RECOMMENDATIONSIncrease Number of Troops AMIS needs more troops on the ground to effectively fulfill their mandate. With a strengthened mandate, they will need even more troops. AMIS also needs to receive more training to be able to respond effectively to the challenges of their mission. Given the size of Darfur, and the enormity of the tasks mandated to AMIS, AMIS is seriously understaffed. In addition to monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, AMIS is expected to provide security for civilians, build their confidence, assist humanitarian agencies (such as in providing escorts for their convoys and sharing information), provide deterrence against the various fighting factions, and collect information and intelligence. All of these tasks are taxing AMIS’ human resources. AMIS doesn’t have enough troops to sufficiently protect itself, let alone protect displaced civilians or humanitarian organizations. According to planning from earlier this year, AMIS was to get to a mandated level of a little over 7,700 personnel (Phase IIe) by September 2005, with a decision on increasing personnel to 12,500 (Phase III) to be made that same month. Because of a series of delays, including problems with accommodations and fuel, AMIS still has not reached its 7,700 target, which is to include 6,171 soldiers (protection forces and Military Observers) and 1,586 unarmed Civilian Police. The majority of the protection forces are from Nigeria and Rwanda. Gambia, Senegal, and South Africa, have also contributed troops, with Kenya contributing a few dozen Military Police. No other member country of the African Union has sent combat troops to Darfur, although 25 countries have contributed Military Observers. Fifteen countries have contributed Civilian Police.7 As of October 21, AMIS had deployed 4,890 protection forces, 686 Military Observers, and 1,176 Civilian Police. According to AMIS, around 120 of these Civilian Police are women; less than 1% of the protection forces and Military Observers are women, which is similar to the percentage normally found on a UN mission. AMIS Military Observers and protection forces are deployed evenly across eight Sectors; the Civilian Police are concentrated around IDP camps. According to AU officials, discussion about Phase III won’t start until after a joint donor/UN/AU assessment mission, scheduled to take place by the end of 2005. Darfur is roughly the size of Texas. No one would ever suggest 5,000 police officers could maintain security in Texas. Yet AMIS currently has less than 5,000 armed troops to provide security in the middle of an ongoing armed civil war. There are only a few AMIS Group and Team Sites per Sector, and only a couple of patrols are able to go out per day from each Site. These patrols of Military Observers are accompanied by about twelve armed members of the protection force; they have been no match, even in self-defense, for the rebel and other forces that are currently challenging them. When Refugees International (RI) asked AMIS why there were so few patrols, and why they would only go out for a few hours a day at most, RI was told that the Military Observers were needed at the base because they have to fulfill Staff Officer roles, such as logistics, communications, administration, and operations. AMIS has also had to figure out how to respond to the growing number of demands for convoy escorts; one Sector Commander told RI that if AMIS didn’t consolidate the escort requests, they risked using all their resources solely on accompanying convoys. AMIS has had other problems with staffing. While RI was in North Darfur, all of AMIS’ local interpreters were on strike because their salaries had been cut in half following a restructuring of salaries and per diems for all AMIS personnel. When RI asked AMIS how they were handling the lack of interpreters, RI was told that the Military Observer teams were relying on Libyan, Egyptian, and other Arabic-speaking Military Observers to translate. Privately, some AMIS officers expressed concerns about using translators from these countries, given the sensitivities of the population towards “Arabs.” RI witnessed a CFC investigation at Zam Zam IDP camp where AMIS Military Observers were using a Libyan Army officer to translate during interviews with villagers who had fled attacks by the Janjaweed. The RI team had brought its own Sudanese translator from South Sudan; eventually, AMIS asked if they could use him to conduct further interviews. At another Civilian Police station, there was no interpreter; translating was done by the Egyptian Civilian Police. In addition, AMIS has made no specific effort to recruit non-Arab translators in Darfur which likely hinders their ability to communicate, let alone build trust, with many of the displaced. More female interpreters are also needed, for interviewing women about sensitive issues such as rape. Unfortunately, qualified interpreters, male and female, are in short supply; humanitarian agencies are struggling as well to fill interpreter positions. There has been a lot of criticism regarding the skill level and professionalism of the AMIS officers. After much negotiation on the part of the West and the AU, Western partners have been assisting AMIS in staff and organizational capacity building activities with the long-term hope that the AU will eventually be able to conduct peace operations throughout Africa. As one U.S. official told RI: “The AU is needed now, and in the future in Africa. There are things beyond Darfur.” One of AMIS' biggest weaknesses in terms of skills is in its Command, Control and Communications and Intelligence (or “C3I”) functions. Sources in Darfur told RI that AMIS suffers from language and cultural barriers between officers from various countries, confusion in procedures, limited future planning, and ineffective communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of peacekeeping experience. Many Military Observers do not have basic investigatory skills. Some Military Observers that RI witnessed in action asked very basic, non-probing questions. They appeared to take answers at face value, and did not make a full attempt to seek a broad spectrum of perspectives. There appeared to be no systematic planning for investigations or a list of questions that needed answering. On one patrol, some villagers said there were newly displaced persons congregating outside of town because of recent attacks. A dispute started between two Military Oobservers because one member of the team thought it would be important to go and confirm that they were there, while the team leader said there wasn’t enough time. Even when AMIS does collect valuable information, RI was told by AMIS officers and advisors that there is a lack of suitably trained personnel capable of analyzing this information for intelligence value, which hinders any given commanders’ ability to react. NATO is currently training AMIS officers in command and staff functions at Force Headquarters in El Fasher. According to NATO officials, AMIS’ capacity in these areas is growing, albeit slowly. In August 2005, NATO supervised and assisted in a Map Exercise, which consisted of role-playing involving humanitarian groups and AMIS. The simulations included scenarios of cholera and mass casualties. Participants RI interviewed reported that AMIS and their civilian counterparts became much more effective at inter-organizational collaboration as a result of the exercise. NATO is also sending officers to accompany AMIS officers in their day-to-day roles as mentors. At times some NATO officers have said they have had to go beyond being mentors, filling operational gaps. The Government of Sudan has made it difficult for NATO advisors to work with AMIS by delaying visa requests into Sudan. One advisor RI met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia had been waiting for several months for his visa to enter Sudan. The Civilian Police are also receiving their own separate additional training from the European Union. In each Sector there will be an EU Civilian Police advisor team assisting the AMIS Civilian Police. Additionally, nine mobile training teams of EU Civilian Police will be sent to Darfur. Over six months, these teams will move from one AMIS Civilian Police site to another, conducting basic policing, management, capacity building and “train the trainer” courses. The hope is that after Darfur, the AMIS Civilian Police, upon returning home, will be able to help build the capacity of their colleagues. There is also a real need for training of AMIS personnel, both male and female, on gender-based violence (GBV) awareness and gender sensitivity. One female Military Observer told RI that, “All Sudanese women are liars; they say they are raped when they are just pushed.” Considering that rape continues to be so widespread in Darfur, training on how to interview survivors of GBV must be made a priority. Additionally, the numbers of female Civilian Police, Military Observers, and interpreters within AMIS are very small. To address some of the skills gaps, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Fund for Population Activities, UNICEF, the UNMIS Human Rights Unit and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights are collaborating to implement an extensive training program for all AMIS personnel starting at the end of this year. This program, funded through the United Nations Trust Fund for Security, by the Japanese government, is being managed by UNDP and will focus on human rights, gender-based violence awareness, child protection, and confidence-building mechanisms, among other things. With the recent spotlight on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, RI urges the AU to do all it can to preemptively address this problem. In 2004, a Sudanese government official expressed concerns to RI about the introduction of peacekeepers into their country and accused them of bringing HIV/AIDS and encouraging prostitution. Now, with the death of two AMIS troops of AIDS in Darfur, the Government has once again raised the specter of AMIS infecting the population with HIV/AIDS.8 While, to date, there have been no known cases of abuse or sexual misconduct on the part of AMIS, it is also unclear if there are procedures in place to report sexual exploitation and abuse. AMIS commanders assured RI that the AU Code of Conduct was in place. Given the realities of Darfur and the mission—the troops have a curfew, vehicles are few, alcohol is illegal, and there are limited social areas in the towns—contact between AMIS personnel and the local population outside of the professional realm has been limited. However, the AU must show zero tolerance for any infringements or abuse. With additional troops, team sites, and permanent Civilian Police stations in the camps and villages, it is important that the AU is vigilant regarding these matters.
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ConclusionExecutive Summary Darfur in Jeopardy Recommendations Improve
Mission Weaponry and Equipment
Accelerate Civilian Police Deployment and Presence Enhance Outreach with Humanitarian Agencies and Displaced Persons Plan for Short-term Contingencies and Long-Term Transition to UN Mission ----------- Notes Acknowledgements |
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