12/03/2003

Although the military situation in Liberia has greatly improved since September 2003, when Charles Taylor was forced out of the country and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began arriving, there are still an estimated 38,000 armed combatants and their family members in Liberia.  These combatants, who locals say are “feeding themselves with their guns,” are still committing atrocities.  Currently, there are no incentives for them to do otherwise.  With a nationwide unemployment rate of 85% there are no opportunities for them to find work.  And, with fewer than 5,000 UNMIL forces (out of an authorized 15,000 that are supposed to arrive by March 2004), which are stationed primarily in the capital of Monrovia, there is no military pressure for them to disarm and demobilize. 

One of UNMIL’s primary mandates is to “develop . . . in cooperation with the [Joint Monitoring Committee], relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) program for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants; and to carry our voluntary disarmament . . .”  If done properly, DDRR is a critical part of bringing peace and stability to this war-torn country and to the region. 

RI is concerned, however, that UNMIL is under pressure to implement DDRR before the programs are in place to ensure effective implementation of the UN’s stated objectives.  Taking away arms is the easiest part of the process. DDRR programs in Liberia have been implemented unsuccessfully twice before, and each time, combatants took up arms again.  It is imperative that the current DDRR process is a success.

The disarmament process in Liberia officially started on December 1, 2003.  Most of the country is still not secure.  According to a UN official, “Deployment has not happened so there is no place for the disarmed to go.  UNMIL made a political decision to begin disarmament by December 7 to demonstrate to donors that something is happening before the donor conference in January.  You can’t do a DDRR program when you do not have troop deployment.”  Since the country is still not secure, there is continuing danger of “recycling” of combatants–or continuing abuses until DDRR “finds” the combatants. 

The DDRR program calls for establishment of three cantonment sites—one for each of the fighting forces—in Tubmanburg, Buchanon, and Monrovia to begin receiving combatants by December 7.  Former combatants are expected to spend up to three weeks in cantonment sites before they will be able to participate in reintegration activities such as vocational training, income generation, and education.  But with less than one third of its authorized strength, UNMIL is unable to deploy to these contested areas to induce combatants to demobilize.  And if some combatants do want to voluntarily demobilize, it is questionable if UNMIL has the capability to provide adequate security at each of these cantonment sites. 

Providing reintegration assistance, considered by many to be the most challenging aspect of the DDRR process, will present difficulties.  Programs must be in place to provide some food and money to demobilized combatants in the cantonment camps and perhaps for a period of time to help the reintegrate into society.  Job training and education programs must be established.  (In RI’s Bulletin "Time Has Come to Work Towards Lifting Sanctions in Liberia," we propose training them to monitor and protect the nation’s forests.)  Fifteen thousand combatants are estimated to be children affiliated with the fighting forces.  Many of the 16–20 year old combatants ended their formal education in the fifth or sixth grade.  They will need special education and training programs. 

The Senior Representative to the Secretary-General has added a gender advisor to his staff.  We applaud this move, but this special advisor should not be a token position. The gender advisor should be a fully funded position with full decision-making ability. Although a great deal of effort has been made to incorporate the special needs of women and children in the DDRR process, gender experts believe that the programs, while addressing some of the needs of women and children, may allow many in this vulnerable population to fall through the cracks.  “If the DDRR is not planned with the needs of women and children in mind, we will miss them,” said an NGO worker in Monrovia. Many of the women are considered to be “camp followers” but were actually fighters who should receive similar benefits to the male combatants.  Women and child former combatants have different needs and motivations than traditionally male combatants. In particular, the re-integration support given to women ex-combatants must help them overcome the stigma due to rape and sexual exploitation attached to them. Many female combatants are reluctant to return to their home communities or to their families. Their special re-integration needs must be supported and integrated into the DDRR plans.  Many children and women are still under the control of their commanders who will not allow them to disarm.  Asking women to come to centralized locations can alienate women and leave them out of the DDRR process.

International NGOs are concerned about their capacity to support reintegration programs at such short notice, especially when many agencies are also tasked with providing emergency assistance to IDPs (internally displaced persons) in Liberia.  Aid agencies are concerned that frustrated and unemployed ex-combatants will end up languishing in Monrovia or in the overcrowded IDP camps that ring Monrovia.

Funding for the DDRR process is coming from a UN Development Program (UNDP) trust fund.  Of the $50 million requested, UNMIL has been given $23 million to start the process, and UNDP is expecting additional funding from the EU and the US.  At present, there is only funding to cover the disarmament process and the cantonment sites.  As of now, there is little money for civic education, human rights training, career counseling, or psychosocial counseling.  These services are essential to sustainable peace and development of Liberia.

The fate of DDRR in Liberia can impact the entire sub-region.  Fighters from Liberia are in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea, and mercenary forces from the region are fighting in Liberia.  Experts say that DDRR will only work if steps are taken to limit the movement of Liberians to other areas in the region, such as Guinea (which has allegedly supported LURD) and Côte d’Ivoire (which has allegedly supported MODEL).  DDRR should be a regional operation, not just focusing on the combatants within the Liberian borders.  There are also questions of how the third country nationals, or foreign fighters, will be disarmed.  Deployment of UNMIL troops along Liberia’s borders and coordination between UNMIL and the UN Missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone are needed for a successful DDR program in Liberia. 

It is crucial that aid agencies begin developing programs for both ex-combatants and civilians to ensure that all vulnerable groups have access to reintegration programs and support.  Some combatants who have spontaneously disarmed are already facing hostility from the local population, and the perception of combatants receiving preferential treatment will make it difficult for communities to accept the former fighters. 

RI therefore recommends that:

• Although DDRR should be implemented as quickly as possible, it should not be implemented before the supporting programs are in place to ensure its success and sustainability.
• Donors fully fund UNMIL to enable troops to rapidly deploy throughout Liberia to provide the stability and security required to effectively implement DDRR.
• UNMIL ensure that the special needs of women and child combatants are mainstreamed into all stages of DDRR.