04/10/2002

Testimony by
Anne C. Edgerton, Advocate
Refugees International

To the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on African Affairs

Hearing on

Weak States in Africa:
U.S. Policy Options in the Democratic Republic of Congo
April 9, 2002

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I want to thank the Chairperson of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator Russell Feingold, and the members of the Subcommittee, for providing the opportunity for Refugees International (RI) to testify on the current humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and to comment on the kind of assistance the U.S. could provide to contribute to a peaceful, stable Congo. Since 1999, Refugees International has completed seven humanitarian assessment missions to eastern DRC. Our most recent mission, in January 2002, was punctuated by the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo.

At the outset of my testimony I want to stress two points. First, unless the prevailing insecurity is halted, there can be no sustainable development in the east. Security is the single most important area for the international community to address. Second, I see no reason based on my most recent trip to the DRC to modify RI’s conclusion based on our earlier mission in December 2000: nowhere in the world is the gap between humanitarian needs and the response of the international community greater than in the DRC. The efforts of the international community appear feeble and ineffective, dwarfed by the scale of the suffering they are intended to mitigate. Only if peace is achieved and humanitarian assistance substantially increased can this gap be bridged.

The 1999 Lusaka Peace Accords provided the framework for an ordered withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese soil, the disarmament of rebel groups, including the Interahamwe, and an inter-Congolese dialogue leading to the formation of a unity government for the country. While lines of demarcation were agreed upon, and a cease-fire line has nominally held for the past year, fighting nonetheless continues in the eastern portion of the country. Current flare-ups in South Kivu and Ituri provinces, under the control of rebel forces backed respectively by Rwanda and Uganda, are two examples of fighting between these rebels and the indigenous population. An armed Congolese movement is the Mayi-Mayi, a military local defense force with a current political objective of representation within the inter-Congolese dialogue.

After many interviews over the past three years, RI has found that Congolese civilians in the eastern portion of the country are increasingly at the mercy of armed groups, including rebel forces backed by regional powers, the Mayi-Mayi, and the Interahamwe, who murder civilians, rape women, capture children, and steal crops with impunity. In the shadow of insecurity, the village economy has given way to a war economy which drives boys and young men to enlist in the army, where they are not paid or fed, but at least they get a gun. Much of the violence that is still occurring in the east today is totally devoid of a political or strategic rationale; it is banditry to allow unpaid soldiers to survive. This makes the violence endemic and resistant to amelioration through political action.

The insecurity and lack of a functioning government opens the eastern Congo to foreign interests involved in exploitation and smuggling of primary products such as coltan, diamonds, and timber. The local population benefits tangentially by assisting these foreign business interests, either as owners, beneficiaries of bribes and other financial dealings, or as workers hoping to gain the means to live by selling primary products.

The insecurity severely and directly hampers the delivery of emergency assistance. Access to war-affected civilians is limited by two great factors: the enormous territory of the Congo, which lacks a functioning transport network, and the rampant insecurity, which further complicates delivery in the eastern portion of the country and often prevents access to vulnerable populations for months at a time.

The U.S. and the international community have supported the various cease-fire and peace agreements through several measures, including UN Security Council resolutions, the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission to the Congo (MONUC), and dedication in name to the process of the inter-Congolese dialogue. Currently, there are 5,500 MONUC troops approved by the UN Security Council, although only about two-thirds have been deployed. The Secretary General has requested an extension and expansion of MONUC. Even if all MONUC troops and observers were to be deployed, their effectiveness would be limited, because their mandate allows them to serve only as observers of a cease-fire and prevents them from responding to the violence that swirls through the eastern portion of the country. At the very least, MONUC should be more aggressive in disseminating information widely on the security situation and the human rights abuses that its personnel observe. MONUC could do this within its existing mandate.

If and when a real ceasefire is achieved, a requirement for maintaining the peace will be the demobilization of armed personnel. MONUC’s mandate includes the creation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan, but the concern is whether the international community will provide the timely financial support that will be required to make the plan a reality. As we have seen in Angola, for example, when the demobilization process is underfunded, it takes very little time for the conflict to resume.

Child soldiers are prevalent in the Congo. All parties to the conflict employ them. In the context of the Lusaka Peace Accords, the international community has had some success in stigmatizing the recruitment of child soldiers, but the commitment of the parties to demobilizing them has thus far been largely a public relations exercise. It is a collective responsibility of the international community to make sure that the acceptance of children in the ranks of soldiers delegitimizes a government or rebel force. Because of the special needs and vulnerabilities of child soldiers, the demobilization plan should contain provisions for the separation of child soldiers from other combatants and for their rapid exposure to education and other services. Programs also need to focus on reintegrating these children into their communities and assuring that support for child soldiers is in the context of programs that reaches all vulnerable children.

The U.S. remains one of the largest donors to the Congo. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. donated almost $100 million in development and humanitarian assistance, and remains the largest bilateral creditor to the Congo, providing 21% of the Congolese external debt. Nonetheless, in fiscal year 2001 donor response came to only 60% of the funds requested by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, and FY 2002 does not look more promising. As such, the UN humanitarian operation is made more difficult due to severe under-funding.

The UN and NGO humanitarian network is attempting to manage a complex and daunting humanitarian challenge for the entire Congo from Kinshasa. While this approach is understandable in that it supports the principle of the territorial unity and integrity of this vast country, the practical consequence is the relative neglect of the eastern region of the country where the needs are greatest.

In addition to attempting to respond to humanitarian needs, the UN is also addressing infrastructure needs by rehabilitating the internal transportation network, especially rail lines and river barges. This can help to recommence the flow of commercial goods and allow humanitarian supplies to reach isolated areas.

Individual development organizations have, since 1994, changed the focus of their programs to include humanitarian and emergency assistance. These organizations continue to be involved in humanitarian work, particularly in the eastern parts of the country, which are most affected by the war and mass displacement. Oxfam finds that, country-wide, 65% of the population has no access to safe water, and 40% of primary school-age children have no access to education. In a recent survey conducted by World Vision staff in North Kivu province in January, two of sixteen villages chosen could not be included at the last minute because of prevailing insecurity. Of the villages assessed for health and nutrition, a 30% global malnutrition rate surfaced, with 14%, or almost half of that being severe malnutrition. Such numbers have not been seen by the humanitarian community since the 1998 famine in Sudan.

The Congolese are impressive organizers. Through local NGOs and church-affiliated networks numerous Congolese are attempting to ease the suffering of their people. Some of the most effective associations have been the local “peace committees.” These are inter-ethnic associations that attempt to mobilize community response around a shared goal, such as building a school or repairing a road. These organizations draw primarily on local resources, however, so they lack capital to undertake many projects. These all-volunteer committees would benefit from an infusion of small amounts of resources to give them the means to expand their efforts.

Given the strength of Congolese civil society, development assistance must support local organizations, thereby enhancing effectiveness by being more responsive to local input and conditions. Only by putting local communities in the drivers’ seat, while avoiding local armed elements, can development be sustainable. Donors need to respond to the requests from the community structures that remain intact after years of war.

One way to measure the level of community involvement in bridging the gap to development is to talk with women. Women’s groups have consistently advocated a stop to the conflict and urged all sides to try to return to peace. Traditionally, development and assistance programs only include women in the “gender” or soft social programs. But donors and beneficiaries could benefit from involving women in the planning stages of infrastructure and public policy programs.

Refugees International makes the following recommendations to the US government:

Commit to high profile, US attention to the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accords, with special attention to stopping the atrocities.

Consider applying targeted economic sanctions, such as the freezing of bank accounts of those benefiting from the economic exploitation of Congolese resources, on governments and individuals that continue to block the implementation of the Lusaka Accords.

Identify ways, either through the UN or through U.S.-based NGOs, to channel assistance to small-scale Congolese peace-building, humanitarian, and development efforts.

In addition, RI makes the following recommendations to the U.S. as a member of the international community:

Ensure that MONUC fulfills its current mandate and support the expansion of its troop presence in the Congo.

Increase investment in the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, with particular focus on infrastructure improvements throughout the country and support for humanitarian assistance in the east.

Reassess the modes of delivery of development assistance to ensure that community-based organizations are the driving force in the design and implementation of development projects.

Appoint a senior UN humanitarian coordinator for the eastern Congo, a high-profile official who would work under the direction of Kinshasa, but would have the necessary weight and authority to advocate for a greater humanitarian response in the east and for greater access from the belligerents.

Ensure that women directly gain access to development assistance at the local level.

Support improvement in public expenditure management to ensure that the revenues generated in foreign exchange sectors benefit the Congolese people.