Somalia may be the most difficult place to provide aid in the world. The needs are tremendous after years of conflict and drought. The central government controls a few square blocks of the capital and is under threat from an Islamist insurgency that includes both local and foreign elements. Infrastructure is badly degraded. In such a resource poor environment, aid itself has a value out of proportion to its actual cost.

These factors combine to make providing aid in Somalia, especially central and southern parts of the country, a very risky business. Aid agency staff, both local and international, deserve a tremendous amount of respect for being willing to carefully negotiate for and expand humanitarian access in such a fraught environment.

As if the situation weren’t complicated enough, the U.S. government is seeking to apply counter-terrorism financing regulations to aid agencies operating in areas of Somalia where the Islamist Al Shabaab operates. The concern is genuine --- that aid not fuel an insurgency that is trying to overthrow the internationally-recognized central government and is hostile to the United States. The U.S. is a major donor to the Somalia relief effort, contributing more than $300 million in 2008 and another $190 million this year. It supports the operation of more than 10 organizations inside the country, and thus any restrictions that would limit the programs or increase the dangers to these agencies would have a substantial impact.

U.S.-based humanitarian organizations have been in complex negotiations with the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Treasury Department since late last year. They have been trying to make the case that the situation in Somalia is extremely fluid, with shifting local alliances and agreements meaning that often no single group may be said to control a particular area or population. Aid agencies carefully negotiate access and the content of programs with local authorities, who then have the responsibility of assuring access and the implementation of the projects as planned. Aid agency personnel, usually Somalia nationals, monitor the working environment and make responsible decisions when they fear the possibility of aid being co-opted or misused.

If the U.S. government tries to apply standards suited to other difficult, but nonetheless more stable environments, this will endanger the work of the agencies, both in terms of restricting their programs and putting their staff at risk if agencies continuing to operate are known to be complying with counter-terror restrictions. Agencies are doing their utmost to be responsible in keeping with core humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality. They do have the responsibility to ensure that the aid they provide is not manipulated, and to guard their integrity they need to be extremely cautious and not take unnecessary risks. Aid that is truly life-saving should have the highest priority, especially considering the risks to staff safety involved in providing it.

For agencies willing to operate in this fashion, the U.S. should grant an explicit exemption from the counter-terror financing regulations similar to that granted to organizations working in Hezbollah territory in Lebanon. This would have the effect of recognizing the humanitarian imperative and the overall integrity of the organizations navigating the minefield that is Somalia in 2009.