Japan has engaged in a tactic of “constructive dialogue” and supports the ASEAN approach on Burma as a workable one. It believes ASEAN efforts to promote democracy in Burma should be supported by the international community. Japan was Burma’s biggest donor prior to 1988. Following the pro-democracy uprising, it suspended all new assistance but continued to disburse funds committed for humanitarian aid projects prior to the democracy crackdown. Japan officially resumed some aid in 1995. From 1988-2000, Japan was the only country to provide significant humanitarian assistance to Burma, supporting half a dozen health care, education, and food production projects, as well as a grassroots assistance program.91 After the May 2003 attack on Suu Kyi’s convoy, Japan suspended economic cooperation and the distribution of new bilateral development aid to Burma via the Official Development Assistance Program. The suspension excludes grassroots grants aid, which has been going primarily to NGOs, and permits disbursement of previous agreements. Japan continues to provide humanitarian assistance to Burma on a case-by-case basis. In August 2005, the Japanese government donated more than US $50,000 to Burma for the fight against malaria following the decision of the global fund to pull out of the country. China Since 1988, China has been an important supporter of Burma in international forums such as the UN because it too opposes foreign demands to improve its domestic human rights record.92 China sees Burma as an important gateway through which it can expand its strategic influence into Southeast Asia and the Indian ocean. China is Burma’s key defense ally and provides the military with hardware and training. During the last decade, China’s military sales to Rangoon have been valued at around US $2 billion. This has led to the Burmese military becoming more technically sophisticated and has enabled the army to expand from 180,000 to more than 450,000 soldiers. China has also provided Burma with more than US $200 million in economic assistance and helped with the development of Burma’s infrastructure, including the construction of roads, airfields, ports and dams.93 China is believed to be the largest foreign investor in Burma, though the size of this investment is not recorded and remains invisible in international statistics.94 Many parts of northern Burma are heavily influenced by China. Chinese investment in Mandalay is believed to be so high that most of the property in the city is owned by businessmen of Chinese origin. Burma sends raw materials like teak and bamboo to China, and in exchange, receives cheap Chinese goods. Some analysts consider China to be one of the few countries to have some influence over Burma. An example is Chinese pressure on the SPDC to cut back the cross-border drugs trade95 which made the regime take steps in this direction. The SPDC is also believed to have recanted its decision to leave the ILO96 at China’s bidding. India In 1988, India was the only neighboring country to stand on the side of democratic forces in Burma. The prime minister at the time, Rajiv Gandhi, declared that India must strengthen the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. When student activists fled to India for shelter after the military takeover in September 1988, India willingly harbored them.97 Additionally, it permitted refugees from Chin State to live in camps in the northeastern state of Mizoram. Since 1989, New Delhi has watched anxiously as Chinese capital, aid, and military equipment have poured into Burma. In the early 1990s, a major policy switch came about as India too became afraid of the close cooperation between China and Burma. New Delhi began establishing better bilateral relations with Rangoon through increased political, trade, and military ties.98 the camps in Mizoram, which used to shelter Chin refugees, were dismantled in 1995. In 2004, the Congress party, with Rajiv Gandhi’s wife at its helm, came back to power in India. Some analysts believed that India would once again push for democracy in Burma. However, that has not been the case and ties continue to improve between the two countries. Economic collaboration plans include a pipeline project which would transport gas from Burma’s Rakhine State to India. ASEAN Burma joined ASEAN in 1997. The regional organization has been reluctant to push Burma towards political reform out of deference to the ASEAN doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs of member states. It deals with Burma under a policy of “constructive engagement.” Over the past few years, ASEAN members have become increasingly frustrated with the lack of reform in Burma. Under ASEAN’s rotational leadership, Burma was scheduled to take the chairmanship of the organization’s Standing Committee in 2006. The United States and European Union, which attend the annual ASEAN meetings as “dialogue partners,” threatened to boycott the 2006 meetings if Burma was the chair. A diplomatic crisis was averted in July 2005 when agreement was reached among ASEAN members that Burma would relinquish its turn at the chairmanship.99 In December 2005, ahead of its summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN made public its call to Burma to quicken its pace of reform and get on the road to democracy.100 Malaysia, the current president of ASEAN, planned a delegation to Burma in January 2006 to discuss democratic transition with the SPDC given the repeated refusals of the regime to allow the UN Special Envoy into the country. In the first week of January 2006, Burma called off the fact-finding trip saying the government was too busy to host the mission because it was in the midst of switching its capital.101 Outside of Asia, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the African Union have urged their members to adopt the guiding principles into national law and apply their standards to the internally displaced. It is, however, unlikely that ASEAN — most of whose members are themselves not in favor of being held to international standards on internal displacement — will embrace the Principles anytime in the near future and put pressure on fellow member Burma to enforce them. Thailand ASEAN member Thailand has been in an especially difficult position due to its proximity to Burma. In 1998, Thailand, beleaguered by refugee flows, drug smuggling and border conflicts with Burma, proposed a “flexible engagement” approach,102 meaning that ASEAN would be able to discuss internal issues in member states that have implications for other ASEAN members. The Thai proposal did not result in a dramatic break with established policy but did mark a subtle shift in thinking about intra-ASEAN relations. A reason for this shift was the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia that was Burma’s closest ideological ally and ASEAN’s largest member.103 Prior to the 1990s, Thai military quietly supported the armed ethnic nationalist groups controlling virtually all of the Burmese side of the Thai-Burma border. This was part of a Cold War strategy to keep a buffer zone to prevent communists in the region from linking up. As the communist threat faded and opposition groups began losing ground to the Burmese army, Thailand’s generals improved relations with the junta. They cooperated in pressuring the ethnic nationalist armies to make ceasefire agreements with the regime.104 As Thailand’s trade and foreign investments in Burma have risen, Thai governments have had to balance a concern about the regime’s repressive behavior, which often leads to refugee flows into Thailand, and the Thai business community’s call for better relations with the junta.105 Thaksin Shinawatra, who became Thailand’s Prime Minister in 2001, has received criticism for his close ties to Burma’s military leaders, as well as for his reluctance to openly criticize the regime. Since coming to power, he has brokered ceasefire negotiations between the KNU and the SPDC and sponsored the so-called Bangkok process, an initiative involving high-level officials from Burma, Thailand, regional and European countries and the UN to further democracy in Burma. The plan foundered when junta representatives pulled out. |
Main Page Executive Summary Introduction Types of Displacement and Conditions of the Displaced Population Humanitarian Response Inside Burma The Debate Over Aid and Engagement Rationale for International Assistance Inside Burma Towards a More Effective Response to Internal Displacement Refugees International's Recommendations --------------- Acknowledgements Glossary Notes |
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Ending the Waiting Game: The International Community's Response to Burma
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