04/09/2004

In 1995, then RI President Lionel Rosenblatt listed ten steps the world needed to take to avoid another Rwanda.  There has been little progress on the recommendations.  Thanks in part to the efforts of RI Board Member Richard Holbrooke, there has been more focus on internally displaced persons, but the international response to their needs for material assistance and protection is still poorly organized. The U.S. government’s structure for humanitarian response has become more complex, but the effort tends to feature an ad-hoc approach to each emergency, with little planning or coordination. U.S. responses also increasingly involve the Pentagon, posing serious questions about effectiveness and appropriateness that remain unanswered.  At the international level, most emergencies today still do not have an overarching UN coordinator with sway over the individual agencies.

Thus, in the context of the Rwanda anniversary, we should observe that “never again” rings very hollow.  Next door to Rwanda, in Burundi, which features the same ethnic mix, the UN has attempted preventive efforts, but the situation remains tenuous with fundamental issues such as land rights and disarmament largely unresolved.  The Darfur region in western Sudan illustrates that the international community is still slow to respond to potential genocide and crimes against humanity.  Rwanda remains a chilling example of what happens when the world fails to act, allowing evil to run its course.

Refugees International therefore recommends an updated ten steps the U.S. and the international community must take if another genocide like Rwanda is to be avoided:

• Early Warning and Response: The signs of an impending crisis are not that difficult to see.  The genocide in Rwanda was planned well in advance, and many observers, including the UN’s own team in the country, reported this evidence to their superiors.  The Brahimi Report noted that the UN lacks capacities for intelligence gathering, and recommended the creation of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (ISAS).  While the UN Secretariat and the Security Council have welcomed this proposal, some UN member states have blocked action, fearful of getting identified as potential crisis points.  The Bush Administration should nevertheless support implementation of this proposal, and should ensure U.S. intelligence agencies assist and cooperate with this UN office once it is created.
• Conflict Prevention Tools: Conflict resolution skills, negotiation and human rights training, the ability to broadcast peace information and tools, and civil-affairs training for the military are all important parts of a preventive strategy to avoid the outbreak of conflict.  In particular, the UN must be given the ability to conduct public information campaigns during peace operations to counter negative propaganda and to ensure the populace understands the UN’s mission. Popular misunderstandings helped precipitate the tragedy in Somalia in 1993.
• Early Deployment of Troops:  The UN must be given the capacity to rapidly deploy peace operations troops to a crisis point.  The most logical solution is the creation of a UN Rapid Reaction Force.  If this is not politically feasible, then at the least member states must clearly identify and be willing to commit their national troops for rapid deployment to a UN peace operation.  The UN must also have far better logistical support capacity for peace operations, including air lift support.  Either member states must provide this capacity, or the UN must be allowed and encouraged to contract private sector firms with the requisite logistical support capacity.
• Emergency Relief: After the outbreak of a humanitarian crisis, a quick response can save lives.  Yet, the massive outflow of Rwandan refugees into Goma, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, illustrated that the UN, and even the U.S. military, was unprepared to provide basic necessities, such as clean water.
• Countering Violence: The ability of states to maintain and uphold the rule of law must be supported.  To accomplish this, the UN’s ability to conduct rule of law operations must be improved. The most logical solution is to create an UN Emergency Justice Corps, composed of civilian police, constabulary police, judges, lawyers, other judicial experts and personnel, and penal system experts.  If public security can be maintained in a failing state, an outbreak of conflict might be avoided.  Just as importantly, after a conflict has taken place, if the rule of law is not restored, development and reconstruction efforts will surely fail.
• The Internally Displaced: There is no single UN agency responsible for internally displaced persons (IDPs), yet IDPs outnumber refugees.  They have lost their homes, their jobs, and have often been the victims of atrocities, just like refugees, but they have not crossed an international border.  They deserve the same level of assistance that refugees get, and both refugees and IDPs deserve more support than they currently get from the international community.
• Relief to Development: As a humanitarian crisis winds down, refugees and IDPs, as well as former combatants, must be reintegrated into society.  This has rarely been done well, but is nonetheless critical to long-term success of the peace process.  The UN needs better and more cost-effective ways to implement and manage disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects.
• UN Emergency Czars: The UN must continue to seek out and appoint persons of world political stature who understand the complexities of peace operations to serve as the ultimate coordinator of the numerous UN and international agencies that are supposed to work together during a peace operation.  Without an effective overseer, UN agencies tend to compete with and battle one another.  Such persons are also better able to mobilize the political will necessary to stick out the tough spots, as well as hold their own against national interests that might otherwise weaken the operation.
• Reform at the UN: The recommendations contained within the Brahimi Panel’s 2000 Report on United Nations Peace Operations should be supported and implemented. For example, to ensure greater efficiency and stability, the financing of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and related UN headquarters peacekeeping support should be moved from the Peacekeeping Support Account into the UN Regular Budget.
• Reform in the U.S.: The U.S. still seems reluctant to undertake peace operations, and when it does, it does not do the job well.  In 2003, the Bush Administration chose to keep several thousand U.S. Marines that could have stopped the killing in Liberia on their ships out in the harbor. In early 2004, the Administration deployed Marines to Haiti, but at first kept them from preventing looting and related violence that destroyed infrastructure valued at over half of Haiti’s meager annual economic output. The U.S. needs a better capacity to plan for, manage, and participate in the civilian post-combat stability operations that take place after military intervention.  The U.S. also needs a better system for the provision of civilian police to peace operations than sub-contracting with a private company to hire police who have no direct accountability to the U.S. government.