12/14/2007

The European Union must take the lead in providing unambiguous direction and guidance to the longer-term process of defense sector transformation in the DRC; forge agreement on the issue with the Government and all partners providing military assistance; and create an effective mechanism for pooling funding and resources towards the achievement of an agreed professional end-state for the FARDC. Further, all external actors supporting defense sector transformation should insist – as a precondition for further military assistance (short or long term) – upon the constructive resolution of the internal governmental dispute on plans for reform, and upon the convening at the earliest opportunity of the Round Table for the presentation and refinement of a unified plan for the transformation of the DRC defense sector.

• In June 2005, the European Union launched its Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC RD Congo) with the principal aim of "support[ing] the transition process in the DRC, including the creation of an integrated, restructured, and inclusive national army." The first priority of EUSEC is to provide technical expertise to the Government of the DRC on issues of military command and control, budgetary and financial management, training, accounting and dealing with contracts and tenders. A project known as 'EUSEC FIN,' which is aimed at setting-up a chain of payment system for the FARDC, was launched in December 2005. It aims to rectify several of the key weaknesses of the FARDC: the embezzlement of a considerable part of the soldiers' salaries at various points in the chain of command, and the issue of 'ghost soldiers' on the military payroll.


• While the Congolese government needs considerable help with defense restructuring and the build-up of a professional army, there is a chronic lack of international funding for such a process. The EUSEC team consists of 49 personnel from 13 different EU member states, but EUSEC cannot access any money at all from the European Commission's development assistance budget. Although it is widely accepted that security is a prerequisite for development, no means has yet been found to convert this common wisdom into tangible funding for the establishment of capable and sustainable defense forces.


• In order to harmonize the EU initiative with those of other donor partners, a Contact Group was created as a centralized forum for engagement with the government on issues of security sector reform. At the first Contact Group meeting in July 2007, the Congolese Minister of Defense presented a "Master Plan". It provided for a national army that rests on four pillars, or a four part strategy to establish: a deterrent army, including a rapid reaction force capable of taking over responsibility for the territorial integrity of the DRC from the UN by 2009; an "army of excellence" that will include training and education on human rights, as well as improved benefits and living conditions for troops and dependants; an "army of production", based on the Chinese concept of an army that produces food for self-sufficiency and also a surplus for the broader population; and an "army of construction" that undertakes construction work for the armed forces, but also civilian infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, bridges, schools and hospitals.


• The Defense Minister tasked the Chief of General Staff (CGS), General Dieudonne Kayembe, to convene a commission of experts to elaborate on his plan and fill in the technical details. The Minister of Defense further directed that the Commission should present its plans at a Round Table to be convened in mid-October 2007. The expert Commission was not established until mid-September 2007. This left very little time for a thorough and consultative planning process. The detailed, technical plan produced by 81 officers – Congolese together with 58 international experts (from the UN, EU, Belgium, South Africa, USA, UK and France) – proposes a three-phase approach to building up a professional and affordable army.


• The Minister of Defense apparently objects to the Commission’s plan because it is based on a 'Western' model of a professional defense force and does not incorporate the four pillars contained in his "Master Plan." Moreover, the Minister’s plan is a short-term one, drafted with a two-year horizon in mind, and based on the need to consolidate the brassage process while at the same time providing the military capability to stabilize the eastern DRC, while the Commission’s plan envisages a 20-25 year time frame for building a professional army.