by Eric Reeves
06/11/2007

To read the entire article, click here.

Below is an excerpt from the Sudan Tribune:

Almost as if to mirror Darfur itself, news reporting and other accounts of the vast crisis in western Sudan and eastern Chad have become less and less coherent. Attempts at synthesizing what we know, from the broadest range of sources, are virtually non-existent, particularly in assessing the key issues of civilian and humanitarian protection. As a consequence, global assessments continue to be presented primarily in the form of almost incomprehensibly large statistics coming from the UN and humanitarian organizations: a staggering 4.7 million conflicted-affected persons in Darfur and eastern Chad; more than 2.5 million displaced from their homes, most losing everything, with no prospect of return in sight; a million human beings beyond all reach of humanitarian assistance; and hundreds of thousands who have already perished.

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“No matter who I talked to, what everyone wanted most was ‘protection’ and ‘security.’ More than food, more than water, more than going home. And when asked who could protect them, the overwhelming majority responded, ‘The United Nations.’” (The Independent [dateline: eastern Chad] March 24, 2007)

But instead of detailed and comprehensive assessments of the scale of the security crisis, and an overview of particular threats to civilians and humanitarians, we are much more likely to encounter very partial reportage, or credulous accounts of progress in sending a UN/African Union “hybrid force” to Darfur.

NO PROGRESS ON A PROTECTION FORCE FOR DARFUR OR CHAD

Here the largest truth is that there has been virtually no progress toward actual assembly and deployment of a meaningful international protection force to Darfur. The so-called “heavy support package” (“phase two”) of the three-part “hybrid operation” mooted in Addis Ababa in November 2006 has yet to materialize in any significant way, despite nominal “agreement” by the Khartoum regime in mid-April. Moreover, the “heavy support package” makes sense only in the context of a very large follow-on force.

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A useful overview of the contemplated functions of the “heavy support package” was provided today by Refugees International:

“The heavy support package is designed to support [African Union mission in Darfur] in a range of areas, including civil affairs, humanitarian liaison, public information, mine action and support for the Darfur political process. The package thus includes 1,136 civilian personnel, as well as 301 police officers and three formed police units. 2,250 military personnel are to be deployed to provide military transport, engineering, signals and logistics, surveillance, aviation and medical services. To implement the heavy support package, the UN requires urgent Member State contributions of specialist troops and police, the agreement of the Government of the Sudan on land and water drilling in Darfur, and the restructuring of [the AU mission] from the current eight deployment sectors into three comprehensive sectors. (Refugees International, “Sudan: Seven months and counting for the Darfur hybrid force,” June 11, 2007)

Notably, there are no infantry forces, a very limited number of civilian police, but a raft of key tasks for specialists that alone will enable effective deployment of a large follow-on force. None of this has been secured or is in sight, including agreement from the Khartoum regime. Indeed, in the absence of a decisive change in the diplomatic climate, and a much greater sense of international urgency concerning deployment of protection forces to Darfur and eastern Chad, nothing on the horizon gives promise of changing what we now see.

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