This isn’t a new problem. As long as there has been aid there have been accusations of manipulation, but the issue reemerged with a vengeance in the 90’s, where the manipulation and siphoning off of aid resources by armed groups with political aspirations reached epic proportions in the conflicts in Somalia and in the post- Rwandan genocide refugee camps in the DR Congo.
The political value of aid has often been adopted by international political actors as a peace building tool, a means to bolster the popular support for particular governments or the anointed “good guys” in a given conflict. Aid is often cast as a political incentive or peace-dividend. This not only violates the principles of impartiality – effectively co-opting aid to a political end and depriving innocent civilians unfortunate enough to live in areas controlled by the ‘good guys’ – but also puts aid workers at risk, making them appear to be operating in the service of a political objective, and making them targets of the parties opposed to that objective.
In Somalia this trend is re-emerging, with its Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) expressing a clear expectation that aid organizations and UN humanitarian agencies to fall in line with political objectives. [1] Specifically, the SRSG would have agencies stop delivering aid in regions that are under the control of forces opposed to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Taken to its logical conclusion, this edict would condemn civilians in non-TFG controlled areas to suffer for long-term political objectives that can never be guaranteed.
Humanitarian agencies have rightly resisted this push. For their part, however, the humanitarians in Somalia have been reluctant to recognize that their aid does in fact have political ramifications. They may have to “deal with the devil” to get aid to the people who need it, but humanitarians need to pay careful heed to the “do no harm” approach that emerged in the 90’s and take greater steps to mitigate the harm that aid can do.
Everyone – aid groups, the SRSG, and UN humanitarians - seek the same thing: the safety and security of the Somali people. But neither the short-term protection, nor the long- term political strategy can be prioritized at the expense of the other. The traditional lack of trust between humanitarian and political actors has broken down the crucial conversation between these two communities.
Ultimately, the best way for the TFG to be strengthened and legitimized is through an internal and international effort to bolster the TFG’s ability to create secure conditions for people to live their normal lives. In the meantime, all international actors – be they political or humanitarian – must find a way to work constructively together so that neither the political progress, nor the humanitarian imperative is compromised.