The Debate Over Aid and Engagement
Even those who in principle support humanitarian aid to Burma before the achievement of political reform are skeptical that current assistance is reaching those most in need. They believe funds are being misdirected by the regime for its own use, which international organizations are unable to prevent. Charges leveled against international agencies in Burma include that organizations have to pay a 10 percent fee to the regime for operating in the country; out of every dollar destined for UN agencies in Rangoon, between 40-60 cents automatically benefits the regime as the UN accepts an exchange rate on the dollar lower than the market rate; MOUs signed between the SPDC and the UN and international NGOs stipulate using Burmese consultants who are closely linked to the regime; food and supply convoys have to pay money at SPDC checkpoints on the road; and medicines provided by UN agencies are being resold in markets. Humanitarian agencies in Burma deny most of the accusations about aid being misused at present,59 but do admit that the regime levies a 10 percent tax on food purchased by the WFP to distribute internally. Additionally, as discussed previously, access remains a major problem with severe restrictions in 2005 on the delivery of aid and project monitoring. Critics remain unconvinced that international organizations have the freedom to implement programs and benefit people in the military-controlled environment in Burma. They caution agencies against working with the bureaucracy or GONGOs. Additionally they want the organizations to implement initiatives without having any connection with the SPDC. The critics express doubt that the UN and international NGOs can ensure that funds are helping the most vulnerable people and call for much more extensive monitoring. Another concern is that money from the international aid community permits the regime to spend even less on key sectors like heath and education and leaves it free to use the funds towards building up its military. The skepticism is warranted as there is little doubt that the military leadership would prefer international donors to simply hand over the money ‘at the border’ and let the government implement its own programs as it sees fit. The SPDC is more in favor of UN programs which respond to government requests and are implemented through government departments or GONGOs. It is reluctant to work with international NGOs, whose grassroots approach, emphasizing local organization and empowerment to build social capital and ensure project sustainability, is at odds with a government bent on control.60 The international organizations in Burma emphasize they can carry out their programs independently so as to reach the most vulnerable in the areas they operate. The strategy used by several organizations is to start out working on small projects and build trust and relationships with officials in government departments. Once the regime ceases to be suspicious of them, they have more room to expand to additional projects in different sectors. Expatriate staff stress that there are some dedicated officials in government ministries who are genuinely concerned about the welfare of the people and keen to assist the international agencies. This is especially the case at the local level where the officials are often from the same communities as the people. International agencies maintain that even when a civilian government comes to power, the bureaucracy will remain the same, so exposing this group to their work will be beneficial in the long term. In the early and mid-1990s, some international NGOs worked through the GONGOs, but since then have dealt more with church and women’s groups and encouraged the formation of village and ward-level associations.61 The agencies in Burma stress that they provide most aid directly to the beneficiaries. Regarding the issue of carrying out activities without connection to the SPDC, agencies make the point that it is not possible to undertake national-scale initiatives in fields like HIV/AIDS prevention, restriction of human trafficking, and drug eradication while completely bypassing the government in power. Staff of international organizations believe that the monitoring of their programs meets international standards. They maintain that donors would not be funding them if they were unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the funds in ameliorating the conditions of the poor in areas of access and argue that if they were unable to monitor their programs, they themselves would suspend or cease activities in Burma. International organizations in Burma acknowledge that the SPDC is continuing to expand its military. Estimates of the military expenditure range from 29 to 50 percent of the total government budget; meanwhile the regime allocates only three percent of its budget to health and eight percent to education.62 as in any other country, there is the possibility that aid will allow the government to divert resources to other purposes. International organizations in Burma contend that most of their activities are in sectors and geographical areas where the government was hardly involved before their arrival on the scene. If they were to withdraw, instead of diverting resources from the military to social services, the government would provide minimum services to selected communities seen to be sympathetic to the regime while ignoring the needs of the majority of the people, ethnic minorities in particular. For example, agencies working with the Rohingya communities in Rakhine State claim that if they were to leave, the SPDC, which does not even consider Rohingya to be citizens of Burma, would not step in to take over food delivery and social services, thus depriving the Rohingya of all assistance. Finally, while many of the international agencies would like to respect Suu Kyi’s wishes and consult with the NLD, they believe that doing so is not practical because any consultation with “The Lady” could result in a backlash from the regime and their programs could be affected. Some of the agencies operating in Burma say that they are able to inform, but not consult, the NLD about their programs and run their programs according to the criteria of transparency, accountability and independent monitoring as prescribed by the NLD and NCGUB. WAITING TO RETURN HOME A 56 year-old woman interviewed by Refugees International said that she had been on the move for five years. She now lives in a settlement for internally displaced people in Karen State close to the border with Thailand. On two separate occasions, this woman thought she had found safety and could start to rebuild her life. Instead, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, a proxy force for the Burmese military, set fire to her home each time. She and her family had to live under trees for a few days until they could determine where to go. She eventually reached this settlement, but soon after she arrived, her husband was killed in a bus accident just across the border in Thailand. Today she survives by doing paddy farming. She sent her youngest child to a refugee camp in Thailand so he could receive an education, and has two other children who are now married and live in this same settlement. Right now, this woman believes that the only place in Karen State where she can stay safely is in this settlement — she doesn’t have any other place to go. While her life is better here than in her native village, she hopes one day in the near future she will be able to return home and live in peace. |
Main Page Executive Summary Introduction Types of Displacement and Conditions of the Displaced Population Humanitarian Response Inside Burma The Debate Over Aid and Engagement Rationale for International Assistance Inside Burma Towards a More Effective Response to Internal Displacement Refugees International's Recommendations --------------- Acknowledgements Glossary Notes |
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Ending the Waiting Game: Concern about Aid Reaching People in Need
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