The militarization of aid to Africa

What do you get when, at a 17 to 1 ratio, US spending on the Global War on Terror far outweighs the funding for diplomatic, development and long-term capacity-building programs, combined?

In a report released yesterday by RI’s peacebuilding program manager Mark Malan, we outline exactly what’s happening now, and what’s at risk of happing in the very near future. Foreign aid is being increasingly militarized, meaning more and more of US humanitarian aid is being funneled through the military to go towards the Global War on Terror. There is an increasing danger that civilian agencies, which do important work for long-term stability and development, will lose out to military initiatives focusing on short-term gains at the expense of crucial development and humanitarian aid.

Mark urges AFRICOM, or the US Africa Command, to play a productive role in support of a more stable and secure Africa: “AFRICOM will dominate US foreign policy in Africa for the foreseeable future, and we need to make sure it gets off on the right foot.” To do so, AFRICOM should focus its efforts on professionalizing African armies and security agencies, and creating the foundations for the kind of long-term stability, under the rule of law, that is so essential for growth and development in Africa.

What does all of this have to do with displaced people and refugees?

Africa is home to millions of the world’s refugees and internally displaced people – people who have faced years of violence and conflict that has forced them into terribly unstable environments. Focusing long-term development efforts into building a more stable and secure future would allow so many displaced people to return from exile and begin to rebuild their lives.

AFRICOM: What President Bush Omitted to Say in Ghana

After his meeting with President John Kufuor of Ghana on February 19th, President Bush reiterated to a press gathering that his administration’s strategy is "to support African leaders to deal with Africa’s problems." Responding to speculation about sending more U.S. troops to Africa to secure U.S. interests, he added that the role of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is to provide military assistance – like peacekeeping training – to African nations, so that they will be more capable of dealing with African conflicts.

Before leaving for Africa, on February 14th, President Bush told the BBC’s Matt Frei that he had a "firm, heartfelt commitment to the continent of Africa." However, he tempered his warm, fuzzy feelings for the continent and its people with a pointed reference to his Global War on Terrorism. After reminding Frei that in Africa "[w]e have people who are suffering from disease and hunger and hopelessness," the President added that "the only way a radical can recruit is to find somebody who's hopeless."

President Bush omitted this perspective in Accra – and to explain that AFRICOM reflects the centrality of the Global War on Terror to twenty-first century U.S. foreign policy – particularly the belief that failed states are breeding grounds for terrorist organizations and radical regimes.

While emphasis on the Global War On Terror has been a big part of ‘marketing’ AFRICOM to domestic constituencies, neither President Bush nor any official in his administration will share such perspectives with African counterparts. Africans, it seems, are presumed not to read Western media or to log onto U.S. Government websites where they will find ample evidence that the U.S. has chronically under-invested in non-military instruments for state-building. They will also see that the Department of Defense is pushing hard for a "unity of effort" that uses all U.S. government agencies and their grantees – military and civilian – as "force multipliers" in the war on terror.

The U.S. strategy for global engagement has focused increasingly on the military as its main foreign policy action arm, with significant consequences for the U.S. and the world. From 2002 to 2005, the Department of Defense’s share of U.S. official development assistance increased from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent, while the staffing, programs, and operational capacities of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State have steadily eroded over the past 25 years.

However, Africans most need development assistance that puts responsible governments and poor people first on the agenda, irrespective of their perceived strategic importance by the U.S. military. Importantly – also from a counter-terrorism perspective – Africans question the motives behind U.S. policy and U.S. aid. They can distinguish short-term public relations-oriented aid from long-term development approaches. Instead of "winning hearts and minds," AFRICOM may well end up fueling cynicism and anti-American sentiments on the continent.

AFRICOM is the latest example of the stark imbalance in a U.S. foreign policy toolkit that remains ill-equipped to tackle the enormous poverty and justice challenges on the continent. Millions of Africans will die of poverty and conflict related hunger and disease over the next decade. If President Bush really wants to help African leaders solve their own problems, he should be openly discussing how the U.S. can develop a more cohesive and long-term approach to African development that is built on a foundation of security and good governance. In return, African leaders should be asking the President how he thinks a new U.S. combatant command that looks at Africa through a counter-terrorism lens will really help to reduce poverty and injustice.

--Mark Malan, Peacebuilding Program Officer