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No Power To Protect: Enhance Outreach

No Power to Protect

RECOMMENDATIONS

Enhance Outreach with Humanitarian Agencies and Displaced Persons

AMIS must improve coordination and information sharing with humanitarian agencies and make greater outreach efforts to displaced persons. For AMIS to be successful, it must gain the trust and respect of the population it is there to serve—the people of Darfur.

A priority for the Refugees International (RI) assessment mission to Darfur was to examine how AMIS is perceived by the local population and to what extent they understand the role of AMIS. RI met with displaced persons and villagers, while with AMIS personnel and separately. RI found that there was confusion amongst the local people about the role of the African Union in Darfur, and what AMIS can actually do.

AMIS has not conducted any large-scale coordinated information campaign about their mission. On several occasions, when RI asked AMIS if they had a brochure describing their mission, officers handed a printed copy in English and Arabic of the “Declarations of Principles” signed this past July with photos of the signatories. RI saw no posters and no other printed documentation. A once a week radio show in Arabic was being started in North Darfur, but it is unclear if radio is the best way to reach this population. Adding to the lack of information and contact, it appeared that AMIS officers tended to concentrate their discussions and relationship-building with those in power —that is the sheikhs of the villages and camps—as opposed to reaching out farther to the broader community.

Displaced persons told RI that they couldn’t tell the difference between AMIS and the rest of the humanitarian community: “They all have the same white vehicles.” At other times displaced persons said they couldn’t tell the difference between an AU soldier and any other soldier in uniform. One woman did say, “I know who the AU soldiers are because they are the soldiers that don’t shoot at us.” In this context, Ambassador Kingibe’s recent assertions that Government troops were operating in white vehicles that mimicked those of AMIS become even more worrisome.¹⁰ Most of the displaced told RI that AMIS was there to protect them, but as AMIS increasingly has come under attack, civilians risk losing faith in AMIS capabilities. As for their understanding of the Civilian Police role, the displaced believed that AMIS Civilian Police would be able to actively police and investigate crimes taking place in the camps.

In both North Darfur and West Darfur the working relationship between the humanitarian community and AMIS seems to be improving, although there doesn’t appear to be Darfur-wide agreement on a system of coordination. AMIS forces are divided into eight Sectors, the boundaries of which do not correspond with the political boundaries of North, South, and West Darfur. At times this has been problematic for coordination with humanitarian agencies which are organized along the Darfur state lines. (The Civilian Police, on the other hand, have decided to align their sectors with the political boundaries.)

The humanitarian community also wishes to keep a certain amount of space between itself and AMIS; for example in North Darfur, at the request of several members, AMIS is not invited to the Protection Working Group but is instead briefed on the outcomes after the meeting. In West Darfur the AMIS Civilian Police have been asked to be part of the Returns Working Group, but only at every other meeting. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has taken the lead in coordinating communications with AMIS, but each UN agency and NGO has also developed individual relationships with AMIS. AMIS representatives have agreed that they rely heavily on NGOs for information, and see the important role that NGOs and the UN play in bringing not just assistance to those affected by the conflict, but also security.

The humanitarian community in general is hesitant to be too closely associated with AMIS, which is a military force, in keeping with the principle of impartiality. For example, one NGO told RI that they were afraid that if they were escorted by AMIS, and AMIS got into a battle with an armed group, their NGO would be associated with this attack. This has become especially true with the growing attacks on the AMIS patrols. However, as humanitarian convoys also increasingly become a target of attacks, with staff being beaten and taken hostage and goods stolen, some NGOs and UN agencies have asked AMIS to provide them with security. RI took part in an AMIS convoy escorting NGOs from El Fasher in North Darfur to Nyala in South Darfur. RI spoke with an international staff member of one of the NGOs being escorted that day. He said that normally his organization did not want to use AMIS escorts, but the national staff had refused to travel without AMIS protection.

Others continue to decline envoy escorts, in order to maintain the separation between humanitarian assistance and military presence and force. Some NGOs have suggested that AMIS could do road sweeping patrols, whereby the AMIS force would drive about 500 meters ahead of the NGO convoys. AMIS has argued that this type of system doesn’t allow them to be fully responsible for the NGOs under their protection. There is also a difference of opinion between AMIS and members of the humanitarian community as to whether AMIS protection forces should be allowed in the camps. One NGO staff member told RI that while they had a good relationship with the AMIS team near a camp at which they were working, they repeatedly had to ask them not to come into the camp with their armed troops, as the armed men scared the camp residents.

Refugees International therefore recommends:

AMIS urgently launch a public information campaign which would include confidence-building activities with displaced persons and civilians living in the villages. A simple brochure in Arabic (and English for the international community) explaining the mandate of AMIS and explaining ways the local population can get in touch with AMIS would be an important first step. As RI has seen in other peacekeeping missions, when the local population has expectations out of step with the reality on the ground, they can become frustrated and turn on the mission soldiers.
AMIS and the humanitarian community organize more open channels of communication regarding the security situation, overall plans, and concerns. As much as possible, the humanitarian agencies should harmonize and institutionalize their relations with AMIS across sectors; currently, coordination is ad hoc, and dependent upon personalities.
AMIS recruit more female Military Observers, Civilian Police and interpreters in order to communicate with a broader segment of the Darfur population.