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No Power To Protect: Darfur in Jeopardy

No Power to Protect

DARFUR IN JEOPARDY

For generations, Darfur has been the site of low-level conflict between Arab nomadic herders and mostly non-Arab sedentary farmers, which has involved livestock theft and occasional violence. Traditional inter-tribal justice systems maintained the balance between the desire for retribution and the need for coexistence. This system allowed for the settlement of such issues without full-scale war.

In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) launched attacks on what it perceived as oppressive discrimination and marginalization by the Arab regime in Khartoum against the non-Arab tribes, such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, of Darfur. In its most notable military action, the SLA seized the airport in El Fasher, destroying a number of Sudanese aircraft. In Khartoum, the Sudanese government, focused on its long-standing struggle in south Sudan, decided to combat the SLA (and other rebel groups such as the Justice and Eequality Movement, or JEM) through what one UN official has described as “counterinsurgency on the cheap” by ethnically cleansing or exterminating the tribes that made up the potential rebel support base. Potentially lucrative oil reserves in South Darfur added to the desire of Khartoum to ensure government control of the region.

The Government of Sudan armed, trained and equipped Arab militias to fight as their proxy force in the region. These nomad militias, with government support, swept across Darfur from late 2003 into 2005 in a campaign of pervasive and extreme violence at levels previously not seen in Darfur. These militias became known as the “Janjaweed,” a term previously used for anyone that was a thief or criminal. Over two years of the conflict, as many as 400,000 Darfurians have been killed and over two million have been displaced as either refugees in Chad or internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps across Darfur.

Lacking sufficient political will to intervene more directly, the international community decided to delegate responsibility for Darfur to the African Union, an “African solution to an African problem.” As South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki later explained, “We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It’s an African responsibility, and we can do it.”² The newly established African Union was given the responsibility for overseeing the peace negotiations and for deploying an intervention force on the ground.

On April 8, 2004 the Government, SLA and JEM signed a ceasefire agreement and a month later a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) was established to monitor the ceasefire. The primary role of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been to monitor, but specifically not to enforce, the ceasefire agreement. In terms of civilian protection, AMIS has limited authority in providing security for humanitarian relief and to “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability.” Ultimate responsibility for security still rests with the Government of Sudan. For its part, the West agreed to train, support and finance AMIS, and enable its deployment throughout Darfur.

The massive death and destruction that characterized the first two years of the crisis in Darfur abated somewhat during the first half of 2005. This can partly be explained by the fact that there were few villages left to destroy. In addition, the international presence in the form of AMIS and the humanitarian agencies has helped to deter attacks on civilians in the IDP camps and major urban centers. However, August through October of 2005 saw a re-escalation of the conflict, with AMIS becoming a prominent target of violence itself. Possibly in response to the current round of Abuja peace negotiations, all of the armed parties have increased their attacks on civilians, humanitarian agencies, and AMIS to show their respective strength and capacity for disruption.

Humanitarian convoys have been a prime target of attack by armed “bandits,” suspected of being affiliated with unidentified warring parties. One of the more prominent attacks took place on September 1, 2005 on the road between Kongo Harasa and Masteri to the south of Geneina, West Darfur’s capital. The “bandits” forced staff from Tearfund and International Aid Services from their seven vehicles, robbed, stripped and beat them and threatened to kill them if the aid workers ever returned to that region.
On September 18, 2005 the Janjaweed attacked Hafara and several other small villages in the mountains southwest of Tharbit. Rreportedly, at least ten civilians were killed in the attack which precipitated the abandonment of the villages in the region. Approximately 7,000 displaced persons fled to Zam Zam IDP Camp south of North Darfur's capital of El Fasher, as well as to camps in the Tawila area west of El Fasher.
On September 19, 2005 Janjaweed attacked an AMIS CFC patrol that was investigating the previous day’s attacks in the Hafara area. Two Rwandans of the protection force and the JEM representative to the monitoring team were all shot—none fatally—before the patrol could withdraw to Shangil Tobayi.
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, due to rising insecurity and despite an AMIS camp in close proximity, on September 25, 2005 three NGOs evacuated their staff from Shangil Tobayi, North Darfur, reportedly leaving the town without an international humanitarian presence.³ A week earlier Rrefugees International (RI) had witnessed the site director for one of the NGOs sending three of her staff home to Europe.
The Government of Sudan police, which had begun patrolling in response to recent attacks on convoys south of Geneina, was ambushed by Janjaweed. The police counterattacked, killing four Janjaweed and capturing two, whom they imprisoned in Geneina. A few days later, on September 21, 2005 the Janjaweed came into Geneina, shut down the marketplace, freed their imprisoned fighters and hunted the two Government police they deemed responsible for the four dead militiamen. The Janjaweed occupied Geneina for about four days until, in tense confrontation with government forces, they agreed to leave the town. Since then, non-essential UN personnel have been put on notice for evacuation.
On September 29, 2005 250-300 Janjaweed reportedly killed 29 civilians at Aru Sharow IDP camp in West Darfur, provoking around 4,000 displaced persons to flee into the desert.
The first AMIS forces were killed in a reported SLA ambush on October 8, 2005. Two Nigerian soldiers and two AMIS support civilian contractors were killed, with three more AMIS troops wounded, near Kourabishi in South Darfur. Later, bodies of two other Nigerian troops killed in the same attack were found, bringing the death toll to six.
The next day, on October 9, 2005 a JEM splinter group kidnapped an entire AMIS patrol of 18, including the American monitor-team advisor, in Nana near Tine, West Darfur. A rescue mission of 20 AMIS troops was also captured. Thirty-six were released within days, and the last two were freed following a firefight with the captors. Mohamed Saleh, the leader of the abductors, told Reuters that, “The AU have become part of the conflict. We want the AU to leave and we have warned them not to travel to our areas.”⁴

As part of its ongoing monitoring of the situation in Darfur, Refugees International traveled to the region in September 2005 to assess the effectiveness of AMIS in providing protection for civilians displaced by the continuing conflict in Darfur. This report explores some of the key issues now facing AMIS, while providing specific recommendations of ways in which AMIS can be improved.

RI started its mission in Addis Ababa, where the AU is headquartered, meeting with the AU Darfur Intervention Task Force. RI then traveled to Khartoum where the team met with AMIS, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Finally, RI went to El Fasher, capital of North Darfur and Force Headquarters for AMIS and to Geneina, capital of West Darfur. In both North and West Darfur RI took part in various AMIS activities such as investigation patrols, confidence-building patrols, and humanitarian convoys, met with UN agencies, NGOs, Sudanese police, and talked with Darfurians in IDP camps and villages. AMIS patrols took RI outside El Fasher to Zam Zam and Shangil Tobayi, and from Geneina north to Abu Sorog. Despite the fact that many roads and areas had been declared “no-go” areas by humanitarian agencies, RI had relatively good access as the team traveled with AMIS itself.

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