The government of Colombia’s response to the humanitarian needs of internally displaced people continues to show serious gaps despite increases in funding and planning at the central level.

These advances have not translated into concrete results locally, and municipalities receiving high numbers of people fleeing violence and fighting are failing to prepare properly for expected displacements, provide adequate humanitarian assistance when they occur, and assist those displaced residing for years in their areas. The Colombian government needs to follow existing humanitarian response procedures with the active contribution of affected communities, and in close coordination with the United Nations and other non-governmental actors.

Read a Case Study to learn more about the gaps in responding to IDPs.

Local Structures, Strategic Planning and IDP Leadership

The Colombian government must take better advantage of structures that were created expressly to respond to the needs of displaced people. It should redouble its work with the Territorial Committees for Comprehensive Attention to Displaced People, which are responsible for preparing departments and municipalities to provide humanitarian responses to recent and long-term displaced households. Too often, mayors fail to chair these committees, as required by law, and junior officials are tasked with this responsibility, a clear indication of the low priority of the displaced.

Refugees International has heard repeated reports that when sessions are held, IDP leaders often have difficulty ensuring that their concerns are incorporated into the agenda. Similarly, decisions undertaken during committee sessions are rarely implemented as agreed. These committees jump to respond during massive displacement crises (defined as more than 50 people at once), often in response to public pressure and their high international visibility. The response is reactive, however, and rarely the result of adequate contingency planning. These same committees often fail to plan for and adequately respond to the steady flow of less visible individual, single family, and intra-urban displacements - cases which represent the majority of displacement in Colombia.

Local officials are also required to prepare area plans that respond to the needs of the displaced. Single Integrated Plans are supposed to elaborate the needs of the displaced, and the appropriate response, as well as earmarking resources for implementation. While the development of such plans would seem to be a necessary first step in areas of heated conflict and high insecurity, they rarely exist. This has been the case in the departments of Nariño and Chocó, where the last two years have been marked by a sequence of massive displacements in which thousands of Colombians have been forced to flee their villages.

The Territorial Plans for Development should detail new housing programs, the provision of basic social services, the restructuring of local economies and local investments. These also must take into account the specific needs and aspirations of the displaced population. Otherwise, hundreds of thousands of Colombians will remain excluded from and marginalized by the host community.

In many parts of the country the displaced have created Municipal Committees of the Displaced Communities to coordinate their self-help activities and advocacy actions. These committees potentially provide an effective way to engage authorities. Their contribution is essential in the formulation of Single Integrated Plans and Territorial Plans for Development as they have intimate knowledge of the needs and aspirations of their communities, but local authorities too often sideline or disregard the Municipal Committees. The committees themselves must be strengthened to increase their ability to successfully interact with government officials, and would benefit from improved organizational structure, project management training, and access to small operational grants.

At the local level, humanitarian organizations can facilitate dialogue between beneficiaries and the authorities regarding strategic planning. At the regional level, meetings of representatives of member agencies of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) have the potential to produce better coordination among humanitarian actors and closer collaboration with regional branches of Acción Social. Through the IASC, IDP leaders, IASC members and local Acción Social officials can engage mayors and the local administrations to ensure that they fulfill their mandated responsibilities.

Greater Accountability Needed

“Helping the internally displaced is good business in Colombia. It’s a shame that the displaced are often left out of the transaction.”
- Displaced person living in Medellín.
December 2007

Read a Case Study on Medellín

In the past five years, the Colombian government has increased its budget for assistance to its internally displaced population four-fold. The Colombian agency responsible for attending to the displaced, Acción Social, has recently shown greater sophistication at national level for planning emergency responses to massive displacement, and in proposing solutions for the long-term integration of displaced people into the communities where they settle. Similarly, the US government has dedicated, on average, $40 million per year for displaced people in Colombia since 2003.

While these gains are commendable, Refugees International has found that too few of these resources actually reach displaced people, a reality which creates anger and resentment over rampant corruption and the misuse of funds. In order to capitalize on the national-level gains, Colombia must now focus on providing effective monitoring, evaluation, and auditing of its programs for the displaced.

The build-up of resources in a relatively short time has spawned a network of contractors and sub-contractors to provide services to the displaced population. These implementing agencies are mainly comprised of local organizations of varying age, size, and sophistication, which implement grants from Acción Social and US-funded contractors, often at the same time. RI has seen excellent examples of local agencies effectively serving displaced communities, but the largest complaint RI receives directly from the displaced is that the services that were promised to them (and in some cases derived from Acción Social and USAID monies) were not delivered as promised, or never arrived at all. RI has documented claims of mismanagement, misuse of funds, and corruption in the management of IDP projects in all five territorial departments that RI staff visited in 2007.

The prevalence of complaints of malfeasance suggests that monitoring, evaluation, and auditing mechanisms are not adequate to identify problem partner agencies. In one particularly glaring case, the USAID contractor in Medellín was not aware that one of its sub-contractors was currently the subject of investigation by the Inspector General for alleged misuse of funds. While monitoring of financial records is standard, and evaluation of the efficacy of projects is common, RI was unable to identify any independently-led evaluation process that included stake-holder surveys. Given claims of falsification of documentation, coercion of beneficiaries, manipulation, and denial of services, beneficiaries must be independently consulted on a regular basis to ensure that they are receiving the services promised to them.

A three-tiered approach must be used provide effective oversight of Colombian implementing agencies. First, Acción Social must strengthen the capacity of its internal auditing offices to carry out effective monitoring, evaluation and auditing of all its contractors. Second, the Colombian government should strengthen the agencies of the Public Ministry, and especially the Investigator General’s office, to prosecute blatant cases of corruption and mismanagement of IDP-targeted funds. Third, international agencies which also use local contractors should improve their monitoring, evaluation, and auditing capacities in a systematic fashion to ensure the maximum return for their investments. In all cases, if internal investigations find evidence of legal malfeasance, the matter should be tuned over to the Investigator General for further action.