02/24/2004

The United Nations is currently involved in thirteen peace operations around the world. These operations are poorly equipped and haphazardly staffed due to lack of funding and commitment from industrialized countries, including the United States. Yet in 2004 there are another six potential missions (Sudan, Cote D’Ivoire, Burundi, Haiti, Uganda, and Somalia), and one (Cyprus) that might be significantly expanded. The most pressing question is whether troops will be available for these missions.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the UN mission (MONUC) has some 10,000 troops tasked with establishing a secure environment in a country the size of Western Europe.  While a more robust mandate, allowing MONUC to take on spoilers and protect civilians, has increased its overall effectiveness, peace is still extremely fragile. The DRC is too large for such a small force to have an impact throughout the country. The UN relies on former combatants to stay peaceful, while it conducts spot checks and establishes secure zones in different parts of the country.  

In Liberia, the deployment of UN peacekeepers is well behind schedule.  As of the end of February, the UN mission (UNMIL) has approximately 12,000 troops of the 17,000 mandated for full deployment. To its credit, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had originally maintained that an October 1, 2003 start date for UNMIL was not possible, but the Security Council overruled UN staff under pressure from the United States, which was seeking to avoid any obligation to deploy its own troops to stabilize the situation. As a result, with many fewer troops than needed to provide security in Liberia, the initial attempt to demobilize the numerous armed groups in December 2003 produced chaos. The UN had contravened one of the key recommendations of the August 2000 Brahimi report on reforming UN peacekeeping operations by taking on the Liberia mission without the necessary resources in place to succeed from the outset.

The need for troops in newer operations can lead to difficulties for older ones.  In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL troop strength has been reduced from 17,500 to around 11,000 currently. In one sense, this is a testimony to its overall success in stabilizing the situation in Sierra Leone after a very rocky start. But with pockets of the country still insecure, the planned level of downsizing (5,000 troops by October 2004) may be premature.  In East Timor, continued tensions suggest that the UN should reassess its schedule for downsizing and closing that mission (UNMISET).  These examples suggest that creating peace means more than ending conflict; the transformation of societies emerging from conflict into ones that are healthy and can manage tensions in a peaceful way is a long-term process that requires matching commitment. Pulling troops prematurely from UN peace operations that seem stable could lead to renewed conflict.

The availability of troops for UN peace operations is further restricted by other peacekeeping operations.  In Afghanistan, NATO is struggling to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond the capital of Kabul.  NATO also runs the military part of the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.  While the European Union is expected to take over peacekeeping in Bosnia (and possibly Kosovo), this will not necessarily free up troops for other operations.  EU troops now serving under NATO command will simply switch to EU command.  Meanwhile, the U.S. is desperately seeking help in Iraq.  The percentage of foreign troops aiding the U.S. in Iraq is small, and is miniscule if troops from Britain are discounted. The war in Iraq is tying down much of the U.S.’s own spare military capacity.

A look at potential missions in 2004 completes the disturbing picture.  First and foremost, recent positive developments in Sudan lead many to believe that this long-running conflict may soon be over. Any peace operation in Sudan, however, will be a huge and daunting undertaking. Everything needed for the peace operation will have to be brought in from outside the country, a country that for vast stretches has no passable roads and only isolated air fields. As the experience in the DRC has shown, this will be tremendously expensive. The Sudan operation will require at least 10,000 troops, perhaps more.

France has requested that the current UN-authorized French-led mission in Cote D’Ivoire, which also features troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), become a UN peace operation.  The UN is also looking at starting up an operation in Burundi, where currently the African Union has been conducting a limited monitoring mission.  DPKO has reportedly received requests to look at possible operations in Uganda and Somalia.  The recent wave of violence in Haiti has led to calls for yet another intervention to restore order on that conflict-plagued island.  Finally, the possible peace agreement on Cyprus can easily result in the need to expand peacekeeping forces there.

The ability of the UN to acquire capable troops is clearly stretched. Given the potential need for new peacekeeping operations in 2004, the likelihood is that some missions, however necessary, will not be authorized at all, and that others will not have the resources necessary for success.

Therefore, Refugees International recommends that:

• The Bush Administration and Congress support a sensible funding apparatus for UN peace operations.  Rather than ad hoc funding on a yearly basis, which creates uncertainty and inefficiency within the UN, the U.S. should support moving the peacekeeping support account budget for the UNDPKO headquarters into the regular budget of the UN.  This will require permanently lifting the zero nominal growth mandate for the UN regular budget.
• The U.S. Congress lift the restrictions currently in place that require a waiver for in-kind support costing more than $3 million, effectively prohibiting the Pentagon from providing timely logistical support to UN peace operations.
• Congress provide legislative authorization and expanded funding for the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program.  African countries understand the need for Africans to support peace operations in Africa.  The ACOTA program has already helped enhance Africa’s ability to provide effective troops for peace operations, but could do more, in cooperation with similar EU initiatives.