01/22/2008

All the displaced and other CAR citizens with whom Refugees International spoke stressed one priority: siriri, or peace. Civilians are currently unprotected by a wide array of overlapping institutions that are nominally working toward that end. The UN’s peacebuilding support office in the CAR (BONUCA) must develop a stronger and systematic human rights reporting mechanism. Donor governments, including the United States, must also support an effective security sector reform process so that the political dialogue can proceed.

International responses to the past decade of conflict have proceeded on an ad hoc basis. Some multilateral institutions have essentially become vestigial limbs, with their mandates repeatedly renewed despite negligible impact. Still, the problems they were designed to address remain. The challenge of coordinating and accommodating the various multilateral initiatives is substantial. They have overlapping mandates, report to far-away capitals and some need to account for their checkered history in the country.

• BONUCA‘s terms of reference are ambitious, but its impact has been negligible. The appointment of a new SRSG in October 2007 is welcome, and with a renewed mandate until December 2008 he needs to be given support. However, the mandate of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CDH) – a Geneva-based independent organization hired to mediate the national dialogue process – clearly overlaps with BONUCA’s.


• BONUCA’s Human Rights Section has been moving at an extremely slow pace. A support visit by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in May 2007 led to concrete recommendations that remain outstanding more than 7 months later. In yet another example of its unwillingness to confront the government, no investigation has been conducted into the Ngaoundaye incident of May 2007. It is crucial that a representative of the international community serve as an impartial and authoritative recorder of the human rights situation in the country. If BONUCA proves unwilling or incapable to do so, this function should be taken over by the OHCHR.


• FOMUC – a multinational force deployed to CAR in December 2002 to support the struggling Patassé regime – consists of 380 soldiers from Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad. Its mandate was quickly revised following President Bozizé’s successful coup four months later. The European Commission and France primarily pay for FOMUC’s annual budget of €17 million and should demand greater cooperation between the FOMUC and the CAR’s national armed forces. FOMUC troops rotate among several bases, conducting patrols along major axes. While the Gabonese and Congolese troops are seen as having little effect, the Chadian soldiers have an infamous reputation for brutality. Moreover, FOMUC’s protection mandate is limited by their inability to confront zaraguinas.


• The FACA, gendarmerie, and police all have a presence in the northwest and bear primary responsibility for civilian security. President Bozizé pulled the Presidential Guard from the northwest in mid-2007, replacing them with relatively well-trained FACA troops. These soldiers have stopped burning villages and committing other abuses against the civilian population. However, in addition to being under-equipped and due to lengthy salary arrears, these forces lack all will to protect their fellow citizens. When called upon to respond to crimes, they refuse. The lack of initiative on the part of the state forces and FOMUC means that zaraguinas can strike with impunity as close as a few kilometers from town centers.


• The South African government has sent 60 soldiers to provide security to President Bozizé and help train the GP.


• Some 300 French soldiers currently serve in CAR through Opération Boali. EUFOR, the planned European peacekeeping operation in Chad and CAR, will effectively entail the multilateral re-hatting of these French troops.


• A UN civilian police force, MINURCAT, will complement those efforts. EUFOR and MINURCAT would cover only northeast CAR: its raison d’être remains firmly rooted in mitigating Chadian-Sudanese dynamics. But by providing some oversight of the northeast, it could contribute to a base of security and stability.


• The need for SSR in CAR has been a continual refrain since independence. Lack of results so far demonstrates the futility of a piecemeal effort. The current program, which encompasses all sectors – FACA, gendarmerie, police and the justice sector – gives hope that lessons learned will be taken into account. Whereas in the past SSR was primarily a French endeavor, a number of donors both multilateral and bilateral have now signed on. The broader engagement opens an opportunity for greater accountability and, potentially, sufficient funding to make it sustainable. Donors have promised $134.3 million for SSR. The US remains conspicuously absent in these discussions, actually decreasing funding from its already small bilateral military training program.The French still spearhead the SSR efforts. A national seminar to set priorities for SSR is planned. However, it already faces delays and will not begin until at least April 2008. Such delays have serious consequences for the task at hand, and may threaten the renewed interest of multilateral donors.


• CAR has seen no less than three national political dialogues aimed at reconciliation in the past decade. Expectations for the latest round’s eventual outcome should be limited. Many see dialogue as the best of several less-than-ideal options. Nevertheless, displaced people interviewed by Refugees International stated the eagerness with which they follow news of the dialogue, as they see it as a meaningful marker of peace. The real challenge lies in arriving at an agreement that can serve as a foundation for collaboration among the various parties while also avoiding validating armed rebellion as a way into political participation.


• The dialogue planned for March or April 2008 should be supported to the extent it opens a space for stabilization that enables development and SSR to proceed. It is intended to resolve the outstanding political and military problems by including members of government, civil society, opposition, and armed groups. However, disagreements on location and composition of the talks clearly do not augur a sea change in CAR stability. The main current security threat – the zaraguinas – operates outside the dialogue’s scope. (Possibilities for repatriating the bandits are being explored in talks led by Minister Dieudonné Stanislas M’bangot.) The populations in the northwest expect perhaps too much out of this dialogue, but it should serve as a reminder that the duty of an elected government is to provide security to its citizens.