RECOMMENDATIONSPlan for Short-Term Contingencies and Long-Term Transition to UN Mission AMIS needs to plan better for short-term contingencies, and the AU needs to work with the UN and the rest of the international community on the best way to transition the mission in Darfur from AMIS to the UN in the longer-term. When Refugees International (RI) first arrived in Khartoum in the beginning of September 2005, officials there from donor countries and some UN agencies appeared optimistic about the trajectory for Darfur. From this perspective, AMIS’ future role appeared to be limited, as peace, through the Abuja negotiations, seemed to be imminent. Discussions with people in Darfur, and recent events, tell a much different story. First, there are serious questions as to whether a negotiated settlement in Abuja will actually translate into peace in Darfur. New splinter groups are demanding a seat at the negotiating table, and it appears that some armed groups are acting independently from any higher authority within their faction. There is also increasing concern about the viability of the peace talks and the independence of the AU given the fact that the AU presidency will be held by the Government of Sudan as of January 2006. The JEM and SLA have threatened to pull out of the Abuja negotiations if this takes place. The displacement caused by the conflict has also raised its own sets of issues, as traditional migration routes have been disturbed, and some abandoned villages have been taken over by nomadic groups. Second, predictions made by humanitarian agencies and donors in Khartoum of major permanent returns by the first quarter of 2006, before the next planting season, are unrealistic. The overwhelming consensus of people on the ground in Darfur is that permanent internally displaced and refugee returns in significant numbers is unlikely for the next 10 to 12 months. A source at the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) said she couldn’t imagine returns happening before 2007 at the earliest. While RI was in Darfur the team saw continued displacement by people fleeing attacks and threats to IDP camps. Sudanese government efforts to induce returns of internally displaced persons and refugees to their home villages have also created distrust among the displaced of overt efforts to promote returns. Third, with the growing number of attacks on AMIS over the past few months, it appears that AMIS is being tested by the armed factions to see if it is a force to be ignored or respected. As AMIS is tested and found ineffective due to resource, training and mandate constraints, their deterrence factor will decline and they will more often become targets, as will civilians under their protection. A major, easy target will be the AMIS bases themselves as these are administrative compounds with virtually no security systems. Unless this situation is remedied, the violence will thus likely grow in Darfur with more and more civilian and AMIS casualties. Finally, as the call and need for AMIS to become larger and more forceful grows—particularly in the areas of disarmament —so will the outside pressure for UNMIS to assume control of the operation in Darfur. AMIS will continue to face serious challenges regarding their ability to execute command and control over such a large force, and will also eventually run into capacity problems as troops need to get rotated in and out. As one international official noted, “The AU can be the arms and legs of the mission, but it’s not able to be the head.” Initially, AMIS deployed to Darfur with minimal planning and preparation. Because this was the very first AU mission of this size and scope, the AMIS officers have had little experience with drafting plans on such a scale. Since then, NATO, the EU and the U.S. have engaged in extensive training and support to the AU staff on planning current and future operations. Nevertheless, the African Union is doing very little planning or preparing for any number of very realistic complex long-term contingencies. The list of short and mid-term challenges AMIS will likely confront and for which they have not begun preparing includes:
It would be unfair to blame the African Union exclusively for planning shortcomings. It is very likely that the United Nations will be either supporting or taking over the mission in Darfur at some point in the next year, which RI believes is the necessary next step. Security Council members are currently in discussion about the best way to “transition” AMIS to a UN mission. Previously there had been hope that the resolution of the Abuja talks could serve as a benchmark of AU success, and a natural point for a hand-over. However, with faltering negotiations and increased attacks on the ground, a peace agreement looks less and less likely in the short term. Security Council members, the UN, and other AMIS donor countries are concerned about the repercussions of the perception of a failed AMIS mission on the development of the African Union as a whole. For a UN “blue-hatting” of AMIS to move forward, several political, logistical, and economic hurdles need to be overcome. Publicly, the AU is not yet considering a hand-over of its mission; it too is worried about appearing to fail, and also must be prudent in the face of the Government of Sudan. There are also power struggles within the AU, particularly between Nigeria and South Africa. South Africa has not yet sent its pledged personnel to AMIS, which has been interpreted by some as a snub to AMIS. Sudan would also have to be persuaded or pressured into accepting a UN mission in Darfur, particularly as its interests are safeguarded by China on the Security Council. In addition, UNMIS has been having its own problems getting off the ground; when RI was in Sudan, only 20% of UNMIS’ personnel had been identified and deployed. The UNMIS mandate is to be reviewed in March 2006, a logical time to reconsider its role in Darfur. However, given the difficulties UNMIS is currently facing, the UN is unwilling to jeopardize the success of UNMIS in the south by overstretching into Darfur pushing a likely hand-over to later in the year. Funding will also be an issue. The U.S. seems more content to provide in-kind contributions to AMIS (via payment to US-based contractors) rather than in meeting its obligations for general contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.
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ConclusionExecutive Summary Darfur in Jeopardy Recommendations Improve
Mission Weaponry and Equipment
Accelerate Civilian Police Deployment and Presence Enhance Outreach with Humanitarian Agencies and Displaced Persons Plan for Short-term Contingencies and Long-Term Transition to UN Mission ----------- Notes Acknowledgements |
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No Power To Protect: Contingencies and Transition
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Kahar, his mother, Magrun, 2 brothers and 2 sisters and 19 children have lived in the collective town of Baharka since 1978. Iraqi forces destroyed their houses ...
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