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No Power To Protect: Executive Summary

No Power to Protect

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over one year ago, the U.S. government declared that the killing in Darfur was genocide. Proclaiming the slogan “African solutions to African problems,” the United States, NATO member states, and members of the United Nations Security Council turned the responsibility for resolving the crisis over to the African Union (AU). The AU deployed the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the ceasefire agreed earlier in 2004, as well as to “assist in the process of confidence building” and to “contribute to a secure environment.” The AU deployment, however, while bringing a modicum of additional security in certain locations, has not created a stable environment for the people of Darfur. Based on information obtained while traveling with AMIS in Darfur and through extensive interviews, this report argues that AMIS’ ability to protect civilians is in jeopardy. In the short term the U.S. must do all it can to support AMIS, and in the long term, the UN must take over the situation in Darfur.

With the recent upsurge in violence over the past two months, AMIS’ shortcomings have come into full focus. AMIS does not have the ability or the resources to carry out its job of monitoring a ceasefire that is widely and regularly violated by all sides in an escalating two and a half year conflict. AMIS is hobbled by a weak mandate, too few weapons, and fewer than 5,000 armed troops to cover an area the size of Texas. Donor governments have failed to provide AMIS adequate support, while the Government of Sudan places innumerable obstacles in its path. Its Civilian Police (CivPol) are still not fully deployed to camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the civilian population is unsure about AMIS’ role.

The recent deterioration in the security situation has been marked by attacks on humanitarian convoys, including one in West Darfur where aid workers were stripped and beaten; Janjaweed attacks on villages in North Darfur displacing close to 7,000 people, killing ten, and wounding three members of an AMIS patrol; an attack on Aru Sharow IDP camp, which killed 29; the kidnapping of nearly 40 AMIS forces in West Darfur by a rebel splinter group; and the murder of four AMIS Nnigerian forces in South Darfur as they tried to intervene in an attack reportedly by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) on a civilian contractor.

These attacks represent a deliberate show of strength in the context of the peace negotiations in Abuja and the testing of AMIS by the armed factions to see if AMIS is a force to be ignored or respected. As AMIS continues to be found ineffective due to resource, training and mandate constraints, their deterrence factor will decline. They will be increasingly targeted, as will civilians under their protection. For better or for worse, Darfur civilians have only AMIS to protect them right now; this is a choice that has been made by the entire international community. Civilians will continue to be vulnerable for the foreseeable future as peace talks are not progressing as smoothly as hoped. There is in fact increasing concern about the viability of the peace talks and the independence of the AU given the fact that the AU presidency will be passed to the Government of Sudan as of January 2006. The Justice and Equality Movement and SLA have threatened to pull out of the Abuja negotiations if this takes place.

If the U.S. is serious about preventing more civilian casualties in Darfur, it and its NATO allies, in partnership with the AU, need to move quickly to strengthen AMIS’ mandate, provide more troops, greatly increase logistical and organizational assistance to AMIS, and bring pressure to bear on the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed and allow AMIS to perform its job unhindered. When the U.S. says, “There are obviously things the Government of Sudan wants that they’re not going to get if they continue to do this,” it needs to follow up these words with action.¹

For over a year, RI and other human rights and humanitarian agencies have been calling for increased support, greater presence and a wider mandate for AMIS. Unlike prior interventions in the Balkans, the U.S. has shown little interest in sending its own or NATO troops in response to a human rights emergency that it has declared to constitute genocide. Therefore, if AMIS is its solution of choice, the U.S. has an enormous responsibility to make sure that AMIS is a success. At a minimum, the Administration must lobby strongly for Congress to appropriate the US$50 million pledged by the U.S. last May to support AMIS; as of this writing Congress removed these funds from the FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. As for the AU, if the AU is eager to assert itself as the organization to handle African crises, it must be willing to insist upon greater authority to protect citizens, despite resistance from the Government of Sudan.

Earlier in the year, AMIS had been able to provide some security and deterrence. Displaced persons were congregating near AMIS bases, the UN World Food Program started parking its vehicles at AMIS sites, AMIS escorted humanitarian convoys, and helped victims of attacks get to hospitals. The round the clock presence of civilian police in some IDP camps has provided a greater sense of security to a population that is distrustful of the Sudanese police. AMIS forces have helped to restore order and provide security during the very difficult IDP re-registration process. But rising violence shows what can happen when there aren’t enough troops on the ground, and when these troops are hamstrung by a weak mandate and logistical and organizational constraints.

With increased assistance, AMIS will be able to provide short-term security but it still does not have enough experience or the structure to handle the tasks of a long-term multidimensional integrated mission (such as disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating all fighting forces, securing areas of return, and coordinating humanitarian agencies and actions) in Darfur. The AU has played a critical role in ensuring security over the past year, and should be commended for stepping into a breach where Western powers have had little appetite to go. The AU has increased its expertise as a regional player capable of responding to crises, which bodes well for its future. Refugees International believes, however, that in the future the crisis in Darfur will need to be handled by a UN peace enforcement mission, which can build on AU forces and logistical capability already on the ground.

As a senior official at the AU told RI, “In the long-run, the United Nations will have to take over after a peace agreement, with 20-25,000 [soldiers]. But the AU is not talking about it yet.” “Blue-hatting” a mission (a phrase derived from the blue helmets worn by UN peacekeepers) has worked in the past in such places as Burundi and Liberia, where the AU or Economic Community Of West African States, after providing initial stability, handed over a mission to the UN. Given the delicate politics surrounding a potential UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) takeover of AMIS, Security Council member countries are currently in discussion about the best way to proceed with such a transition. Nevertheless, considering that UN missions in general, and UNMIS in particular, are slow to start up and under-resourced, it is still critical that AMIS is supported and strengthened in order to provide security immediately and build a solid base for the future.

Refugees International therefore recommends:

The AMIS mandate be strengthened. With its current mandate, AMIS is unable to protect civilians pro-actively.
AMIS expand its deployment to fulfill its mandate effectively. With a strengthened mandate, AMIS will need even more troops. AMIS also needs to receive more training to be able to respond effectively to the challenges of their mission.
Donor countries support AMIS by providing it with more weaponry, communications equipment, and vehicles, as well as advice on organizing itself more effectively. If AMIS’ mandate is strengthened, it will have even greater requirements.
The AMIS Civilian Police deploy and assert their presence in as many IDP camps and villages as possible.
AMIS improve coordination and information sharing with humanitarian agencies and make greater outreach efforts to displaced persons. For AMIS to be successful, it must gain the trust and respect of the population it is there to serve --- the people of Darfur.
AMIS plan better for short-term contingencies, and the AU work with the UN and the rest of the international community on the best way to transition the mission in Darfur from AMIS to the UN in the longer term.