Testimony of Joel R. Charny, Vice President for Policy
May 20, 2008
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives
I would first like to thank Representative Eni Faleomavaega, the
Chairperson of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific, and the Global Environment, for the opportunity to submit
written testimony for the May 20 hearing on Burma in the Aftermath of
the Cyclone. The focus of my testimony will be on the best approach to
improving the plight of the two million people affected by this
catastrophe.
Cyclone Nargis was the perfect storm. It struck at the worst
possible place at the worst possible time. The Burmese people,
especially in the Irrawady Delta region, will be dealing with the
consequences of the cyclone for many years.
Cyclone Nargis struck at the worst possible place in two
senses. First, it struck the country full force at its most vulnerable
spot, the low lying delta region. There was no natural barrier to
impede the storm as it swept up from the coast through the country’s
major city, Rangoon. Second, the region is the rice bowl of Burma, and
disruptions in rice production there will have negative ramifications
for food availability throughout the country, especially in the context
of regional and global price increases and shortages.
The storm struck at the beginning of the rainy season, when
preparations for the main rice crop were underway. Not only did the
storm kill more than 100,000 people, mainly in the delta, but it swept
away draft animals, destroyed dikes, and flooded fields that need to be
planted by the end of June.
The timing of the cyclone also could not have been worse
politically. It struck Burma exactly one week before the military
government’s national referendum on the new constitution, which the
Burmese political opposition and ordinary citizens have dismissed as
the culmination of an illegitimate process calculated to entrench the
military in power. The government, suspicious of outside interference
at all times, was especially concerned about externally fomented unrest
in the days prior to the referendum. The senior generals, who in any
event would hardly have been inclined to accept a major foreign
presence overseeing the emergency response, had one more justification
for placing severe limits on the international aid effort, even in the
face of a disaster on the scale of Cyclone Nargis.
The cyclone will exacerbate existing vulnerabilities of the
Burmese people. Under-5 child mortality is 104 per thousand, the
highest rate outside Africa except for Afghanistan. HIV infection rates
are the highest in Southeast Asia and malaria, a treatable and
preventable disease, is the leading cause of mortality and morbidity. A
rice bowl for Southeast Asia at independence in 1948, Burma is the only
country in the world where Beri Beri, a vitamin deficiency, is a major
cause of infant mortality; 30% of children under five are malnourished.
Reflecting the difficulty that Burmese families face in feeding
themselves, the average family spends 75% of its income securing
adequate food supplies, compared to 57% in Cambodia and 52% in
Bangladesh.
More than two weeks after the cyclone, the relief effort remains
feeble. The Burmese government is primarily responsible for the frailty
of the response. While it has backed off from its initial position that
it could handle the emergency with its own resources, it has refused to
accept international offers of aid on a scale commensurate with the
need. It has allowed aid to dribble in --- a few flights here and
there, more visas to international personnel --- but it has not made it
possible for a tsunami-size effort to go forward. And the crime is that
the logistical assets to undertake a major effort in the delta with
helicopters and boats have been readily available in the region. But
because they flew a U.S. flag, they have not been utilized. Hundreds of
thousands of Burmese in the delta remain isolated and in distress.
The role of the Burmese government is inevitably problematic.
The country’s military leaders are out of touch with the desperate
conditions of the people, as evidenced by their shock at the
poverty-driven protests of the Buddhist monks last September. The
authoritarian system in Burma discourages local initiative, which is
critical to any emergency response. Early reports from Rangoon
indicated that soldiers and police were inactive, presumably awaiting
instructions on how to provide assistance from officials that had been
caught by surprise by the magnitude of the disaster. In recent days,
the military has been more visible, but more for show piece
distributions for propaganda purposes rather than for sustained aid
that would really make a difference to the survivors.
The Burmese government does not have the institutional
capacity to provide relief on a massive scale. The combination of
institutional weakness and suspicion of outsiders is crippling the
emergency response.
In the face of Burmese intransigence, the United States, the
United Kingdom, China, India, and the member states of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are coalescing around a British
proposal that would have ASEAN be the face of the relief effort, using
Asian disaster response experts and military assets of ASEAN countries,
backed with funds, materials, and logistical support provided by the
major powers. This is the only viable approach at the moment, relying
on Burma’s own expressed willingness to cooperate with ASEAN, but its
success is far from assured due to ASEAN’s lack of internal unity on
matters related to Burma policy and its complete lack of experience in
organizing a collective emergency response of any kind, much less on
the scale required in this instance.
The core of the relief response to date has depended on
self-help efforts of the Burmese people, through spontaneous efforts by
concerned citizens, as well as ones by local non-governmental
organizations. For the international effort, experienced relief
organizations that had a presence and extensive local staff prior to
the cyclone have been in the best position to respond. Ten UN agencies
and 48 international NGOs were already operating inside the country
with government permission. In many cases, through patient work over
many years, these organizations have devised ways of operating
independently of the government, mainly through their local staff
working closely with Burmese community-based organizations. These staff
are hired free of government interference, and they deliver assistance
directly at the village level.
Given the difficult working environment in Burma, and the regime’s
mistrust of international actors, donor governments should rely on the
capacity of organizations already inside the country as the quickest
route to providing services to disaster-affected communities. Donors
should ensure that NGO appeals are fully funded, and that priority is
given to agencies with a proven ability to work in Burma.
I am pleased to recognize that the U.S government has adopted this
approach in its initial response to the emergency. Refugees
International especially appreciates the U.S. flexibility in proceeding
with this funding despite the fact that its own personnel, in the form
of a full disaster response team, has not been able to enter the
country due to government visa restrictions.
In the medium-term, adequate response in Burma will require
the presence of new international agencies. The UN and ASEAN should
lead discussions with the government on streamlining procedures to
register new operational agencies and managing access. In the meantime,
agencies that are interested in becoming operational should explore
partnerships with agencies already present, and the possibility of
integrating their staff with these partners until they can set up their
own official presence inside Burma.
A major medium-term challenge will be the need for recovery
and development assistance. Cyclone Nargis has left several million
Burmese homeless. Many villages are flattened and delta communities are
reporting 90-95% damage. The threats to the 2008 rainy season rice crop
and the future productivity of the delta are severe. Rangoon, the
country’s largest city and economic hub, has also been directly
affected. Large investments will be required to rebuild its
infrastructure. This will require a long-term commitment from donors
for the stabilization of the disaster-affected population and for the
reconstruction of cities and villages throughout the delta, including
Rangoon.
Currently, most donor nations have strict restrictions on the
provision of development assistance to Burma, as this type of aid is
usually provided for cooperative projects with the government. These
restrictions are useful insofar as they ensure money is not misused by
the Burmese regime. The demands for reconstruction aid will be
substantial, however, and the United Nations, in cooperation with
international NGOs, will need to define how best to carry out this work
while ensuring the greatest degree of independence possible.
At the same time, members of Congress should begin to develop policy
options that allow for development-style assistance to Burma within
politically acceptable limits. It should begin to do this in
consultation with NGOs working in the country to ensure that political
limitations and operational needs complement each other, as is the case
with the current European Commission Common Position on Burma.
It will also be important to extend programs beyond the
disaster-affected areas to the country as a whole. The loss of food
supplies and farmland in the delta region, the nation’s rice bowl,
could have negative consequences for highly vulnerable people in other
parts of the country. Similarly, the further sapping of Rangoon’s
economic strength in an anemic economy could have reverberations
throughout the country that will further jeopardize livelihoods in
areas that were not directly affected by Cyclone Nargis.
The political impact of the cyclone is impossible to predict.
The differing post-tsunami experiences of Indonesia and Sri Lanka point
to the difficulty of judging the cyclone’s ramifications in Burma. In
Aceh, the severity of the tsunami broke the political impasse between
the armed resistance and the Indonesian government, freeing both
parties from long-held rigid positions as they gradually coalesced in
the interests of the welfare of the people. A dramatically increased
international presence helped create the environment for these
developments. In Sri Lanka, in contrast, the tsunami response quickly
became politicized, amid mutual accusations of unjust aid allocations
and donor bias, which contributed to the return to open warfare between
the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government.
The cyclone offers the possibility of revitalizing the
relationship of the Burmese government and the international community
as the world’s generosity manifests itself in the coming days and
weeks. The hope is that the scale of the disaster is so immense that
even the reclusive military leaders, at ASEAN’s urging, will eventually
have no choice but to accept a large-scale international aid presence.
For mid-level civilian officials, the new engagement with the outside
world will be a welcome opportunity. Even if the generals who run Burma
make it difficult for the aid agencies to respond to needs in keeping
with humanitarian principles and practice, new relationships will be
forged at the local level that will bring a measure of hope to the
long-suffering Burmese people.
The American people traditionally show strong support for
assistance to those in dire need, regardless of their nationality,
religion or form of government. After Hurricane Mitch, the tsunami in
Southeast Asia in 2004 and the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, Congress
passed supplemental spending bills that authorized multi-year
commitments of funds for the emergency response, and we feel a similar
commitment is needed for Burma.
The financial requirements for the emergency response and the
near-term reconstruction effort will amount to more than two hundred
million dollars. At this point the United States is largely doing the
right thing --- stressing the humanitarian needs and the imperative to
respond; making generous offers of assistance; supporting the
diplomatic efforts of the UN Secretary-General, ASEAN, and regional
powers with the Burmese government. In closing, I urge Congress to give
the Administration the financial resources that it needs --- $40
million --- through the supplemental appropriations legislation
currently under consideration to ensure that the United States is able
to play an appropriately strong role in the response to the Cyclone
Nargis catastrophe.
