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No Power To Protect: Strengthen Mandate

No Power to Protect

RECOMMENDATIONS

Strengthen Mandate

AMIS’ mandate must be strengthened. With its current mandate, AMIS is unable to pro-actively protect civilians.

The current mandate establishes a mission that is essentially there to monitor and verify the ceasefire between the Government of Sudan and rebel groups in Darfur. In addition, the mission is there to “contribute to a secure environment” and “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.” It is this part of the mandate that has caused frustration for AMIS, displaced civilians, and the humanitarian community.

A strict interpretation of this mandate does not allow AMIS to protect civilians from imminent attack unless the AMIS troops are present at that very moment. Even when AMIS knows an attack is coming, it is unable to react. For example, during the attacks on villages in North Darfur of September 18, 2005, AMIS was limited by its mandate to simply investigating afterwards and was not able to intervene. Flexible interpretation of the mandate in some cases has resulted in a more pro-active attitude, but this seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. A Rwandan officer at one of the sites told Refugees International (RI) that displaced persons ask him, “Why are you not defending us?” He said, “I believe we have to defend those in IDP camps.” Another Rwandan officer told RI: “We had genocide in our country, we are in Darfur to stop it from happening again. How can we do this if we can’t protect civilians?” Many AMIS Military Observers nevertheless went to great pains to impress upon RI that their role was primarily to monitor the ceasefire, and to expect much more was unrealistic.

Some AU officials in Khartoum have argued that it is politically impossible for them to expand the mandate, given the active resistance on the part of the Sudanese government. Yet one African official commented that it was time to stop “handling the Government of Sudan with kid-gloves.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in a recent Ccongressional hearing, declared that the U.S. has “made clear that we would welcome an additional expansion of the mandate if they so choose.”⁵ Nonetheless, the U.S. has done little to push for a stronger mandate, often citing eventual UN takeover of the mission as a reason not to push further on the mandate now.

There are also serious problems with the ceasefire investigation mechanisms. Some AMIS Military Observers expressed frustration with the inclusion of Government of Sudan, SLA, and JEM representatives on the investigation teams (a member of the Chadian mediation delegation, as well as U.S. and EU representatives are also on the teams). While one of the reasons representatives are included is to allow the AMIS investigative teams access and security in various areas, it appears that in many cases these representatives do more harm than good. Because the representatives live on the AMIS bases, and take part in briefings, they are privy to all AMIS information, movements, and intelligence. AMIS officers told RI that often the representatives would call ahead of an investigation to warn their counterparts of AMIS’ arrival. An advisor told RI: “They don’t need them live on base, it could be done in another way, through developing relationships in the field.”

Representatives are also able to control where and when an investigation patrol goes. RI witnessed the cancellation of a patrol in West Darfur because the JEM representative refused to visit an area where an alleged JEM attack had occurred. AMIS Military Observers told RI that during investigations, witnesses at times seemed threatened by the presence of the representatives of the groups that had committed the attacks. AMIS investigation teams also expressed unease at their dependence on local Sudanese interpreters, and realized that the interpreters themselves were rarely impartial.

Finally, the armed factions no longer respect the ceasefire agreement, and AMIS has no power to enforce it. In a recent press statement, AMIS Head of Mission Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe stated, “I am of the view that the mechanism in place, while it could have worked if the parties to the conflict in Darfur were acting in good faith and if they were genuinely committed to their undertakings in the various agreements they have signed. However, in the light of our experience in the past fourteen months we must conclude that there is neither good faith nor commitment on the part of any of the parties. I also believe that there is a clear need to review the rules of procedure and of especially the JC (Joint Ccommission).”⁶

Refugees International therefore recommends:

The U.S., other members of NATO, the Security Council, and AU put pressure on the Government of Sudan to permit AMIS to have a stronger mandate. A strengthened mandate would authorize AMIS Forces to take any and all means necessary for the protection of themselves, of unarmed civilians, and of humanitarian personnel, in line with a Chapter VII-type mandate. Language in the mandate would also ensure AMIS unrestricted ability to transport into Darfur any and all equipment necessary, including weapons and military hardware, to fulfill this mission without restraint by the Government.
The U.S. Congress pass the bipartisan Darfur Peace and Accountability Act which, among other things, directs the Administration to expand and strengthen the AMIS mandate, to further support AMIS financially, and to impose further sanctions and visa restrictions on the Government of Sudan.
The AMIS donor group (including, amongst others, the U.S., EU, UK, Canada, Norway) commit considerably more resources to AMIS (as outlined more specifically below) so that AMIS would be able to fulfill a more robust and strengthened mandate.
The AU reconfigure the ceasefire investigation mechanism. Considering the bad faith of warring-faction representatives, the AU should explore the possibility of limiting the involvement of outside representatives in investigations, and examine extra enforcement mechanisms. One potential model is the Civilian Monitoring Team system that was used in South Sudan.